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  i 
Abstract 
In my thesis, I aim to problematize (i.e., challenge) the established literatures on emotional 
intelligence (EI) in general and, EI and leadership ethics in particular, on the ground that they 
articulate a myopic logic of the utility of the EI construct. I criticise that published works that 
distinguish between the prosocial and the “dark side” of EI are important and vital contributions, yet 
they lack nuances and pragmatism. To deal with this issue, I propose that most utilisations of EI by 
leaders reside somewhere “in the middle” and, ultimately, target the advancement of personal 
interest. I label this use of EI – strategic emotional intelligence (SEI). More precisely, I define SEI 
as the act of capitalising on one’s EI to satisfy self-interested motives in a way that is compatible 
with ethical conduct. In developing SEI, I thus seek to adopt a realistic and functionalist perspective 
towards human nature. To defend my position, I extend Kilduff, Chiaburu and Menges’s (2010, 
Research in Organizational Behavior, 30, 129-152) pioneering work on SEI with arguments from 
organisational politics, motivation, moral philosophy, critical management, and the evolutionary 
paradigm. I conducted two studies to explore and test my view of SEI. 
In Study 1, I interviewed 14 leader-follower triads (total N=42) to capture and dissect 
qualitatively the motivations (self-focused vs. others-focused) that drive leaders to value emotions 
in interactions with followers. I examined the data using thematic content analysis and the 
negotiated agreement approach. Results post-negotiation showed a slight dominance of self-focused 
leaders, providing encouraging support for the existence of SEI. 
In Study 2 (N=152 practicing managers), I conducted a three-phase experiment 
incorporating an online in-basket simulation to assess the interactive effects of ability EI, 
competitiveness (CMP), and personal goal pursuit (PGP) on managers’ likelihood to engage in two 
types of strategic behaviours: strategic external behaviours (SEB) (i.e., impression management) 
and strategic internal behaviours (SIB) (i.e., deliberation and discretion). Contrary to my 
predictions, hierarchical linear modeling analyses revealed a significant 3-way interaction between 
overall EI, CMP and PGP in predicting SIB for low-EI managers after controlling for three key 
covariates (IQ, basic personality traits, and Machiavellianism).  
I discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of these results. I also 
consider limitations and offer a couple of interesting avenues for examining further SEI in future 
research. Given the controversy of the themes tackled, I close with a brief note that clarifies the 
intentions of my proposed conceptualisation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Introduction  
Until around the mid-90s, the importance of emotions, both in research agendas and in the 
directives of applied settings, was mostly overlooked. It was tradition to view emotions as being of 
little relevance for human effectiveness. This vision seems to have flourished though the influence 
of declinist psychologists (e.g., Young, 19431) and to have propagated across disciplines. According 
to neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (2000), for instance, emotion research was the victim of the 
“cognitive revolution” (p. 156) and neglected for decades in the field of neuroscience. He ascribes 
a fraction of that neglect to the fact that brain researchers found a way to analyse how external 
events were mentally computed (e.g., inscribed into memory) without the need to initially establish 
if they had reached experiential awareness (e.g., being conscious of feeling afraid after detecting a 
threat to wellbeing). This, he denounces, had engendered a strong interest in the study of pure 
cognition to which was associated superior scientific objectivity.  
Many organisational scholars deplore the same type of condescending treatment concerning 
the role of emotions in the workplace (Ashkanasy & Ashton-James, 2005; Briner, 1999). They 
frequently argue that the Tayloristic2 approach to productivity, which dominated the past century, 
normalised the dehumanisation of work in endorsing a vision of effort that promoted cold efficiency 
(i.e., minimum social exchange between workers and the non-expression of individualities) 
(Fineman, 1997). This had led to the consideration of emotions as futile for individual performance, 
or even counterproductive. Ironically, scientific advances made during the cognitive revolution 
revealed a constructive connection between the cognitive and emotional spheres. Studies that have 
used the procedure of Pavlovian fear conditioning,3 for example, demonstrated that repetitive 
exposure to events recorded in the brain (with or without conscious realisation of the recording) as 
having undesired affective impacts could predict, through associative learning, future adequate 
response automatisms (LeDoux, 2000, 2013, 2014).  
Within the same era, an aggregation of other breakthroughs theorised modern conceptions of 
intelligence that incorporated social and emotional competencies in their definitions (e.g., 
                                                 
1 Young (1943) has defined emotions as “acute disturbance(s) of the individual as whole” (p. 143). 
2 Tayloristic refers to Taylorism, Frederick W. Taylor’s (1911) theory of Scientific Management, an extension 
of Adam Smith’s (1759/1966) thinking. Its goal was to maximise labour productivity through a standardisation of work 
methods and a rigid control of employees’ attention and task performance (Fischer & Fischer, 2013). Contemporary 
management theorists (e.g., Vroom, 2013) judge Taylor’s approach as a major obstacle to intrinsic motivation. 
3 Pavlovian fear conditioning is a leading procedure used by neuroscientists to study how the mammalian brain 
detects and activates behavioural responses to threats. As LeDoux (2014) details, the combination neutral tone + (mild) 
electric shock is traditionally sufficient to validate the conditioning. Variations with regard to the subtle (conscious  vs. 
nonconscious) processes involved and their terminological implications (i.e., using the term “fear conditioning” instead 
of “fear system”) can be found in the same article by LeDoux. 
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Thorndike’s 1920 concept of social intelligence; see Chapter 2 for a concise list) (Brackett et al., 
2013). The combination of these factors modified, quite drastically, perceptions of the utility of 
emotions in facilitating adaptive behaviours. In the field of positive psychology, it acted as a 
catalyst for the invention of the concept of emotional intelligence (Brackett, Rivers, Bertoli, & 
Salovey, 2016; Salovey, Mayer, Caruso, & Yoo, 2008).  
Salovey and Mayer (1990) formally introduced emotional intelligence (EI) to the scientific 
literature. They define EI as an individual’s ability to ‘‘monitor one’s own and others’ feelings, to 
discriminate among them, and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and action” (p. 189). 
According to this definitional approach, EI is a mental ability that marks the intersection between 
cognition and emotion. This precision is important as the field has evolved in prominence in recent 
years but too often in ways that distort EI’s originally intended meaning, leading to a lack of clarity 
with regard to what EI comprises and which assessment tool is most apt to capture it (Brackett et 
al., 2013). Currently, there exists a plethora of models purporting to delineate EI. For Côté (2014), 
the abundance of available versions signals the prevalence of a “jingle fallacy” (p. 462) in EI 
research. The metaphor “accuses” certain definitions of EI of intellectually abusing the term (same 
label, different meaning).  
In this thesis, I argue that Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) ability model or “four-branch” 
model, which conceives EI as a set of four hierarchically organised abilities (i.e., perceiving, using, 
understanding, and managing emotions in the self and in others), offers the most logical model of 
the construct. The basis of the Mayer-Salovey argument lies in the fact that the term intelligence (in 
emotional intelligence) infers that EI is a type of intelligence and hence should be characterised and 
assessed exclusively as such (Côté, 2010), i.e., by a performance test. The authors of the ability 
model have addressed this challenge. Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (1999) demonstrated that EI 
meets criteria for a standard intelligence. They have also developed what has become, to date, the 
most established performance measure of EI: the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence 
Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002a) (Fiori, 2009).  
As Brackett, Rivers and Salovey (2011) noted, there is an expanding body of evidence 
showing that EI has implications for success in various domains (personal, Brackett, Warner, & 
Bosco, 2005; Casey, Garrett, Brackett, & Rivers, 2007; social, Côté, Lopes, Salovey, & Miners, 
2010; Lopes, Salovey, Côté, & Beers, 2005; academic, Brackett, Rivers, Reyes, & Salovey, 2012; 
Hagelskamp, Brackett, Rivers, & Salovey, 2013, health/clinical, Duncan et al., 2013; Eack et al., 
2010; Zeidner & Matthews, 2016; organisational, Parke & Seo, 2013; Rosete & Ciarrochi, 2005; 
and political, Caruso, Salovey, Brackett, & Mayer, 2015). Out of all domains, the theory of EI has 
generated the most interest in the workplace (Caruso et al., 2015). One central explanation is the 
resurrection of emotion as an important topic in the management sciences generated by the 
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theoretical works of three groups of organisational behaviour (OB) scholars (i.e., Ashforth & 
Humphrey, 1993, 1995; Pekrun & Frese, 1992; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; see Chapter 2 for the 
theories they introduced). 
Today, the level of interest in emotions at work is so high that some assert we have been 
witnessing an “affective revolution” for the past two decades in the study of OB (Barsade, Brief, & 
Spataro, 2003, p. 5). The fact that “soft adjectives” such as transformational, authentic, spiritual, 
servant, compassionate (Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009; Dutton, Frost, Worline, Lilius, & 
Kanov, 2002) or even paternalistic (Chen, Eberly, Chiang, Farh, & Cheng, 2014) proliferate in the 
leadership literature to distinguish the attributes of effective leaders is a testimony of the 
aforementioned revolution. To investigate the causes, in a review article, Barsade and Gibson 
(2007) asked the question “Why does affect matter in organisations?” and answered it by providing 
compelling evidence that highlight how critical emotions are in shaping individual and 
organisational outcomes (e.g., job performance, decision-making, creativity, turnover, teamwork, 
and negotiation). This implies that the way emotions are utilised directly impacts and moderates, to 
some extent, how effectively these outcomes are achieved. For these reasons, organisational 
scholars increasingly share the conviction that leadership primarily needs (Goleman, Boyatzis & 
McKee, 2002, 2013) or at least partially demands emotional intelligence (Ashkanasy & Dasborough 
in Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough, 2009).  
Because leaders are considered to embody influence within organisations (Bass, 1990) and 
to be the point of reference from where emotion contagion most often circulates (Sy, Côté, & 
Saavedra, 2005), they are expected to be the person most able to generate impactful results through 
the use of EI (Menges, 2012). According to the dominant rhetoric, emotionally intelligent leaders or 
high-EI leaders set, and thus can modify, the affective tone of social interactions. They are able to 
detect followers’ emotions accurately, to evoke emotions in their followers, and to manage 
followers’ emotions in a way that galvanises their performance (Caruso & Salovey, 2004). High-EI 
leaders are also capable of regulating their own emotions to respond adaptively to situations of 
various degrees of complexity (George, 2000). Based on this portrayal, high-EI leaders appear to 
possess an opportune profile for implementing prominent, yet rather populist, leadership styles that 
view leadership as a process that is intrinsically emotional (e.g., transformational leadership, Bass, 
1998; Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002; Leban & Zulauf, 2004; authentic leadership, Luthans, 
Norman, & Hughes, 2006; and servant leadership, Spears, 1995; Van Dierendonck, 2011). 
Empirically, some data exist to endorse a positive association between EI and leadership 
emergence, transformational behaviours, and leadership effectiveness (see Walter, Cole, & 
Humphrey, 2011 for a review). 
 
  4 
However, if crediting a somewhat emotionalised identity to leadership comes across as an 
obvious reflex for most in the management sciences, it does not for everyone – at all. The idea even 
creates intellectual polemic. In particular, in the critical management literature, severe claims 
directed at the conceptual evolution of what the leadership function entails can be found. Alvessson 
and Sveningsson (2003), for instance, criticise contemporary definitions of leadership for over-
estimating a rarely activated emotional responsibility and hence for lacking theoretical integrity for 
the sake of bankable romanticisation. They presage the disappearance of leadership (and even 
suggest its non-existence) on the grounds that the execution of mundane acts is, they argue, most 
representative of what leaders really do. But they seem to forget a factual point: emotions may be 
intangible yet they are an integral part of human nature; they cannot not be. As motivation theorists 
have abundantly justified, affect, through the formation of motives4 and goals (Vroom, 1964, 2013), 
is primary in driving behaviours (Emmons, 1986). Plus, as Dasborough (2006) reasoned, emotions 
flourish and fluctuate most vividly through interpersonal relationships, which renders their presence 
and management at work inevitable. Note that this logic does not insinuate that emotion 
management (should) govern organisational agendas. Rather, it denotes a form of contextual 
dependency in the way emotions are likely to impact life at work (Cherniss, 2010; Jordan, 
Dasborough, Daus, & Ashkanasy, 2010).  
In this research, I adhere to the contingency-based view that leadership is situational (Vroom 
& Jago, 2007). Specifically, I define a leader as a manager who has a vision for the organisation, 
who regularly interacts with lower-level members, and who is able to influence their behaviours 
(Yukl, 2002) (because he/she is perceived by them as the leader;5 Lord & Maher, 1991) through 
general guidance and by evoking emotional responses in them in situations that demand it 
(Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002; Jordan et al., 2010). 
Examples of such situations are numerous. A follower may need individualised motivation 
from his/her leader to be able to move forward in the accomplishment of a stressful task. To 
optimise the efficacy of the leader’s response, a priori knowledge of the emotions that trigger serene 
self-confidence and reinforce passion within the follower may be decisive. Or, a leader may 
instinctively self-regulate (i.e., alter the nature, intensity and behavioural manifestation of his/her 
current emotional state; Gross, 1998, 2002; Gross & Thompson, 2007) before notifying followers 
about an imminent reduction in force to attenuate the negative effect on their morale.  
These two examples illustrate both the vertical authority of emotion management (i.e., from 
the leader to the followers) and the non-discriminatory role of conscious awareness (i.e., deliberate 
                                                 
4 Used interchangeably with motivations. 
5 Lord and Maher’s (1991) conditional view of leadership (i.e., one qualifies as a leader if one is perceived by 
lower-level members as being a leader) serves to justify an analytical approach adopted in Study 1 (Chapter 4), hence 
the present emphasis early in the thesis. 
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vs. automatic use of emotion knowledge) in exhibiting adaptive behaviours. Most critically, these 
examples give a glimpse of how emotion abilities can serve positive, others-focused goals. 
In contrast to this notion, groups of management scholars (e.g., Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 
2002; Kilduff, Chiaburu, & Menges, 2010) have begun to purport that possessing high EI skills can 
also serve the much less noble motives of pseudo-transformational leaders (Bass, Avolio, & 
Atwater, 1996). In brief, pseudo-transformational leaders manipulate emotions (e.g., via impression 
management techniques such as ingratiation; Jones & Pittman, 1982) to achieve self-interested 
goals, without regard for the respect of others’ wellbeing (e.g., an ambitious worker may establish 
proximity with the superior of a peer and spread false rumours about the peer in question in order to 
weaken his/her chances of obtaining a promotion) (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). 
In summary, considering solely the moral direction given to the utility of EI by EI experts, 
the field today consists of two camps of research: traditional research that focuses on emphasising 
the benefits of an “altruistically” intentioned use of EI and the emerging research focused on 
generating empirical evidence for the use of EI for antisocial causes. In what follows, I explain why 
I believe this current state of the EI literature is problematic. 
 
1.2.  Research problem  
As just mentioned, a review of the EI literature reveals that EI has been polarised in terms of 
its perceived utility for leadership effectiveness. Current visions of the utility of EI either 
exclusively highlight the prosocial behaviours displayed by high-EI leaders or suspect an 
association between EI and negative constructs, especially the dimensions that compose the Dark 
Triad of personality, namely: Machiavellianism (Austin, Farrelly, Black, & Moore, 2007; Côté, 
DeCelles, McCarthy, Van Kleef, & Hideg, 2011), psychopathy (Kahn, Ermer, Salovey, & Kiehl, 
2016; Watts et al., 2016), and narcissism (Czarna, Leifeld, Smieja, & Salovey, 2016). This 
somewhat provocative association (because it defies the prevalent view that EI is a beneficial tool 
for leadership) has led to the speculation that EI may have a dark side (Austin et al., 2007), and 
could even fabricate “evil geniuses” (Côté et al., 2011, p. 1079) – a dramatised description of the 
issue later relayed in the popular press (e.g., Grant, 2014).  
EI, like IQ, is a neutral set of abilities and, as such, in its purest conceptual form at least, is 
not meant to subscribe to any moral causes. Therefore, it seems difficult to contest that EI can be 
used in more or less objectionable ways. In addition, pointing the cursor onto the negative side of EI 
redresses a palpable imbalance in the field given that the majority of published papers have 
disproportionately concentrated on the benefits of applying the construct to everyday challenges 
(Austin et al., 2007; De Raad, 2005; Kilduff et al., 2010). I observe, however, that, in the latest EI 
literature, the utility of EI is now envisaged largely through a Manichaean (i.e., binary) approach. A 
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fairly recent study on the topic (Côté et al., 2011), through its title (“The Jekyll and Hyde of EI”) 
and its authors’ choice to oppose in it “saints” (p. 1079) (i.e., individuals high in ER knowledge, a 
constitutive branch of the 1997 Mayer–Salovey EI model) to the aforementioned “evil geniuses,” 
corroborates my observation. 
To recap, after reviewing the EI literature it becomes apparent that the manner by which the 
utility of EI (in general and for leadership) is presently being theorised and analysed is reductionist. 
EI is characterised as a useful tool to perform either good (mostly and by far) or evil acts (more 
recently). This is an important problem because this way of tackling the construct infers a limited 
appreciation of its value. On the one hand, acknowledging the plausibility of each extreme view is 
fundamental. Given they are extremes, they help to demarcate a continuum for the ethical use of EI. 
On the other hand, I argue that “over-nourishing” their significance risks to (a) exacerbate passions 
(e.g., does EI have a dark side?), (b) progressively lead the field to a vegetative state (as passions 
are ephemeral) (e.g., it just has both, a positive and a dark side), and (c) block, or at least 
significantly slow down, the birth of other forms of reasoning, more subtle, and possibly more 
pragmatic and thus more representative of reality and more useful to disseminate (Farjoun, Ansell, 
& Boin, 2015; Visser, 2016) (e.g., in fact, most individuals use their skills to further their personal 
interest, while not qualifying as clinical psychopaths). 
 
1.3.  Purpose of the thesis  
In this thesis, I therefore aim to achieve two specific objectives and one more global 
objective.  
My first specific objective is to problematize, or challenge, the dominant assumptions of the 
existing EI literature with regard to EI’s perceived utility in general, and EI in the context of 
leadership in particular. As mentioned several times already, I observe that EI scholars have to date 
confined investigations of the construct’s utility to a polarised logic, which, by definition, does not 
take nuances into consideration. In short, in the precise case of this thesis, nuances refer to types of 
utilisations of EI by leaders not fitting the purely prosocial or purely negative box. Concretely, I 
propose that at the junction of these two radically opposed perspectives resides a zone that has been 
unexplored so far and where most utilisations of EI may find refuge if examined from a more 
pragmatic angle. I argue that applications of EI in this alleged middle zone are strategic and may be 
representative of most individuals’ ultimate motives for using EI, which may vary in terms of their 
perceived opportunistic nature (e.g., being promoted, increasing one’s income, gaining public 
recognition, or feeling proud, liked and admired by other organisational members). Ultimate, in 
ultimate motives, serves to emphasise EI researchers’ lack of attention with regard to the self-
focused goals that may drive leaders’ apparent acts of compassion and different transformational 
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behaviours. In this research, ultimate motives are conceptualised as the deepest (and thus most 
authentic) motives. In a sequential chain of logic, they would be the last ones (as the most absolute 
ones) to explain a given behaviour. According to Sandberg and Alvesson (2011), the act of 
problematizing is enabled by its degree of intellectual audacity. It increases the likelihood of 
producing interesting research questions and impactful theories. To problematize efficiently, I 
extract and connect theoretical arguments from organisational politics, motivation, moral 
philosophy, critical management, and the evolutionary paradigm, and create space for the 
articulation of a novel, testable view of the utility of EI. 
My second specific objective is to use the aforementioned idea of problematization to 
extend Kilduff et al.’s (2010) conceptual work on strategic emotional intelligence. In their 
pioneering article on this topic, Kilduff and his colleagues argue that high-EI individuals can exploit 
EI, whether subconsciously or not, as a tool for pursuing personal goals. They principally associate 
the idea of getting ahead, striving for goals, and opportunism in general, with negative applications 
of EI (i.e., where EI is used at the expense of others). One key element that I advance to extend the 
Kilduff et al. thinking is the need to unequivocally disassociate the act of using EI in the service of 
self-interested goals from unethical leadership. More directly, I aim to extend these authors’ work 
via three actions. First, I propose an operational definition for the term strategic emotional 
intelligence. In this regard, I attempt to define strategic emotional intelligence (SEI) as the act of 
capitalising on one’s EI for satisfying self-interested motives in a way that is compatible with 
ethical conduct. Second, I design a study to qualitatively explore the plausibility of the logic that 
underlies my proposed definition. Third, I design a complementary study to test the mechanism of 
SEI experimentally. 
My global objective is to inspire additional theoretical developments and empirical tests of 
SEI as conceptualised in this thesis. Kilduff et al. (2010) pioneered the expression SEI but, to my 
knowledge, the present research constitutes the first attempt to formally define, explore and test 
SEI. As a result, the findings reported and discussed in Chapters 4 to 6 represent a modest 
beginning towards the scientific establishment of the construct. Besides, SEI philosophically 
implies a new vision for utilising EI and as a consequence it transcends the frontiers of many fields. 
This, I hope, will create exciting research opportunities concerning SEI’s scope and practical value 
within and beyond the domain of the workplace and leadership. In particular, I would like to 
encourage future works to focus on assessing the value of integrating SEI into modern leadership 
training programs as well as into educational reforms and intelligence agency protocols. I also 
would like to encourage the creation of performance instruments, with robust psychometrics, 
capable of measuring SEI. An SEI screening tool for personnel selection (and adapted versions for 
clinical assessments and strategic profiling) being one ultimate achievement I wish to see. 
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1.4.  Research questions and rationales  
So far I have summarised a key fragment of the current state of EI research. I observed that 
encouraging progress has been made to date in providing an understanding of how useful EI may be 
for leadership. I also observed that the perceived utility of EI (in general and for leadership) is 
divided into two principal positions. To reiterate, this refers to the issue that EI is at present 
described either as a tool that serves prosocial or negative comportments/causes. I then theoretically 
deduced that a causal rationale for the division is the lack of consideration of leaders’ individual 
motivations for attempting to demonstrate emotionally intelligent behaviours (or EI behaviours). 
Based on this deduction, I formulate the following research questions (RQs): 
 
RQ1: What ultimately motivates a leader to value emotions in interactions with followers? 
My intention in framing RQ1 is to initiate qualitative investigations in the area of high-EI 
leaders’ motivations. Specifically, via RQ1 I aim to explore and discriminate the types of motives 
that guide leaders’ emotion management efforts in two steps. First, I distinguish between leaders’ 
self- and others-focused motives to determine the potential prevalence of one category (RQ1-a: 
What is the proportion, in frequency terms, of others-focused motivations in comparison to self-
focused motivations?). Second, I dissect further these two categories by proposing an elaborated list 
of submotives (e.g., for the self-focused motivations: external approval, self-preservation; and for 
the others-focused motivations: developing others, advancing organisational goals). By performing 
a thorough dissection of the motives, I will be able to consider more precisely their ethicality and to 
discover whether a moral hierarchy of these latter can be offered (RQ1-b: How does the nature of 
leaders’ motivations for valuing emotions in interactions with followers vary on a continuum of 
different levels of egoistic motivations?).  
To completely answer RQ1, I also consider followers’ perception of the intentions of their 
leader for displaying EI behaviours. Given the sensitivity of the themes addressed (i.e., self-interest, 
personal goals), I judged it critical to capture the perceptions of both parties to ensure the reliability 
and validity of the findings (RQ1-c: Is the perception of leaders with regard to the nature of their 
own motivations congruent with the one that followers have of them on the same topic?). In 
addition, collecting these data from the followers will permit me to examine whether a connection 
can be established between leaders’ dominant type of motives and followers’ satisfaction with 
leadership (RQ1-d: Does follower satisfaction of the leader's leadership style vary as a function of 
the answer to RQ1-c?). Leadership satisfaction has indeed been associated with followers’ 
attributions about the intentions that actuate their leader’s behaviours (Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 
2002). And SEI infers a strategic use of EI that is compatible with ethical conduct. Consequently, it 
is fundamental to obtain these data to fully explore the nature of SEI.  
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RQ2:  What type of strategic behaviours do high-EI leaders (in relation to low-EI leaders) 
favour for goal pursuit? 
 In addressing RQ2, I seek to determine whether high-EI leaders, when they are pursuing 
self-interested motives or personal goals, display behaviours that are more subtle, or more 
insidiously constructed, than basic behaviours that are habitually considered strategic (e.g., 
ingratiation). This speculation arises because the term “strategic” is often nebulously and 
simplistically conceptualised while possessing, from an epistemological point of view, complex 
actionable potential. It could be argued, for instance, that flattering a superior to obtain careerist 
favours may render the intention easily detectable (Jones & Pittman, 1982) and should thus not be 
considered strategic (RQ2-a: To what extent does the type of strategic behaviours favoured by high-
EI leaders represent an obvious choice from a theoretical standpoint?).  
 
RQ3:  Is strategic emotional intelligence empirically a valid view of the utility of EI? 
RQ3 is the ultimate question of this thesis. It consists of establishing if my proposed 
conceptualisation of SEI represents a valid theorisation of the utility of EI. To do this, the objective 
is to extract the key conclusion of Study 1 (RQ3-a: To what extent do self-interested motives 
explain the importance that leaders give to valuing emotions in social interactions?) and to 
complement it experimentally by testing the mechanism that underlies the practice of SEI. For 
clarification, SEI refers to using EI to fulfil self-interested motives while exhibiting ethical 
behaviours (i.e., strategic– not Machiavellian or deviant – behaviours). I propose that two 
situational variables, namely (a) the presence of competitiveness, and (b) an opportunity for 
personal goal pursuit, activate and thus predict the exhibition of strategic behaviours in high-EI 
leaders. RQ3-b focuses on testing these hypothesised relationships (RQ3-b: Are high-EI leaders (in 
relation to low-EI leaders) significantly more prone to engage in strategic behaviours in 
competitive situations that present an opportunity to achieve a personal goal?). Lastly, RQ3-c (Can 
emotional intelligence serve leaders’ personal goal pursuit in a way that is compatible with ethical 
conduct?) aims to draw final conclusions regarding the degree of compatibility of self-focused 
motivations with ethical behaviours. This question differs from RQ1-b as it is posed in relation to 
the mechanism tested in the intermediary RQ3-b. Moreover, RQ3-b incorporates EI fully into the 
examination of the relationships tested (an EI measure is administered) while RQ1-b (and RQ1 in 
general) focuses on exploring the more global servant role of emotions in the realisation of self- vs. 
others-focused motivations. 
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Table 1.1 Research questions, subquestions and source of study 
Research questions Subquestions Source of study  
RQ1: What ultimately motivates a 
leader to value emotions in 
interactions with followers? 
(a) What is the proportion, in frequency 
terms, of others-focused motivations in 
comparison to self-focused motivations? 
 
(b) How does the nature of leaders’ 
motivations for valuing emotions in 
interactions with followers vary on a 
continuum of different levels of egoistic 
motivations? 
 
(c) Is the perception of leaders with regard 
to the nature of their own motivations 
congruent with the one that followers 
have of them on the same topic?  
 
(d) Does follower satisfaction of the leader's 
leadership style vary as a function of the 
answer to RQ1-c? 
 
Study 1 (a-d) 
RQ2: What type of strategic 
behaviours do high-EI leaders (in 
relation to low-EI leaders) favour 
for goal pursuit? 
(a) To what extent does the type of strategic 
behaviours favoured by high-EI leaders 
represent an obvious choice from a 
theoretical standpoint? 
 
Study 2 
RQ3: Is strategic emotional 
intelligence empirically a valid 
view of the utility of EI? 
(a) To what extent do self-interested 
motives explain the importance that 
leaders give to valuing emotions in 
social interactions? 
 
(b) Are high-EI leaders (in relation to low-
EI leaders) significantly more prone to 
engage in strategic behaviours in 
competitive situations that present an 
opportunity to achieve a personal goal? 
In other words, does EI have a utility 
that is significantly higher for leaders 
that are sensitive to the pursuit of 
personal goals and the presence of 
competitiveness? 
 
(c) Can EI serve leaders’ personal goal 
pursuit in a way that is compatible with 
ethical conduct? 
Study 1  
 
 
 
 
Study 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studies 1 and 2 
(each partially) 
 
1.5.  Research paradigm 
Depending on the nature of the research questions they seek to answer, social scientists 
usually have the choice between conducting interpretivist or positivistic work. Simply put, the 
central assumption of interpretivism is that reality is socially constructed (Husserl, 1965). That is, 
from an interpretivist standpoint, subject and world are intersubjective. Their invisible friction and 
reciprocal influence produce investigable meanings, experiences, introspections, and perceptions. 
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Not surprisingly, interpretivism predominantly appeals to qualitative researchers because it 
is a paradigm that values contextual profoundness as well as the intellectually biased ways that 
shape one’s appreciation of it (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). In contrast, positivists typically favour 
quantitative research because they are not interested in, or at least less sensitive to, the worth of 
exploring subjective truth. Instead, they attribute primary importance to establishing statistical 
predictions about preconceived relations between different variables (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). In 
this respect, the reasoning that guides positivistic research envisions human complexity in a way 
that is quite deterministic (Yilmaz, 2013).  
Of course, each paradigmatic tradition possesses relative merits and limitations. For 
example, in embracing particularism interpretivists limit the generalisability of their research 
findings. Positivists, on the other hand, may be able to extrapolate at greater levels but are 
constrained to execute their research in mechanistic ways, i.e., by complying with rigid reliability 
and validity standards. This, in turn, risks reducing opportunities for capturing deep and meaningful 
data about a phenomenon’s subtleties.  
In the present research I chose to employ none of the above paradigms. Using the research 
questions as discriminatory parameters (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004), I opted for a more 
pertinent alternative epitomised by the paradigm of post-positivism. Advocates of post-positivism 
and positivists pursue the same scientific quest. Both target objective truth, which implies a view of 
subject and world as two separate entities. Post-positivists’ philosophical logic, however, is slightly 
more flexible than that of positivists. Post-positivists understand the rapport between subject and 
world as being possibly vulnerable to the influence of blurred and nonlinear situational dynamics. 
In other words, as long as it is assessable quantifiably, a post-positivist tolerates the imperfect 
decoding of reality through abstract discoveries (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Given that the research 
questions guiding the thesis aim to advance previous work on SEI in two principal steps (Step 1: 
exploration, Step 2: experimental testing), each necessitating different research methods, I argue 
that, overall, the sensibilities of post-positivism represent an adequate compromise to achieve this 
aim. 
 
1.6.  Methodological approach 
Consistent with the post-positivist paradigm guiding this research, I adopt a mixed methods 
design, including one qualitative interview-based study (Study 1) and one experimental study 
(Study 2). A mixed methods design allows deep examination of the relationships that underlie a 
phenomenon (Bryman & Bell, 2003). In turn, this helps to enhance the validity and the rigour of the 
research conducted (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Studies 1 and 2 target complementary goals. 
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Study 1 is exploratory in nature and aims to examine the plausibility of, and to provide 
primary qualitative support for, the existence of SEI within the context of leader-follower 
interactions. In Study 1, I assess the relative dominance of two categories of motivations (self-
focused and others-focused) that I hypothesise leaders have for attributing importance to emotions 
in their interactions with followers. I also maximise knowledge about these motives by breaking 
down each category into a detailed list of submotivations. Finally, since SEI is predicated on the 
assumption that the strategic use of EI is ethical, I qualitatively verify that the reported motives 
align with ethical behaviours. To realise this, I included followers’ perceptions about their leader’s 
motives and leadership style in the analyses performed. Precisely, in depth semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 14 senior leaders and 28 followers (2 followers per senior leader) 
from a range of organisations established in different industries. The data is then analysed using 
thematic content analysis (Dasborough, 2006) and the negotiated agreement approach6 (Campbell, 
Quincy, Osserman, & Pedersen, 2013; Garrison, Cleveland-Innes, Koole, & Kappelman, 2006).  
Study 1’s findings target the questions RQ1, RQ3-a and RQ3-c. They also partially inform the 
experimental model tested in Study 2.  
Study 2 endeavours to determine if the SEI construct, as theoretically described in this 
thesis, holds experimentally. The key mechanism tested is the effect of (a) situational 
competitiveness and (b) opportunity for personal goal pursuit in predicting strategic behaviours for 
high-EI leaders (in relation to low-EI leaders). To test it, I designed a three-phase study 
incorporating an online in-basket exercise (experimental component of Study 2) adapted from 
Ashkanasy, Windsor and Treviño (2006). One hundred and fifty-two managers recruited from 
various organisations completed the full study, with a one-week interval between each phase on 
average. Phase 1 involved completion of the MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002a). In Phase 2, control 
variables were administered. These include, in order, the Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS; 
Dahling, Whitaker, & Levy, 2009) for Machiavellianism, the Big Five Inventory-44 (BFI-44; John, 
Naumann, & Soto, 2008) for personality, and the Wonderlic Personnel Test – Quicktest (WPT-Q; 
Wonderlic Inc., 2004) for cognitive ability. The in-basket exercise was then completed in Phase 3. 
Data analysis was carried out in SPSS version 24.0 using hierarchical linear regression to test for a 
3-way interaction between EI, competitiveness and personal goal pursuit in predicting strategic 
behaviours. Study 2 helps to answer RQ2, RQ3-b, and RQ3-c.  
 
                                                 
6 The negotiated agreement approach is used to evaluate intercoder reliability in qualitative research. To 
perform this approach, at least two coders separately “code a transcript, compare codings, then discuss disagreements in 
an effort to reconcile them and arrive at a final version in which as many discrepancies as possible have been resolved” 
(Campbell et al., 2013, p. 305).  
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1.7.  Contributions to theory, methodology, and practice 
I anticipate that the proposed thesis will generate important theoretical, methodological, and 
practical contributions. Below, I provide a summary of these contributions. They are elaborated in 
greater detail, based on the results of the two studies, in Chapter 6. 
At the theoretical level, the thesis will contribute to four main bodies of literature, namely: 
EI, ethical leadership (including moral philosophies applied to business ethics), goal/motivation and 
organisational politics (OP), separately and through various combinations.  
First, this thesis will contribute to advancing current understanding of the EI construct. As 
EI scholars often remind, EI is still in its infancy; it is only twenty-eight years old. Thus, similar to 
intelligence, which remains disputed (Schneider, Mayer, & Newman, 2016), much remains to be 
discovered about what EI integrates. One recurrently recommended strategy for illuminating the 
scientific composition of EI is to examine how EI relates to other variables, notably the ones tested 
in Study 2 (i.e., IQ and personality; Harms & Credé, 2010; Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003 and 
components of the Dark Triad such as Machiavellianism; Austin, Saklofske, Smith, & Tohver, 
2014; Roberts, MacCann, Guil, & Mestre, 2016).  
Second, this thesis is on the cutting-edge of EI research. It addresses the dark side of EI in a 
way that allows problematizing current views about the utility of EI in general. Precisely, it will 
expand Kilduff et al.’s (2010) earlier theoretical reflections on the probable existence of SEI by 
proposing a first formal definition for the term and by inaugurating scientific investigations on the 
topic.  
Third, and linked to the previous point, the results of the thesis will provide new insights 
into the specific utility of EI for leadership. In particular, in scrutinising the nature of leaders’ 
motivations (self-focused vs. others-focused) for valuing emotions in interactions with followers, 
the thesis addresses the repeated demands of organisational scholars to empirically demystify the 
intersection of EI and leadership ethics (e.g., Côté, 2014; Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002; 
Emmerling & Goleman, 2003; Jordan, Ashton-James, & Ashkanasy, 2006; Kilduff et al., 2010; 
Lindebaum & Cartwright, 2011; Walter et al., 2011). Besides, as noted in previous works (Blasi, 
1980; Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002; Den Hartog, 2015; Ellen, Ferris, & Buckley, 2016; 
Sendjaya, Pekerti, Härtel, Hirst, & Butarbutar, 2016), research in OB has essentially concentrated 
on studying adult human behaviour to the detriment of the more complex topic of motivations 
(more complex because it is conceptually located at the root in the sequential chain motive  
judgement  behaviour). This thesis (through Study 1 principally) will thus contribute to reducing 
this imbalance. 
Fourth, this research will contribute to enhancing current knowledge about personal goal 
pursuit (and the larger field of human motivation) by examining how it can provide pragmatic 
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purpose to, and assist in delineating boundary conditions for the ethical use of EI. In this regard, the 
conceptualisation and experimental testing of SEI contribute to illuminating certain controversies of 
the OP literature. The recently redefined nature of political behaviours as being “the new prosocial” 
leadership behaviours (Ellen et al., 2016) represents a particularly interesting proposal to explore in 
support of the SEI hypothesis. This is because OP and SEI are, to some degree, based on allied 
assumptions (Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewé, 2005). Relatedly, the results of this research will also 
help to interpret the constructiveness of the EI/OP relationship in predicting work outcomes, which 
is a nascent area of research and, as such, is for now led by provisional conclusions (see Meisler & 
Vigoda-Gadot, 2014; Shrestha & Baniya, 2016).  
Fifth, at a more conceptual level this research perhaps will help to emphasise the need to 
question (and possibly revise) how strategic behaviours are currently perceived (e.g., by asking: 
What dose of sycophantism can be tolerated for a behaviour to qualify as strategic? What is the fine 
line between overt and covert behaviours and which ones are most likely to predict constructive 
consequences in the long-term? Is impression management really instrumental for goal 
achievement?). The goal behind these questions is to combat assumptions that strategic behaviours 
are (mostly) externally displayed, primitive/direct, and easily describable. I see effective strategic 
behaviours as behaviours that occur at much more subtle levels. In adopting this perspective, I 
concur with most of the ideas proposed in the works of Gerald R. Ferris and his collaborators (Ellen 
et al., 2016; Ferris et al., 2005; Ferris et al., 2007a, 2007b), which I aim to contribute developing, at 
least intellectually. 
Sixth, given that SEI is partially developed through arguments that refer to the contentious 
notions of self-interest and egoism, which have been the subject of important disagreements among 
theoreticians for centuries (Miller, 1999), this thesis has singular potential for provoking rich 
philosophical debates. 
Methodologically, the strength of the thesis lies in its use of two complementary designs, 
qualitative (Study 1) and experimental (Study 2). This combination will provide a richer and more 
complete understanding of the proposed theorisation of SEI and will enhance the validity of the 
thesis’s findings (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Previous research has indeed shown that 
qualitative and quantitative designs can engender inconsistent results for the same research question 
(e.g., Kan & Parry, 2004).  
Another strength is that both studies are based on a sample of real managers who have 
significant work experience and who occupy functions within different organisations and fields. 
Because working samples are less prone to biases than student samples (they possess a more mature 
experience of social phenomena and, usually, less knowledge of emotion theories) they have been 
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recommended for EI research (Landy, 2006; MacCann & Roberts, 2008). Thus, the samples used in 
this research will enhance ecological validity and the potential of generalisability of the findings.  
Moreover, the research design adopted in each study responds to a specific call made by EI 
and leadership experts.  
Study 1 addresses the lack of qualitative leadership studies (Conger, 1998; Dasborough, 
2006). Study 1 also addresses a limitation noted in a past qualitative study led by ethical leadership 
authority Linda Treviño (Treviño, Brown, & Hartman, 2003): the use of leader-member subjects 
extracted (here as individual triads) from within the same organisation (see Chapter 4).  
Study 2 contributes simultaneously to three calls: (a) conducting more EI studies based on 
experimental designs (Côté et al., 2010), (b) idem for the study of ethical behaviours (Den Hartog, 
2015; Treviño, 1992). Randall and Gibson (1990), for instance, noted that only six percent of 94 
published studies on ethical beliefs and behaviour in organisations have been experimental in 
nature. In the same vein, Laczniak and Inderrieden (1987) have argued that addressing this 
disproportion should be an “exigency” (p. 297), and (c) controlling for cognitive ability and 
personality in EI research (Antonakis et al., 2009; Walter et al., 2011). 
From a more general standpoint, this research is guided by the problematization approach, 
which is gaining an increasing amount of interest in the management literature. For Ashkanasy 
(2011), this approach possesses superior capacity for elevating the level of original contributions 
produced in the field of OB. 
The thesis has also promising potential for generating important practical implications for 
organisations. It will provide novel and important insights into the reasons for and ways in which 
leaders behave and process emotional information in social interactions. Thus, the findings of this 
research should have direct implications for leadership training programs, especially since scientific 
knowledge is finally being acquired on the feasibility of teaching emotion abilities with impact 
(Herpertz, Schütz, & Nezlek, 2016). Besides, the accumulation of corporate scandals that emerged 
in the past two decades (e.g., Enron, Worldcom) suggests that today’s capitalism is propitious to the 
exacerbation of individual protectionism. In this respect, I expect that the concept of SEI will 
resonate powerfully in professional circles that wish to promote behavioural strategies that 
positively value the need to fulfil self-focused motives and advancing personal goals. Lindebaum 
and Cartwright (2011) warn that organisations that recruit high-EI individuals may do so at their 
own peril because such emotionally endowed individuals may be tempted to exploit their skills 
abusively. Training programs that integrate SEI would frankly embrace the existence of self-
interested motives as well as their importance. In doing so, they would adopt a pragmatic approach 
aimed at accompanying leaders in their individual journeys toward accomplishing personal goals 
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while also inculcating them with ethical notions, which could potentially abort the dark route pro-EI 
scholars are referring to.  
Like Lopes (2016), I believe that the most effective EI training programs are likely to be 
those that are tailored to the idiosyncratic needs of their attendees. I logically include the 
achievement of personal goals into the needs category. If EI assessments should correspond to the 
needs of the organisation (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004), EI training programs should then 
meet the needs of trainees. From there correspondence might be negotiated. Ignoring the authentic 
needs of one side might lead to dangerous matching failures (see Côté, 2005; Côté, Hideg, & van 
Kleef, 2013; Côté & Morgan, 2002; Grandey, 2003 for empirical evidence of the multi-level 
detrimental effects of unexpressed authentic emotionality and needs). This rationalisation finds 
additional support from the meaning of work literature. Research studies in this active area indeed 
suggest that experiencing the meaningfulness of one’s work (a sense of self-actualisation, of being 
on purpose, of living one’s “calling,” achieved directly or through “job crafting”) is basic for 
performance (see Wrzesniewski, 2018 for an upcoming review on the topic).  
Lastly, derived from the same positive intent (i.e., to serve individual alignment and block 
malignance), the development of an SEI measure for personnel selection (and possibly other 
applied domains) represents an exciting practical goal for future research endeavours.  
 
1.8.  Overview of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis consists of five additional chapters, Chapters 2-6. In Chapter 2, I 
critically review the literature on EI with a focus on the EI-ethical leadership nexus. The main aim 
of this review is to isolate major knowledge gaps located at the intersection between EI, leadership 
and ethics in a way that allows my view of SEI to be gradually crystallised and justified. To achieve 
this, I identify key issues pertaining to each of the three-abovementioned bodies of literature. In 
short, the issues addressed include the dichotomy that underlies discussions about the potential dark 
side of EI and normative debates vis-à-vis the nature of ethical leadership. The background 
literature provided is intentionally copious, and the tone critical, because of the goal this research 
targets (extending a novel view of the EI theory) and the singularity of the strategy chosen to 
achieve it (problematizing eminent fields of research).  
In Chapter 3, I outline the research design and methodology adopted for the overall 
research. The reader will find that explanations previously furnished about the choice of research 
paradigm (post-positivism) and design (mixed methods) are repeated. Supplementary explanations 
concern the strategies employed for data collection, sampling, and establishing reliability and 
validity in the two studies. 
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Chapter 4 concentrates exclusively on Study 1 (the interview-based qualitative study). In it I 
further specify Study 1’s design by presenting the details of the data collection and data analysis 
methods. I also articulate an in-depth interpretation of the findings. In the concluding sections, I 
discuss the contributions emanating from the results and address a series of limitations. 
Chapter 5 introduces the conceptual model tested in Study 2 (the in-basket experiment) and 
presents the results of its testing. First, I develop and theoretically justify three hypotheses derived 
from the proposed model. Second, I describe the procedure and the measures employed to collect 
the data. I then report and illustrate the results obtained from the statistical analyses performed. The 
chapter finishes with a general discussion of the findings. 
In the last Chapter 6, I recap conclusions that can be drawn from the entire research. To 
promote clarity, I formulate short responses to each RQ individually. Next, I elaborate the 
contributions this thesis makes to several bodies of literature (EI, ethical leadership, 
motivation/goal, and OP) as well as to methodology and practice. I also address limitations and 
propose a couple of interesting avenues for advancing the science of SEI. Finally, given the 
controversy of the themes tackled (self-interest, egoism, personal goal pursuit), I close with a 
concise note that reaffirms the intents of my conceptualisation.
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                                    CHAPTER 2: CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2 I critically review and link three main bodies of literature – EI, leadership and 
ethics – to progressively develop my view of SEI. Accordingly, the review centers on three parts. I 
first briefly introduce competing models and measures of EI. My goal is to highlight basic points of 
divergence and to explain my current preferred approach with regard to defining and assessing EI. 
In addition, to enhance the constructiveness of the review, I summarise common critiques about 
EI’s scientific viability. Secondly, I report key rationales that endorse the positive role of EI in the 
workplace, with a focus on the EI-leadership link. I then address theoretical arguments and discuss 
empirical data available to date on the probable dark side of EI. I also address a paradigmatic 
limitation that affects both EI and ethical leadership: the dichotomous treatment of self-interest. In 
the last part, I describe and justify the conceptual foundations of SEI. The concluding paragraphs 
delineate the intellectual intent behind the conceptualisation of SEI and reaffirm the research 
questions enumerated earlier in Chapter 1. 
 
2.2.  Emotional intelligence 
2.2.1.  Emergence and competing perspectives  
 
Historically, the emergence of emotional intelligence as a construct owes much to the 
impact of earlier intelligence theories (e.g., Thorndike’s concept of social intelligence, 1920; 
Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory, 1983/1993; and Sternberg’s Triarchic theory of intellect, 
1985) that rehabilitated the importance of non-cognitive skills (e.g., social adaptiveness, sense of 
humour, creativity, intuition, practical adaptation to context; Hogeveen, Salvi, & Grafman, 2016) in 
predicting intelligent actions (Brackett et al., 2013). These theories aimed to reconcile mentalities 
with the hypothesis that g7 alone (general intelligence; Spearman, 1904) might not suffice to predict 
success in life. It took several decades and gradual episodes of scientific discoveries for the 
reconciliation to effectually occur. The fact that data from the field of neuroscience8 were produced 
quickly to support the existence of an underlying g factor was partly responsible for the supremacy 
of the cognitive approach to study and justify human judgments and behaviour. 
                                                 
7 Most basically, g is posited to contain a set of interconnected cognitive abilities such as verbal 
comprehension, perceptual organisation, abstract and mathematical reasoning. It is important to note, however, that 
there are many interpretations of the g construct; as many as the number of approaches that have been developed to 
study it (e.g., psychometric, genetic-epistemological, cognitive, biological, behaviour-genetic, sociocultural, and 
systems approach; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002).  
8 For example, human lesion studies have reliably established the existence of a causal link between the 
functioning of fronto-parietal networks and that of higher-order cognitive abilities (see Hogeveen et al., 2016 for 
specific references). A simple damage to the former causes disturbances in the latter. 
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At a more general level, the length of the process (to convincingly establish the cognition-
emotion link) appears to be proportional to the time emotions have carried pejorative connotations. 
The Stoics (third century BC), for example, instigated the idea that the automaticity of emotions 
rendered them primitive and detrimental to rational thinking and even to morality9 (Lyons, 1999). 
Focusing on a more recent fragment of history, Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2008, p. 506) have 
cited William James’s view of emotions to illustrate how people’s disdain for affect continued in 
the 20th century. They wrote: “William James, for example, wrote that he would rather “read verbal 
descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on my New Hampshire farm” than a catalog of emotional 
meanings (James, 1892/1920, p. 375).” 
Cleary, reversing the trend was no meagre challenge. Out of all the intelligence theories that 
inspired the conceptualisation of EI, Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory (MIT) perhaps played 
the most determining role (although the co-inventors of EI seem to privilege social intelligence; 
Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2016). According to the latest revision of MIT (Gardner, 1998, 2011), 
human nature possibly comprises ten types of intelligence (i.e., linguistic, logical-mathematical, 
musical, spatial, bodily- kinesthetic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, naturalist, existential, and 
pedagogical), two of which are most distinctly relevant to the introspective and relational exercises 
that EI entails: intrapersonal intelligence10 and interpersonal intelligence.11 Yet, these two 
intelligences do not formally unite the interaction between reasoning and emotional processing – a 
proposal that required further cogitation (see Salovey, 2011 for the story behind the naissance of 
EI). 
In 1990, although the term appeared in earlier writings (Leuner, 1966; Payne, 1986), 
Salovey and Mayer (1990) formally introduced emotional intelligence to the scientific 
psychological literature. As mentioned in Chapter 1, they defined emotional intelligence (EI) as 
“the ability to monitor one’s own and others feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and 
to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (p. 189). Inherent to this definition is 
the view that EI is a distinct and quantifiable mental ability.  
Fundamentally, the core element driving the theory is that emotions are data that signal an 
opportunity for personal growth (Caruso et al., 2015; Mayer, Salovey et al., 2008). Affective states, 
irrespective of their nature (positive or negative), are considered to be sources of information that 
can be utilised to foster intelligent behaviour, which may involve sometimes battling certain 
emotional reflexes (EI is not just about using or cultivating positive emotions to act, it is also about 
                                                 
9 The Stoics believed that because emotions are felt uniquely within the self by the self, then reasoning about 
one’s emotions forces a certain form of self-centeredness that discourages true philanthropic intents. 
10 The ability to introspect about, and to understand, one’s own emotional functioning, moods, needs, and 
motivations (Davis, Christodoulou, Seider, & Gardner, 2011).  
11 The ability to identify and respond to the moods, motivations and desires of others (same reference as 
above). 
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exerting constructive control over maladaptive emotions). Experimental research indeed 
demonstrates how unregulated affect can corrupt logical reasoning (Jung, Wranke, Hamburger, & 
Knauff, 2014). It could thus be argued that, in principle, EI serves both an informative and 
transformative purpose.  
Mayer and Salovey (1997) developed a model, comprising four abilities or “branches,” to 
operationalise their theoretical approach. Nowadays, their model has become a “dogma” (Roberts et 
al., 2016, p. 334) for advancing the science of EI. The four branches symbolise, in order, the ability 
to: 
 Perceive emotions. Labelling, with accuracy, emotions that are experienced within 
oneself and others by detecting the maximum number of sensory cues (physical and 
meta-physical) momentarily available. 
 Use emotions to facilitate thought. Creatively capitalising on emotions to ease and 
fast-track decision-making or, more simply, to problem-solve. 
 Understand emotions. Cognitively appreciating various causal links involving 
emotions as well as how these links vary in accordance to the context within which 
they occur (similar, in some ways, to arborescent tree-type thinking).  
 Manage emotions. Regulating one’s own and others’ affective state to ameliorate (or 
maintain if doing so is judged advantageous) the experiential interpretation of a 
given situation (short-term view) and – ideally – to promote overall elevation (i.e., 
emotional, intellectual, physical, or spiritual; long-term view) for all parties 
involved.  
Knowledge about EI circulated mostly within academic discourses until the mid-90s. It is 
the success of a trade book (Goleman, 1995) that popularised the term internationally. Two other 
contributions have particularly encouraged the popular ascent of EI. The first contribution refers to 
neurologist Damasio’s (1994) discovery on the cognition-emotion link12 (i.e., IQ alone is not 
sufficient for effective decision-making). The second contribution refers to Herrnstein and Murray’s 
(1994) controversial hypotheses concerning IQ distribution (i.e., the existence of one supreme 
intelligence factor that could differ based on race) (Brackett et al., 2016; Cartwright & Pappas, 
2008). In contrast to Herrnstein and Murray’s elitist proposal, Goleman’s book somehow brought 
comfort in democratising possibilities for cultivating human potential.  
                                                 
12 Damasio performed surgery on a patient, Elliot, who had a brain tumour. After he extracted the tumour, 
Damasio tested how functional Elliot was at the emotional and intellectual level. The tests revealed that Elliot had lost 
his emotionality (i.e., he showed no response to typical emotional triggers) while possessing an intact, high level of IQ. 
In spite of his high IQ, Elliot was unable to make the most basic decisions (e.g., deciding where to eat, what pen to 
write with, where to park; “Feeling our way to decision,” 2009). He became clinically indecisive. The story has since 
been cited as a poignant demonstration of the cognition-emotion link (e.g., Cherniss, 2010).  
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Many scholars, however, criticised that the popularisation of EI was poorly negotiated (e.g., 
Daus & Ashkanasy, 2003). On one hand, it revealed the basic conceptual originality of EI, as a 
topic, to millions of neophytes. On the other hand, it provoked an avalanche of claims about the 
nature and predictive power of the construct, some of which have been criticised for being 
hyperbolic (Jordan et al., 2006; Lindebaum, 2009; Mayer, Salovey et al., 2008). Most notoriously, 
Goleman (1998, 2000) claimed (and later disclaimed; Goleman, 2005) that 90% of the variance 
between “star” and average leaders is attributable to the acquisition of advanced EI skills. He also 
equated EI with “character” (Goleman, 1995, p. 285), which extends far beyond the initial 
conceptualisation of Salovey and Mayer (1990).  
Today, the field is saturated with definitions, models and assessment devices, causing 
ambiguity with regard to what EI actually is (Joseph & Newman, 2015). Caruso (2003), for 
instance, wrote that what EI means “to a large extent, depends on who you ask” (p. 1). To restore a 
form of transparency, Ashkanasy and Daus (2005) proposed to categorise EI research into three 
major streams based on conceptualisation and measurement. Other contributions have led to further 
progress in clarifying divergences (e.g., Cherniss, 2010; Mikolajczak, 2010). In addition to 
providing practical parameters for classifying competing versions of the theory, the three-stream 
approach is also well established in the scientific literature (e.g., it is employed in O’Boyle, 
Humphrey, Pollack, Hawver, & Story’s 2011 highly cited meta-analysis; in the latest published 
meta-analysis that focuses on leader EI; Miao, Humphrey, & Qian, 2016, as well as in one the latest 
reviews available on the EI-leadership link; Walter et al., 2011). For these reasons, I utilise it below 
to highlight how existing models of EI differ with one dominant instrument illustrating each stream. 
Table 2.1 summarises key features of the three EI perspectives. 
Stream 1 models conceptualise EI strictly as a mental ability. Accordingly, EI scholars 
employ the term ability EI to refer to this view. Stream 1 instruments are performance tests that 
exhibit incremental validity over and above personality traits and cognitive intelligence. Data show 
that the MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002a; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002b) meets these criteria 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Côté et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 1999; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2003; O’ Boyle et al., 2011). The MSCEIT measures the four previously described 
abilities or branches that compose Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) model, each via two tasks. For 
example, to assess emotion perception, one task asks respondents to rate a list of different emotions 
for their degree of correspondence with the emotion (meant to be) expressed by a random person 
shown in a picture. Another task asks respondents to rate the emotion (meant to be) represented in 
pictures of artworks and landscapes using the same procedure (Mayer, Salovey et al., 2008). Similar 
to an IQ test, the MSCEIT has pre-determined most correct answers. An answer is deemed “most 
correct” if it coincides with the first choice of an expert panel of 21 emotion researchers (expert 
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scoring) or the choice of a large sample13 of the general population (consensus scoring) for the same 
question (Rivers, Brackett, Salovey, & Mayer, 2007). Four example MSCEIT items (one per 
ability) are provided in Appendix G. 
Stream 2 comprises models of self-report EI (i.e., when EI is measured by self-report or 
peer-report instruments) that are based on Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) conceptualisation. The Self-
Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SREIT; Schutte et al., 1998) is one example. A sample item of 
the SREIT is I know why my emotions change. Self-report measures have some advantages, mostly 
practical. They are relatively quick, easy, and inexpensive to administer (Brackett et al., 2013). Still, 
a series of important limitations are uniquely associated with this subjective approach to measuring 
EI. In particular, self-report measures significantly overlap with existing personality measures 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Webb et al., 2013). Stream 2 measures are also exposed to respondents’ 
inexact evaluations of their own abilities (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998) as well as to social 
desirability bias and faking (Day & Carroll, 2008), notably for individuals low on job-relevant traits 
(Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012).  
Stream 3 models are also operationalised via self-report measures and thus suffer the same 
drawbacks as Stream 2s. In addition, Stream 3 models are predicated on descriptions of EI that 
diverge in some fundamental respects from Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) original definition. 
Salovey and Mayer (1990) demarcate their conceptual position by defining EI strictly as a mental 
ability whereas Streams 3 models mix emotion-related qualities (e.g., self-awareness, empathy) 
with personality-type items and other dispositional attributes such as assertiveness and flexibility 
(Mayer, Salovey et al., 2008). This has led some EI researchers to argue that Stream 3 measures 
lack scientific rigour and have questionable construct validity (Joseph & Newman, 2010; Roberts, 
Schulze, & MacCann, 2008). It also led to the expression “mixed models” (Mayer, Caruso, & 
Salovey, 2000) or “mixed EI” (Joseph, Jin, Newman, & O’Boyle, 2014) now classically used in the 
literature to characterise Stream 3 models and measures (sometimes extended to Stream 2 by 
purists). A dominant Stream 3 instrument is the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire 
(TEIQue; Petrides & Furnham, 2003), where EI is deliberately conceptualised as a personality trait. 
Within the mixed EI category such radical proposition is often distinguished with the label trait EI. 
A sample item of the TEIQue is I view myself as confident and likely to “look on the bright side” of 
life. 
 
 
                                                 
13 >5000 individuals from English speaking countries (Maul, 2012). 
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Table 2.1 Key features of the three principal EI approaches 
    Abbreviated      
…definition 
  Measure 
      type 
Standard 
   label 
Dominant 
 measure 
 Representative dimensions 
 
S1 Mental ability,     
strictly 
Performance Ability EI MSCEIT 
(141 items) 
*E. perception, facilitation, 
understanding, management 
 
 
S2 Competencies Self-report  Self-report EI SREIT 
(33 items) 
*E. appraisal and 
expression, regulation, 
utilisation 
 
 
S3 Amalgam of 
competencies and 
traits  
Self-report  Mixed EI 
/trait EI 
TEIQue 
(153 items) 
Wellbeing, self-control, 
emotionality, sociability 
Note. S1= Stream 1, S2= Stream 2, S3= Stream 3. *E= Emotion; it appears only once to conserve space but 
applies to all dimensions separated by a comma. MSCEIT= Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test; 
SREIT= Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test; TEIQue = Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire. 
 
 
Several studies (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Meyer & Fletcher, 2007; O’ Boyle et al., 2011; 
Van Rooy, Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005) have found that the MSCEIT and self-report measures are 
only weakly related. Attesting thus that each type of measure targets a different construct.  
As compared to ability EI, self-report EI and mixed EI predict job performance (Joseph & 
Newman, 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2011) and job satisfaction (Miao et al., 2016) at significantly higher 
levels (mixed EI alone accounted for 49.9% relative importance in predicting subordinates' job 
satisfaction in Miao et al.’s meta-analysis). Future studies are likely to prolong the list of positive 
outcomes predicted by mixed EI measures given the wide extent of their conceptual margins for 
defining EI. Some meta-analytic results have indeed demonstrated that mixed EI strongly overlaps 
with many psychological constructs such as self-efficacy, self-rated performance, and several 
personality dimensions (Joseph et al., 2014). In contrast, results from another meta-analysis (based 
on small effect sizes) that supports the incremental validity of the TEIQue have recently been 
published (Andrei, Siegling, Aloe, Baldaro, & Petrides, 2016). Additional research is needed to 
elucidate the intriguing case of the predictive utility of mixed EI. 
Caruso et al. (2015) contend that reproaches made to self-report measures have been quite 
deserved. I comprehend but do not fully associate with this critique. I see oxymoronic labels such as 
trait EI as most problematic; they accentuate an old confusion between standard personality 
dimensions and EI (Roberts et al., 2016), while the distinction between the two constructs is well 
established (Côté et al., 2011). I note, however, that subsequent to Cherniss’s (2010) clarification 
piece, some progress has been made. For instance, alternative labels for trait EI (i.e., emotional self-
efficacy or emotional and social competencies) seem to be increasingly used, even if not 
consistently (e.g., Petrides et al., 2016). This logical repositioning maybe will serve better the 
important contributions that mixed models make to our understanding of social dynamics at work 
(Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005) and to the development of emotional and social competencies 
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interventions (e.g., Cherniss & Goleman, 2001 have elaborated practical guidelines whose 
usefulness is well established; Zeidner et al., 2004). 
With regard to the abundance of EI versions, perhaps the most useful position to adopt is to 
embrace that consensus may never be reached. After all, behind each version perhaps there truly is 
the ambition to render society more egalitarian through the access to socio-emotional learning 
(Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2009). And, from a more global standpoint, as long as arguments 
exist to justify a preferred approach, all opinions merit a voice. Besides, a researcher’s intellectual 
penchant being influenced by (personal) events he/she subjectively experienced (Rosenthal, 1976), 
no school of thought can seriously claim to detain the monopole of reason (Kuhn, 1970). I also 
concur with Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, and Weissberg’s (2006) point that the multitude of ways 
that exists today to envisage the nature of EI is normal given that EI is “a young theory” (p. 239).  
I chose to base my research on EI as epitomised in the Mayer and Salovey (1997) model 
because I estimated it to be more coherent than others currently available. Thus, hereinafter, unless 
explicitly stated otherwise (e.g., in subsection 2.4.2), when I say “EI” I refer to ability EI. Like Côté 
(2010), I think that the essence of the EI construct is, at least from a terminological standpoint, most 
rigorously captured in the definition (shortened here) reasoning with emotional information. 
Nevertheless the operationalisation of ability EI presents numerous scientific challenges.  
 
2.2.2.  Critiques, sceptics and long-standing issues: A synoptic review 
 
I identified three categories of critiques of EI. Below, I summarise arguments pertaining to 
each category as well as how they relate to unresolved issues in EI research. Because one of the 
central goals of this research is to formulate a novel appreciation of the utility of EI (the other goal 
being to test it and, in future research, to develop an instrument capable of measuring it), I judged it 
constructive to provide a balanced account of the different views of the construct.  
 
Sensationalism14  Existential legitimacy  
I already mentioned the impact of the popularisation of EI. Many scholars argue that it 
caused some difficulty to the field (Daus & Ashkanasy, 2003, 2005; Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 
2008). Two main reasons surface as most evident: 
(a) Temporal effect of implausible affirmations (challenge is: asserting what EI is not). 
Popular claims about the predictive potential of EI that emerged post-1995 obliged EI advocates 
(across all “camps,” e.g., Goleman in Cherniss et al., 2006) to repetitively explain their position. In 
particular, much has been, and continues to be, written to extinguish the allusion that EI is a 
                                                 
14 Term inspired from the observation made by Jack Mayer (in Cobb & Mayer, 2000) that sensationalistic 
claims (p. 15) have been made about the predictive power of EI. 
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superior predictor of work success than IQ (e.g., Antonakis et al., 2009; Mayer, Salovey et al., 
2008). As Antonakis (2003, 2004) noted from past research, significant meta-analytic correlations 
between work success and IQ exist, are high (.51– .62), and have been shown to increase with job 
complexity. IQ has also been shown to relate more strongly than EI to complex abilities such as the 
ability to prevent moods from biasing judgments (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000). Clearly IQ is a 
major explanatory factor of performance, even if the predictive validity of g is recognised to be “far 
from perfect” (Zeidner et al., 2004, p. 394). And, 
(b) Lack of scientific parameters (challenge is: delineating what EI is). The lucrative 
commercialisation of mixed EI has stimulated concerns about EI’s scientific legitimacy. Antonakis 
(2003), for example, has used eloquent quotation marks (i.e., “EI”) to question the existential worth 
of EI. He also inferred that a substantial portion of EI research was “voodoo science” (Antonakis et 
al., 2009, p. 257). Other EI scientists have argued that the concept of EI is “elusive” (Davies, 
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998) or even “invalid both because it is not a form of intelligence and 
because it is defined so broadly” (Locke, 2005, p. 425). Inversely, the ability model has been 
criticised for being too restrictive and for excluding characteristics that are typically attributed to EI 
(e.g., emotional expressiveness, empathy, perspective-taking, self-control; Matthews et al., 2006).  
In the beginning, after the IQ comparison, debates have evolved around the EI/personality 
relationship. Critics have contested that EI is a true intelligence because, they argue, it is more 
likely than not to be conceptually tautological, i.e., inept to offer anything not already captured by 
basic adaptive traits (Davis & Humphrey, 2012). Findings in this area, and their chronology, are 
interesting. First, they have supported the distinction between EI and personality (Van Rooy et al., 
2005). Second, they have revealed the probable existence of a joint/compensatory effect of EI with 
IQ (Côté & Miners, 2006) and emotionality (Fiori, 2015) in predicting performance. Third, and 
presently, they seem to encourage the abandon of comparisons (at least from the old conflicting 
angle) for attributing a distinct, broader form of intelligence to personality (Mayer, Panter, & 
Caruso, 2017), under which EI, as a “hot intelligence,”15 could possibly operate (Mayer et al., 2016; 
Schneider et al., 2016).  
Overall, a respectable portion of research has focused on testing the construct’s validity as a 
type of mental ability. In this respect, some EI experts have recently called for a reorientation of the 
focus on the emotion factor of EI for delineating the construct more precisely (notably by linking EI 
                                                 
15 “Hot” and “cool” intelligences can be differentiated by the type of information they each involve; it is 
qualitatively distinct (Mayer, Caruso, Panter, & Salovey, 2012). Hot intelligences involve processing information that is 
explicit in influencing a person’s emotional and social functioning (e.g., receiving a compliment from someone one 
admires first requires the ability to recognise the compliment for what it is, and ultimately is likely to enhance the 
receiver’s self-esteem). Traditional, cool intelligences, on the other hand, involve processing information that is less 
likely to generate direct personal impacts and emotional responses (e.g., spatial logic, meanings assimilation). 
Emotional intelligence, social intelligence and personal intelligence are considered hot intelligences (Mayer et al., 2012; 
Mayer et al., 2016). 
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with appraisal theories of emotion as identified in Scherer’s 2009 component process model16) 
(Fontaine, 2016; Mestre, MacCann, Guil, & Roberts, 2016; Roberts et al., 2016).  
 
Measurement issues 
Which measure is the most immune against faking? If one perfect measure of EI could be 
created, what would it look like? How much of EI is actually assessed by mixed EI measures? 
These central questions remain unanswered. In fact, since the inception of EI issues related to its 
measurement have been chronic and have prevailed. 
In the last decade, the MSCEIT has been regarded as the most psychometrically sound 
measure of EI. More recently, situational judgment tests (SJTs) (e.g., the STEM and the STEU, 
measuring emotion management and emotion understanding, respectively; MacCann & Roberts, 
2008) have opened a fructuous path for the next generations of EI measures (e.g., Krishnakumar, 
Hopkins, Szmerekovsky, & Robinson, 2016). SJTs address issues pertinent to construct effect bias 
as well as to measurement abstractedness that may contaminate the validity of the MSCEIT (e.g., 
the perception branch is loosely measured using art pictures) (MacCann & Roberts, 2008; Roberts, 
MacCann, Matthews, & Zeidner, 2010). They can also target specific workplace scenarios and thus 
be adapted to specific job characteristics required for a position.  
The literature divulges additional shortcomings for the MSCEIT. First, its factor structure 
has been shown to be not entirely supported, with the emotion facilitation branch (second branch) 
causing a poor fit (Fiori & Antonakis, 2011; Joseph & Newman, 2010; Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, 
& Stough, 2005; Rossen, Kranzler, & Algina, 2008).  
Second, the test blurs the distinction between emotional abilities that refer to the self and 
those that refer to others,17 assuming a premature equivalence in the two set of abilities and thus of 
their predictive value. Although the conceptual coherency of the MSCEIT, overall, seems to be 
supported by neuropsychological evidence (see Hogeveen et al., 2016 for a review), it is important 
to remind that other neuro-scientific data suggest that interpreting one’s emotional functioning and 
connecting with the one of others (with the distance and imagination it implies) activates partially 
different neural mechanisms and brain regions (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Vogeley et al., 
2001).  
                                                 
16 The component process model of emotion conceptualises emotion as a dynamic process that is predicated on 
a specific mechanism: a significant event occurs (e.g., a person loses her job)  an intuitive appraisal is made of this 
event (e.g., the person blames a colleague at work for her dismissal)  on the basis of the way the event is appraised (in 
this example: other-blame), an emotional response is activated (e.g., anger). The basics of this mechanism are identical 
to the ones underlying Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) Affective Events Theory (AET) discussed in subsection 2.3.1.  
17 Two tasks measure each branch of the MSCEIT. The first and fourth branches (respectively perceiving and 
managing emotions) are the branches for which the two tasks seem to be clearly divided into assessing abilities in the 
self and in others. Also, research papers usually provide one unique score per branch. 
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Third, the MSCEIT measures what knowledge people have about emotions (declarative 
knowledge) not how people concretely utilise emotions through implicit learning (procedural 
knowledge) (Fiori & Ortony, 2014). There is therefore no factual guarantee that high-EI individuals 
are able to make use of their abilities in everyday life (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). To 
address this problem, one proposed solution has been the development of implicit EI tests (Fiori, 
2009). Such tests would “catch the mind in action” (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006) and optimise the 
prediction of automatic everyday behaviour.  
I only provided here a condensed review of the limitations of the MSCEIT. Please see Maul 
(2012) for an in-depth critique of the test. Petrides (2009) has also written some thought-provoking 
questions concerning the logic of the MSCEIT scoring methods. Some earlier yet still relevant 
responses can be found in Rivers et al. (2007). 
 
Multi-potentiality curse 
I propose the term multi-potentiality curse to point out the irony experienced by the EI 
construct since its emergence. Other researchers (Antonakis in Antonakis et al., 2009; Fiory & 
Ortony, 2016) have employed a comparable expression – the word “curse” – to communicate some 
of their concerns about, for instance, the advantages of possessing a high level of EI (cf. 
hypersensitivity hypothesis discussed in Chapter 5).  
In my reasoning, the choice for using multi-potentiality curse is directly inspired from the 
giftedness literature. Intellectually gifted individuals detect subtle causal connections from, and 
have an atypical relationship with their environment (activities at the psychomotor, sensual, 
imaginational, emotional, and intellectual levels are exacerbated in comparison to the general 
population; Piechowski & Colangelo, 1984). They often experience painful frustrations and 
emotional despair for not being able to exploit these connections (because they are too numerous 
and not similarly appreciated by others) while being intensely driven to achieve and to serve society 
in prosocial ways (Lovecky, 1986). Their gift turns against them; it carries a risk of social isolation 
and personal misalignment; becoming then a curse. 
A parallel can be drawn with EI. I observe that the intuitive worth of EI (what the 
implementation of EI, in theory, implies to do) renders the construct applicable to a plethora of 
domains and issues (as outlined in Chapter 1, so far the domains range from personal, social, 
academic, clinical, health, to workplace and politics; Brackett et al., 2011; Caruso et al., 2015). The 
relevance seems infinite; or perhaps it simply is infinite (all humans have emotions). The paradox is 
that the ultra relevance of EI creates obstacles for its credibility as scientific construct. As an 
illustration of this point, Van Rooy, Whitman, and Viswesvaran (2010) wrote: “Just as EI has been 
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criticized for being a ‘‘grab bag’’ of unrelated predictor measures (e.g., Locke, 2005), the same can 
also be said about claims on the criterion side (i.e., EI is related to everything)” (p. 151).  
To “break the curse,” then, specificity appears paramount. In this respect, Van Rooy et al. 
(2010) recommend that investigations should not only focus on determining what exact criteria EI 
predicts but also on providing concrete justifications for the relationships reported. Data amassed 
over the past twenty years provide some support for the discriminant contribution of the construct to 
multiple work criteria. Next, I focus on the effects of EI in organisational settings. I start by 
introducing retrospectively the “why” of these effects.  
 
2.3. Emotional intelligence at work 
2.3.1.  From the cognitive to the affective revolution 
For a long period emotions were considered to “pollute” rational thinking (see Lefford, 1946 
and Young, 1943 for proponents of this view), leading to the neglect of emotion research in 
organisational sciences (Brief & Weiss, 2002). However, this notion has evaporated over the past 
two decades (although some sectors in the economics literature continue to cling the old view). As 
mentioned previously, the shift is so obvious, and profound, that Barsade et al. (2003) have 
proposed the term affective revolution to describe its effect in the field of OB. What triggered it, at 
the most rudimentary level, is the realisation that emotions permeate organisations and impact 
important work outcomes. Theoretically, the works of Ashforth and Humphrey (1993, 1995) and 
Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) produced in the mid-90s (see also Pekrun & Frese, 1992) are largely 
responsible for the emergence of this realisation. They pioneered a constructive vision of the role 
affect plays at work. In doing so, they also created a propitious platform for the establishment of EI 
as a conceivable predictor of performance. In particular, management scholars often utilise Weiss 
and Cropanzano’s (1996) Affective Events Theory (AET) to demonstrate the implications of EI for 
workplace effectiveness.  
AET is predicated on the traditional conception of emotions as affective responses to 
environmental changes (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Lazarus, 1991). The theory proposes a chain of 
logic that departs from work events. Specifically, AET regards work events as the causes of 
affective reactions, and affective reactions as a mediator of performance and job satisfaction. In this 
sequential chain, EI intervenes as moderator of the mediator. In simple terms, EI’s key role is 
regulatory and its ultimate goal is the maintenance of positive moods (except for certain situations 
and/or personality types, see Staw & Barsade’s 1993 “sadder- but-wiser” hypothesis for 
justification). Repetitive failures at this role might provoke intense negative affect, which in turn 
might exhaust (cognitive and emotional) resources and impair occasions to self-regulate efficiently, 
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leading to goal blockage and the deployment of aggressive behaviours (Anderson & Bushman, 
2002; Krasikova, Green, & Lebreton, 2013).  
Because the aim of AET is to demarcate and link the emotional and behavioural 
repercussions momentarily generated in the triad work event –emotional response –work outcome, 
its pertinence has been principally tested in studies based on the experience sampling method 
(ESM; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). Results published to date appear to have consistently 
supported the mechanism of the theory (Ashkanasy & Humphrey, 2011; Weiss & Beal, 2005).  
Another significant contribution that served to impose EI as a critical tool for workplace 
effectiveness is the concept of emotional labour (Hochschild, 1979, 1983). Emotional labour 
envisages the role of emotions from the lens of occupational demands; it refers to the 
implementation of “display rules” (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987), i.e., the display of expected emotions 
by service agents during service encounters (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993). The “labour” is 
performed through surface acting (modifying facial expressions), deep acting (modifying inner 
feelings), or the exhibition of authentic emotion (alignment between inner feelings and externally 
expressed emotions) (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993, 1995) – an exercise that is hard to negate given 
that most service jobs (e.g., nurses) are emotionally taxing (Maslach & Jackson, 1984). That is, they 
pressurise workers to identify with their role and to respond to the demands of their role through the 
exhibition of certain expected emotions and the suppression of others that are logically inadequate. 
For example, a palliative care manager would be expected to exhibit compassion and to be only 
modestly excited when welcoming a new patient. It thus seems reasonable to propose that high-EI 
individuals, relative to low-EI individuals, would be superiorly equipped to accurately detect 
situational demands for a particular affective display and to physically align with these demands by 
expressing appropriate facial cues (Brackett et al., 2013).  
Overall, the empirical implications of EI for the workplace, in the beginning rather derisory 
(Zeidner et al., 2004), are now well documented in enumerative reviews (e.g., Brackett et al., 2013; 
Cartwright & Pappas, 2008; Caruso et al., 2015; Côté, 2014; Mayer, Roberts et al., 2008). A 
number of studies (including some field studies) have reported a positive association between EI 
and decision-making, EI and negotiation (see Mayer, Roberts et al., 2008 for specific references), 
and even EI and creativity (Parke, Seo, & Sherf, 2015). Two meta-analyses (Joseph & Newman, 
2010; O’Boyle et al., 2011) and two empirical studies (Herpertz, Nizielski, Hock, & Schütz, 2016; 
Libbrecht, Lievens, Carette, & Côté, 2014) have provided evidence that EI is related to job 
performance in jobs, or job tasks, that demand high emotional labour.  
A closer inspection of the literature, however, reveals that, contrary to earlier presumptions 
(Zeidner et al., 2004), confining the relevance of EI to service roles may be a precipitous move. 
Some of the thinking on the question (e.g., doctors, financial analysts might benefit from some sort 
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of scientific immunity) perhaps omit the elementary point that EI implies emotion management (the 
top branch of the ability model); a skill whose importance for adaptation and concentration appears 
to be generalisable across all professions. For example, a neuroplastician who feels nervous and 
trembles the day he performs surgery because he fears failing is problematic. The notorious court 
case opposing Société Générale (a French multinational bank) against ex-trader Jerome Kerviel 
(accused of having caused a €4.9 billion loss to the bank) illustrates how this logic equally concerns 
positive affect. More precisely, results from a psychiatric assessment performed on Kerviel 
concluded that the euphoric and empowering feelings he experienced when he speculated 
unauthorised amounts significantly drove his behaviour (Gatinois & Michel, 2010).  
Reinforcing my preceding point about EI’s relevance, Forgas’s (1995) affect infusion model 
(AIM) posits that affective states are especially prone to infuse judgments during substantive 
processing. That is, during the implementation of a task that is complex and, as such, that requires 
the acquisition and processing of selective additional information to solve uncertainties associated 
with it (i.e., with the task in question), and to perform it in an efficient manner. The role of affect in 
Forgas’s model occurs fluidly in this system. It shapes the way information is (re)gained, treated, 
the way it evolves, and the way the information absorption and selection process is terminated. Core 
to AIM is the argument that the above-described activity is primed and moderated by the decision 
maker’s current affective state.  
Ultimately, Forgas and George’s (2001) reasoning supports the view that emotional abilities 
influence, also, the effective execution of cognitively demanding tasks. Based on this conclusion, it 
thus seems reasonable to suppose that the applicability of EI extends to jobs outside of the service 
sphere. In fact, data exist to substantiate this argument. For example, in a meta-analysis, emotion 
recognition accuracy predicted workplace effectiveness in a diverse range of professionals 
including human service workers, education leaders, business managers, and physicians (Elfenbein, 
Der Foo, White, Tan, & Aik, 2007). More recently, EI has also been found to be most relevant to 
the tandem high-complexity/emotionally-laden occupations (Legree, Mullins, LaPort, & Roberts, 
2016). 
Leadership, it seems, escapes the test of the “service job criterion.” Even if emerging data 
suggest interdependence and quasi equality in weight between leaders and followers’ level of EI in 
predicting followers’ job satisfaction (Miao et al., 2016), leaders are by and large considered to be 
most innately concerned by EI (Dulewicz & Higgs, 2003; Humphrey, 2002, 2008). A basic 
explanation for this is the fact that leadership is increasingly described as an emotion-laden process 
(George, 2000) that consists of distributing EI through the organisation (Menges, 2012; Menges & 
Bruch, 2009) because emotions impact work outcomes at various organisational levels (see 
Ashkanasy & Dorris, 2017 for a review). I discuss the EI-leadership link in the ensuing subsection. 
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2.3.2. Emotionally intelligent leadership 
 
EI has become a solid pillar of interest in leadership research (Antonakis et al., 2009; 
Caruso, Mayer, & Salovey, 2001; George, 2000; Gooty, Connelly, Griffith, & Gupta, 2010; Harms 
& Credé, 2010; Higgs & Dulewicz, 2016; Humphrey, 2002; Mayer, & Caruso, 2002; Melita Prati, 
Douglas, Ferris, Ammeter, & Buckley, 2003; Spector, 2005; Walter et al., 2011). Some have 
claimed that EI is “the sine qua non of leadership” (Goleman, 1998, p. 93). Others, more soberly, 
argue that it can facilitate leadership effectiveness (Miao et al., 2016). Several rationales have been 
put forward to demonstrate the validity of the EI-leadership link. To justify why I deem this link 
valid, I integrate, critically review and organise key theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
produced on the topic to date into three categories: (a) EI and transformational leadership (Burns, 
1978), (b) EI and emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Schoenewolf, 1990), 
and (c) EI and attribution (Green & Mitchell, 1979; Heider, 1958). I also discuss two propositions 
for advancing research on emotionally intelligent leadership.  
EI and transformational leadership (TFL). TFL is the leadership theory that has been the 
most intuitively associated with EI (Harms & Credé, 2010; Walter et al., 2011). It is also probably 
the leadership style that best epitomises modern conceptions of leadership. Bass and Avolio (1997) 
(see also Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999) identify five dimensions for TFL: idealized influence (creating 
impact via charisma), individualised consideration (detecting and attending to individual needs, 
providing social support), inspirational motivation (setting challenging goals that inspire to act), 
and intellectual stimulation (fostering creativity and critical thinking in others). All the dimensions 
require one common characteristic: the possession of empathic skills. And, empathy, described as 
“the ability to comprehend another’s feelings and to re-experience them oneself” (Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990, p. 194), definitionally correlates with emotion perception, the foundational branch of 
the Mayer and Salovey (1997) model. It could thus be argued that EI and TFL are primarily linked 
through empathy, empathy acting as a threshold attribute in both constructs. This very likely 
explains why empathy and EI have been found to promote leadership emergence (e.g., Côté et al., 
2010; Kellet, Humphrey, & Sleeth, 2002).  
Another simple rationale for linking EI to TFL is to consider how leadership is now most 
ordinarily defined. As inferred earlier, contemporary trends envision leadership as a process of 
social interactions (Calder, 1977), where the leader connects with his/her followers’ emotional 
needs (George, 2000). To reach this deep point it is argued that EI becomes uniquely helpful 
(Caruso et al., 2001). Specifically, EI scholars contend that high-EI leaders can recognise when and 
how to intervene to guide, inspire and motivate followers. They further contend that having this 
information is important because followers who are feeling valued, inspired, and motivated are 
more prone to perform at higher levels, individually and within teams (notably because emotions 
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spread; see segment EI and emotional contagion). In this ideal logic, a performing team is then 
hypothesised to permit the leader to execute his/her vision for the organisation.  
A third rationale concerns the duties of TFL leaders that require a substantial mobilisation of 
(emotional and cognitive) resources. Stimulating inventiveness within a follower could be one for 
instance. The connection with EI is that, in theory, EI abilities should allow leaders to economise 
energy through effective self-regulation (Joseph & Newman, 2010). High-EI leaders should then be 
more emotionally available for developing followers and better cognitively equipped to immerse 
themselves deeply into a task. In line with these speculations, positive affect has been shown to 
predict high-effort cognition (Sullivan & Conway, 1989). Other studies have also found that TFL 
leaders tend to score higher on optimism (Spreitzer & Quinn, 1996) and to generally feel happier 
than other members (Joseph, Dhanani, Shen, McHugh, & McCord, 2015); perhaps because they 
indeed possess more positive energy and are facing less emotional burdens.  
A final rationale consists in viewing EI as an essential facilitator of TFL when TFL is most 
needed, i.e., in times of crisis. During crises, emotions can rapidly exacerbate and conflict may 
emerge and alter followers’ concentration, ultimately affecting their performance (Jehn, 1997). 
McColl-Kennedy and Anderson (2002), for example, found that frustration and optimism fully 
mediate the relationship between TFL and performance. In their analyses, all causal paths18 were 
negative for frustration and positive for optimism. Compared to the positive influence of optimism 
on performance, the negative influence of frustration engendered a more pronounced effect; 
suggesting thus the distinctive need for TFL + EI combined in situations where negative 
emotionality prevails.  
Overall, EI-TFL studies have produced mixed results (see Hunt & Fitzgerald, 2013 and 
Walter et al., 2011 for comprehensive reviews). The Walter et al. (2011) review, for example, 
identifies only one study (Jin, Seo, & Shapiro, 2008) that fully supports the association between EI 
and TFL behaviours. In another useful paper (meta-analysis; Harms & Credé, 2010), the EI/TFL 
relationship was found to be significant only when the same subject rated each variable, leading the 
authors to conclude that claims about the predictive utility of EI for leadership effectiveness are 
“largely over-stated” (p. 13). Still, using the MSCEIT for selecting business managers has been a 
regular recommendation (e.g., Caruso et al., 2001; Caruso et al., 2015). Quality research has 
demonstrated that EI predicts leadership effectiveness above IQ and personality (e.g., Rosete & 
Ciarrochi, 2005) and continues to demonstrate that the interpersonal exchanges that pair leader and 
followers in a dynamic dyad is a crucial factor for performance (e.g., Gottfredson & Aguinis, 2016), 
but the level of certitude concerning what ability measures are actually capturing is not matching. 
                                                 
18 Paths for frustration (all arrows indicate a negative prediction): TFL  frustration  performance. Paths for 
optimism (all arrows indicate a positive prediction): TFL  optimism  performance. 
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As noted earlier (subsection 2.2.1), compared to ability EI, the prediction of mixed EI for job 
performance and a series of performance indicators is significantly higher. Although this might 
sound elementary, perhaps revising labels (of EI measures) could solve a minor yet meaningful part 
of the paradox.19 A related but much more ambitious proposal would be to search whether trait EI 
could be the “g” of personality (see van der Linden et al., 2016).  
Other critical issues about the EI-TFL link can be grouped into three parts. First, we know 
from a recent meta-analysis (Miao et al., 2016) that a leader's EI positively predicts followers' job 
satisfaction and that high-EI followers mediate the relationship. But high-EI followers have a 
particular profile. They are emotionally competent to notice and appreciate the efforts, attentions 
and intentions of their leader. Whether it is useful to deploy TFL in groups of low-EI followers is 
uncertain because leaders may waste time and energy in trying to lead in a way that is not needed 
and that creates little response. Second, Avolio et al. (2009) describe TFL as “leader behaviors that 
transform and inspire followers to perform beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for 
the good of the organization” (p. 423). But how often can such exceptional leadership be attainable 
healthily (i.e., without leaders, and followers, feeling burned out by an extreme practice of 
emotional labour)? Third, Alvesson and Spicer (2012, 2013) argue that, in making the leader the 
supreme authority responsible for setting a vision, TFL deprives followers of independent and 
imaginative thinking and confines them into an obeyer role, promoting then “functional stupidity.” 
This provocative point triggers another question that completes my first reasoning about the utility 
of TFL for high- vs. low-EI followers: could TFL be most impactful for followers who possess a 
unique personality profile (e.g., less ambitious/assertive followers, possibly with more manifest 
nonchalant traits)? 
EI and emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is a spontaneous process involving three 
interrelated actions that often occur simultaneously: (a) detecting another person’s current 
emotional state, (b) mimicking the person’s facial expressions that represent the felt emotion, and 
(c) experiencing the mimicked emotion within oneself (Côté & Miners, 2006). The main notion 
endorsed by emotional contagion research is the interdependence of mood states among individuals 
(Kelly & Barsade, 2001), with a single person’s mood being sufficient to lift or contaminate the 
“affective tone” (George, 1990) of a group (Barsade, 2002; Pugh, 2001). It thus seems rational to 
propose that emotional contagion has serious implications for emotionally intelligent leadership 
given that followers observe and regard their leader as the standard point of reference. This 
proposition gains support from evidence that illustrates that when a leader is in a positive mood, 
his/her followers tend to be as well. In turn, group members' positive moods have been 
                                                 
19 Ability EI, in my view, represents a theoretically more coherent approach to defining and measuring EI but 
it is significantly less predictive of job performance than mixed EI. 
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demonstrated to impact on a range of performance outcomes (e.g., enhanced cooperation, reduced 
conflict, and reduced efforts needed for task performance; Sy et al., 2005). In addition, OB experts 
have theorised multi-level models of emotion that give further support to the assumption that a 
leader’s EI can moderate the effect of emotional contagion (see Ashkanasy’s 2003 five-level model 
of emotion in organisations;20 and Ashkanasy & Jordan, 2008 for the version applied to leadership).  
Interestingly, overlooked data suggest that leaders may be more effective in reinforcing 
followers’ beliefs about the necessity to suppress negative emotions than in encouraging the display 
of positive emotions (Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). This finding reminds an unresolved issue 
about the practice of EI, and the notion of control in such practice. Neophytes might wrongly (i.e., 
automatically) equate emotion management (branch 4 of the MSCEIT) with emotional restriction or 
suppression (i.e., a somewhat purist form of ER) (Mayer et al., 2002b). The confusion is risky as, in 
the long-term, suppression might cause important intrapersonal frustrations, leading then to 
intragroup conflicts and the deterioration of formerly sane relationships (see Methodologically 
segment in section 1.7 for references). Furthermore, recent data show that externalised negative 
emotionality (e.g., direct verbal expression of anger) reflects, also, the flexible adaptation that 
should be expected from the application of the (EI) theory (see Tamir & Ford, 2012). The specific 
conditions that delimit the effective use of controlled negativity, as well as their implications for 
emotional contagion, however, are yet to be clarified (Peña-Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 
2015).  
EI and attribution. According to attribution theory, followers watch and judge their leader’s 
behaviours, and capitalise on their judgment to ascribe certain traits, values or motives to their 
leader (Ferris, Bhawuk, Fedor, & Judge, 1995; Gerstner & Day, 1997; Howell & Hall-Merenda, 
1999). In EI research, Dasborough and Ashkanasy’s (2002) model of emotions and attribution of 
intentionality constitutes the most established application of this theory. As I briefly evoked in 
Chapter 1, the model proposes that followers’ attributions about their leader’s intentions (sincere vs. 
manipulative) lead them to classify their leader either as a true or pseudo-transformational leader. 
The model further proposes that EI moderates the extent to which the attributions and intentions are 
respectively accurate and successful.  
Combining social learning theory (in brief: behavioural learning implicitly occurs through 
imitating others whom one perceives as credible role models; Bandura, 1977, 1986) with attribution 
theory offers another interesting angle to demonstrate the EI-attribution link, given that the two 
theories reciprocally validate each other. For example, one might postulate that the more a leader is 
capable of shaping positive attributions (possible EI effect), the more adjusted and dynamic 
                                                 
20 The five levels are: within person, between persons, interpersonal interactions, group, and organisation-
wide. 
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(emulation effect) the leader-follower relationships will be. Creating positive leader-follower 
relationships appears all the more essential as research shows that followers tend to memorise 
events that involve the leader more distinctly than others if the events are negative (e.g., perceived 
mistreatment) and to consider retaliation as a way to process them (Dasborough, 2006). In theory, 
this could activate a vicious circle of negative attributions  negative behavioural emulation (if the 
leader’s behaviours are cognitively appraised by followers as being somewhat legitimate21 but 
more strongly experienced as unfair)  toxic/unproductive leader-follower relationships  
negative impact on performance outcomes. 
Proposition 1: Putting a halt on the romanticisation. There is an immense responsibility and 
pressure for leaders to self-regulate and to motivate others, as well as to practice ethical leadership – 
with heroic cases portrayed as models22 (Treviño et al., 2003). According to Pirola-Merlo, Härtel, 
Mann, and Hirst (2002), for instance, it is the job of leaders to help team members cope with 
negative events. In a similar vein, Härtel and Ganegoda (2008) contend that emotion management is 
a constant duty for leaders and that there is an “inescapable moral dimension to the exercise of 
power” (p. 157). In contrast, Bligh, Kohles, Pearce, Justin, and Stovall (2007; cited in Avolio et al., 
2009) found that followers excessively regard leaders as the origin of the problems they might 
experience at work. Perhaps the recently theorised concept of emotional division-of-labour 
(Elfenbein, 2016), if concretely applied in work settings, could liberate leaders from such heavy 
responsibilities (via a redistribution of emotional duties that would be role-appropriate and adapted 
to organisational members’ intrapersonal skills and needs). Perhaps also the intense expectations 
placed on leaders may explicate why certain implausible claims have been formulated with regard 
to the contribution of EI for leadership (they serve to satisfy the expectations). In turn possibly 
explicating, to some degree, why some EI scholars have argued that the validity of EI’s utility for 
leadership must be justified by meeting a list of psychometric testing guidelines that can be seen as 
perplexingly inelastic (see, for example, in Antonakis et al., 2009).  
 
Proposition 2: A stronger call to context. Several authors (Cherniss, 2010; Jordan et al., 
2010) have stressed that context is paramount in determining when leaders need to deploy EI 
behaviours and with what intensity. Despite these efforts, the discriminatory role of context remains 
largely neglected in EI/leadership studies. The literature offers four main reasons that support why 
context deserves more attention: (a) emotions reflect a person’s provisional relationship with the 
environment and fluctuate (in intensity and nature) as a function of changes occurring in the said 
                                                 
21 From a social learning theory perspective, perceived credibility is a prerequisite for the emulation to occur. 
22 Treviño et al. (2003) suggest that the media mislead people to perceive ethical leaders as being heroic while 
most ethical leaders are not and do not need to be to prove their ethicality.  
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environment (Lazarus, 1991), indicating that EI interventions might be minimally essential or rather 
needed at irregularly spaced intervals,23 (b) behaviours caused by work situations and by 
dispositions are distinct yet often confused in empirical works (see Humphrey, 1985; Martinko & 
Gardner, 1987 and Ross, 1977 for a theorising of this point under the label “fundamental attribution 
error”), (c) distinguished leadership scholars deplore the neglect of context in modern analyses of 
the factors that regulate the influence/power that leaders have (Treviño et al., 2003; Vroom & Jago, 
2007), and (d) a collection of studies reported that in socially challenging situations possessing 
deeper knowledge about emotions is associated with a vulnerability to experiencing higher 
physiological stress (Bechtoldt & Schneider, 2016), internalised negativity (Ciarrochi, Dean, & 
Anderson, 2002), and incidental anger, possibly leading to an increased risk for inaccurate situation 
appraisal (Fiory & Ortony, 2016).  
In summary, the EI-leadership link is robust at the conceptual level and promisingly 
validated in empirical works, but demands placed on leaders to lead with EI are often 
overwhelming. A realistic reanalysis of the influence of the situational context in creating a need for 
EI behaviours could perhaps render these demands more reasonable. Expectations are so high that 
they may, for certain personality types (e.g., highly competitive individuals), activate a survival 
instinct that feeds on manipulative tactics to compensate for difficulties in using emotion abilities in 
action. This speculative logic seems plausible given that EI and leadership scholars are increasingly 
considering the existence of a dark side to EI.  
In the next two subsections, I introduce the theoretical rudiments that support the negative 
utility of EI, and review some of the most interesting published data on EI and the Dark Triad of 
personality (i.e., Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). 
 
2.4. Current controversies about the utility of emotional intelligence 
2.4.1.  The dark side of emotional intelligence: Theoretical arguments 
 
Thus far I have highlighted that the vast majority of research on EI has been restricted to 
investigating what prosocial outcomes EI might predict. While the prevalent inclination towards 
envisaging the potential of EI in a positive light is factual, early acknowledgments that EI may have 
a dark side can be found. From a logical standpoint, as mentioned in the introduction (Chapter 1), 
they depart from the point that EI, like IQ, is a neutral set of abilities, and that, as such, it can be 
instrumentalised in radical ways. As Kilduff et al. (2010) noted, for example, in their 1990 seminal 
                                                 
23 I suspect interventions might be most useful for people who are experiencing forms of psychological 
suffering (e.g., stress and anxiety due to workplace harassment) that are precluding their personal alignment. Research 
shows, for instance, that it is precisely when one’s wellbeing is diminished (e.g., through stress) that the mechanisms 
that support effective cognitive emotion regulation are deficient (Raio, Orederu, Palazzolo, Shurick, & Phelps, 2013).  
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article, Salovey and Mayer cautioned that ‘‘those whose skills are channelled antisocially may 
create manipulative scenes or lead others sociopathically to nefarious ends’’ (p. 198). Mayer (2001) 
also wrote that ‘‘some emotionally intelligent people may manage their feelings in…negative ways: 
to manipulate, control, and exploit themselves and others’’ (p. 423). Aside from these two laconic 
mentions, however, the co-creators of EI did not intellectualise further what or who may render the 
use of EI negative. Instead, EI was safely affiliated with the field of positive psychology (Salovey, 
Mayer, & Caruso, 2002) within which it prospered until about 2007.24  
1995-2007 (roughly) reflects the period during which most of the thinking that established 
the theoretical foundation for the dark side of EI occurred. The distinction between true and pseudo 
TFL (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999) is a major contribution that served to theorise the idea that there 
exists two ways to utilise EI (e.g., Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002). The parallel is presented quite 
straightforwardly: true transformational leaders use EI to motivate and inspire followers (among 
other progressive intents) and genuinely care about elevating the organisation while pseudo-
transformational leaders are self-centered and display EI purely to realise their own goals, at least 
sometimes at the expense of others. The previously described model of emotions and attribution of 
intentionality (subsection 2.3.2, segment EI and attribution), for example, is largely inspired from 
this logic. It is also an extension of Ferris et al.’s (1995) dynamic model of leaders’ manipulative 
behaviours, in which, in brief, others’ responses to the motives and consequences of the 
manipulation are perceptively driven.  
To these contributions could be added a rich lexicon of interrelated leadership theories that 
emerged outside the time bracket 1995-2007 such as narcissistic leadership (Brunell et al., 2008; 
Higgs, 2009), unethical leadership (Brown & Mitchell, 2010; Den Hartog, 2015), destructive 
leadership (Krasikova et al., 2013; Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007), or impression management25 
(IM; Goffman, 1959, 1969). I do not review each individually here but will comment on some of 
their tenets in later subsections. Here, the main point I wish to emphasise is that much theorising 
exists to support the dark side perspective of EI in organisations. 
The other point I wish to emphasise concerns the scholastic treatment of the topic. A review 
of the literature reveals that it crystallised through three main stages:26 (a) pre-popularisation (of 
EI) (fragmented past): classic “negative(/ly connoted) theories” (e.g., IM from an organisational 
politics perspective; Pfeffer, 1981) exist but are not formally connected to EI, (b) expansion (on-
going/dominating): attributes of EI are enthusiastically received (Barsade & Gibson, 2007), 
                                                 
24 Austin et al. (2007) published the first empirical study that addressed the dark side of ability EI (focus of the 
paper: Mach/EI relationship). Concerning self-report measures of EI, Munro, Bore, and Powis (2005) published an 
earlier relevant study (part of the study considers the narcissism/EI relationship). 
25 Please see segment Strategic behaviours (subsection 2.5.3) for a definition. 
26 I locate SEI in the fourth stage of Centralisation (see Chapter 6, subsection 6.2.1). 
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commercialised and repeated (Brackett et al., 2011, 2013, 2016), and (c) exploration (emerging): 
criticisms about viewing EI strictly as a positive tool (Kilduff et al., 2010), detailed discussions on 
deviant workplace behaviours (see LeBreton, Shiverdecker, & Grimald, 2018 for a review) and 
studies investigating the EI/dark traits relationship are emerging (Austin et al., 2007).  
During the expansion stage, a minority of scholars discussed why EI might have a dark side 
(e.g., Ashkanasy & Tse, 2000; Emmerling & Goleman, 2003; Härtel & Panipucci, 2007; Jordan et 
al., 2006). And their interpretations have been analogously rationalised: high-EI  higher 
knowledge about others’ emotional functioning + higher potential for developing 
“chameleonisation” skills (i.e., fabricated adaptation; Oh, Charlier, Mount, & Berry, 2013; Snyder, 
1979)  possible harmful exploitation of emotion knowledge for personal gain. 
Kilduff et al. (2010) produced the first conceptual article devoted to explore how the Mayer 
and Salovey (1997) four-branch model could facilitate exploitative strategies in an organisational 
context. These authors identified four strategies: (a) “focus on strategically important targets” 
(through the perceiving + using branches), (b) “disguise or express one’s own emotions for 
personal gain,” (c) “stir and shape others’ emotions through sensegiving and misattribution,” and 
(d) “strategically control emotion-laden information” (all through emotion management– into 
which the other three branches collapse).  
Around the same period, calls for a balanced examination of the utility of EI intensified. 
Lindebaum and Cartwright (2011), for instance, argued that: “Rather than reinforcing the popular 
notion that high EI is always a “good thing,” it would seem reasonable to expect that in a maturing 
field of research, critical scholars would be now presenting a more balanced body of research 
evidence and propositions which confront the possibility that employing highly emotionally 
intelligent [individuals] may not always yield desirable outcomes for the organization” (p. 282). 
More recently, Davis and Nichols (2016) reviewed existing research on the negative 
applications of EI (see also Khanna & Mishra, 2017). An interesting contribution of their review is 
the consideration of the “intrapersonally dark effects” of EI (i.e., when possessing a high level of EI 
becomes a handicap and prevents adaptive coping)27 such as internalising others’ occupational 
stress (see subsection 2.3.2, Proposition 2: A stronger call to context for specific references).  
Because the behaviours of dark personalities can reach extremes, examining whether EI may 
cultivate aspects of their functioning has become a fundamental empirical matter. I concentrate on 
this topic next.  
                                                 
27 In theory, a high-EI person should be an effective self-regulator and thus should not be experiencing EI has a 
handicap (self-regulation would be performed before the stage of “handicap” has a chance to occur). In everyday life, 
however, given ability tests of EI “only” measure declarative knowledge, it seems reasonable to propose that the same 
high-EI person might not necessarily be able to implement the said knowledge in a fully adaptive manner. I suspect that 
gifted individuals, because of their overexcitabilities (Dabrowski, 1967), might be the population most concerned by 
this “curse.” 
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2.4.2. The Dark Triad and emotional intelligence: What do the data say? 
 
Questions about the potential dark side of EI are not novel but their weight in the literature 
is recent. As a result, the consensus appears to be that empirical data on the topic are rather limited. 
Within the past decade, however, relevant investigations (the majority based on self-report 
measures of EI and student samples) have multiplied,28 confirming the growing curiosity for the 
vain and dysfunctional aspects of human nature alleged in past research (Khoo & Burch, 2008).  
In simple terms, the dark side of EI refers to utilisations of EI that are made at the expense 
of others (Kilduff et al., 2010). To my knowledge, there exists no exhaustive typology or official 
nomenclature for the behaviours that fall within the domain of the “dark applications of EI.” In this 
thesis, I assume that these behaviours strongly resemble behaviours that are displayed by high 
scorers on Dark Triad (DT) measures. On this basis, I concentrate on the EI/DT intersection to 
review empirical findings on the so-called dark side of EI.  
The DT represents a collection of three malign and relatively stable personality traits, 
namely: Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). While the 
three traits are positively related to one another (see, for example, Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2009; Lee & Ashton, 2005; McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998 for Machiavellianism 
and psychopathy), data show sufficient discriminant validity to ascertain their conceptual 
distinctiveness (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). For example, each DT trait yields differential impacts 
on correlations with several other variables (e.g., with alexithymia, the Big Five, moral 
development, humour styles, and self-enhancement; Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, & Marchisio, 
2011; Petrides, Vernon, Schermer, & Veselka, 2011).  
Perhaps these relative differences explicate why studies in that body of research have 
produced results that partially nullify the intuition that individuals high in one or more DT trait(s) 
are not credible contenders for the mastery of EI. Given the interpersonally toxic characteristics of 
the DT traits, it seems reasonable to expect that the positive product of the interaction EI x DT 
would engender deleterious repercussions on the mental health and job performance of the targets 
of manipulators. In each of the three segments below, I focus on one distinct DT dimension, define 
it, and address what empirical works tell us to date about its hypothetical (in)/compatibility with EI. 
Machiavellianism. Machiavellianism or Mach typically involves (a) the exhibition of 
manipulative conduct for personal gain, (b) the non-respect for conventional moral rules and for the 
needs of others (unless tactically feigned), and (c) a tendency to apprehend others’ intentions with 
cynicism (Christie & Geis, 1970; Leary, Knight, & Barnes, 1986). Accordingly, high-Machs are 
                                                 
28 Considering strictly adult and non-clinical samples, a review of the literature reveals that there exists, at this 
time of writing, close to 60 empirical studies (published and unpublished combined) on the EI/DT association. 
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often described as individuals who operate on the basis of the “end justifies the means” principle 
(Ali et al., 2009; Sendjaya et al., 2016), their motivations being essentially instrumental (Jones & 
Paulhus, 2009). One standard explanation for the atypical profile of high-Machs is the assumption 
that they do not possess the ability to develop an emotional attachment to others and instead process 
interpersonal experiences at the cognitive level (Bereczkei, 2015; Christie & Geis, 1970).  
Consistent with the above description, several studies have found that Mach negatively 
correlates with empathy and emotion recognition, while noting a positive correlation with 
alexithymia (see Austin et al., 2007 for specific references) and neuroticism (Szijjarto & Bereczkei, 
2015). Other studies have found that Mach also negatively correlates with agreeableness and 
conscientiousness (Austin et al., 2007). Taken together, these results seem to indicate that high-
Machs represent a menace for organisations that are desirous to fructify their social assets. They 
also leave little hope for the existence of a positive association between Mach and EI. 
Austin et al. (2007) first assessed the ability EI/Mach association and found that the two 
variables significantly and negatively correlated. Studies based on self-report measures of EI 
(Petrides et al., 2011; Szijjarto & Bereczkei, 2015) have generated analogous results, reinforcing the 
prevailing view that EI’s effectiveness is prosocially oriented (Walter et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it 
is worth noting that Austin and her colleagues also found that high-Machs subscribed to 
emotionally manipulative behaviours on another subjective scale (author created). This second 
finding is expected given that manipulation is inherent to Mach, but it triggers one interrogation: if 
the EI/Mach relationship is negative, then how can Machs be really effective manipulators? Does 
that mean that EI has in fact little actionable potential? 
Bereczkei and Birkas (2014) provide a valuable starting point to examine these questions. 
They hypothesised and found that high-Machs may be poor mind readers but compensate this 
deficit with above average working memory (as measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-Revised; Wechsler, 1981), allowing them to develop tactics. Some social dilemma studies, 
including two based on functional magnetic resonance imaging (Bereczkei, Deak, Papp, Perlaki, & 
Orsi, 2013; Bereczkei et al., 2015), have produced reminiscent findings. Czibor and Bereczkei 
(2012) also found in a Public Goods game29 that high-Machs (relative to low-Machs) monitored 
more prominently the previous steps of their partners in order to choose their responses. This 
finding reveals the behavioural flexibility (including the attempted long-term perspective taking) of 
Machs (Bereczkei, 2015) and provides an indication of how Machs may proceed in an organisation 
to gradually reach self-interested goals, i.e., through detecting and exploiting others’ weaknesses. 
                                                 
29 Similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG) except for the fact that it can involve more than two players 
(see footnote 41, subsection 2.5.3, for a description of the PDG).  
  41 
The findings of Bereczkei’s research group maybe signify that claims that rule out the 
hypothesis that EI may serve Mach (e.g., Jones & Paulhus, 2009) in a more direct way are 
premature. Côté et al. (2011), for example, conducted a two-part investigation to explore the moral 
orientation of EI’s utility. In Study 1 (N=131 undergraduate students), the authors examined the 
interactive effect of ER knowledge (the equivalent of the fourth branch in the 1997 Mayer–Salovey 
EI model), prosocial behaviour, and moral identity. They found that at 1 standard deviation (SD) 
above the mean in ER knowledge, the prosocial behaviour/moral identity association became 
positive and reached significance. In Study 2, among the same statistical population (i.e., high-ER 
individuals, this time N=252 university employees), results showed that, when Mach increased by 1 
unit, interpersonal deviance was also augmented (by 0.41). 
The Côté et al. findings are not surprising, however. As I have commented previously, it is a 
theoretical fact that EI can, also, be utilised for harmful purposes, at least from a short-term 
perspective.30 These findings are also not unique. Other published data (Winkel, Wyland, Shaffer, 
& Clason, 2011) have shown a positive association between ability EI and the broader concept of 
self-report workplace deviance. But a dichotomous approach to understanding the utility EI is 
unlikely to reflect a pragmatic reading of leader-follower relationships. Dualism, especially when 
involving malevolence, excites intellectualisations. Fictions overflow with examples of villains that 
are utilised to provoke intrigues. Organisational life, on the other hand, operates at a much more 
nuanced level of dynamics (Jackson & Grace, 2013; Langley, 1999).  
Several scholars (Belschak, Den Hartog, & Kalshoven, 2015; Hawley, 2003; Schepers, 
2003; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996) have proposed that high-Machs may represent constructive 
potential for organisations (e.g., in terms of adaptation, innovation, problem detection). Empirically, 
some research demonstrates that if Machs’ basic motivational needs are met, Machs can comport 
themselves in a prosocial manner. Belschak et al. (2015), for instance, found in combining the 
results of two multi-source field studies that TFL moderated Mach followers’ propensity to engage 
in challenging OCB31 when their leader provided them with enhanced job autonomy and intrinsic 
motivation. This emerging finding suggests that, for ambitious high-EI individuals, the satisfaction 
of self-focused motives may act as one boundary condition for the display of ethical behaviours 
(Grant & Mayer, 2009). 
                                                 
30 Subsection 2.5.1 addresses why I believe that the short-term vs. long-term temporal distinction is a key 
parameter to differentiate between a negative vs. strategic use of EI. 
31 Challenging OCB can be contrasted with affiliative OCB, which are deemed to be more neutral, cordial, and 
passive type of behaviours that seek to help. Challenging OCB surpass affiliative OCB in proactivity (Den Hartog, 
2015), and possibly in contribution. Classic examples of challenging OCB may be seeking to augment an organisation’s 
creativity capital, or defying status quo (Frese, Fay, Hilburger, Leng, & Tag, 1997). 
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In situations of mutual gains,32 it could be argued that given Mach infers the camouflage of 
one’s actual values and referential norms, (for Machs who consistently excel at this task) no harm 
would be felt/detected by others on the surface, while the benefit(s) of their actions would remain 
salient – for some time. In acknowledging this, my intention is not to promote Mach. The difficulty 
for Machs to consider others’ welfare beyond superficial levels carries too much risk for human 
collateral damages to exonerate the construct from its dark affiliation. My intention is to value the 
existence of one overlooked reasoning to enrich the critical quality of the current review. Its 
ethicality is a debate for normative ethicists.  
Psychopathy. Psychopathy is the dimension of the DT that theoretically contains the most 
hostile characteristics for interpersonal relations. Psychopaths are described as superficial charmers 
and skilled manipulators who demonstrate abnormally poor affectivity (e.g., low empathy, lack of 
remorse, greater cruelty potential), pronounced impulsive tendencies (Bagley, Abramowitz, & 
Kosson, 2009; Hare, 1985, 2003; Patrick & Lang, 1999) and an enhanced propensity for conducting 
criminal acts (O'Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & McDaniel, 2012). Clearly these descriptions infer 
important deficiencies in ER.  
Taken in isolation, prior research on psychopathy has reliably reported that psychopaths 
have deficits in recognising emotions in others (Kahn et al., 2016). Specific divergences between 
findings concern the nature of the emotions with which the deficits are most associated. For 
example, one study found that psychopaths most struggle to recognise facial disgust (Kosson, 
Suchy, Mayer, & Libby, 2002). Other results have indicated that detecting fear and sadness is more 
difficult (Blair et al., 2004). Some disagreements have also evolved around the notion that 
psychopathic traits may be more or less internalised and dangerous. The variability of past findings 
eventually led to a definitional sophistication of the construct and to the distinction between 
primary and secondary psychopathy (Newman, MacCoon, Vaughn, & Sadeh, 2005). Primary 
psychopathy relating to interpersonal-affective traits such as callousness, and secondary 
psychopathy relating to instinctual, often anxiety-driven, deviant behaviours (Vidal, Skeem, & 
Camp, 2010).  
In research based on ability EI, the two subtypes have shown some importance. For 
example, Vidal et al. (2010) found that the lower-anxiety capital of primary psychopaths allowed 
them to perform more successfully on EI tests (their performance was intact) than secondary 
psychopaths. They also found that secondary psychopaths manifested increased dating aggression 
and violence. Vidal and colleagues concluded that primary psychopaths might be able to maximise 
the exploitation of their level of EI in order to adapt and evolve in traditional society, including as 
                                                 
32 When high-Machs progress in their intended direction, which happens to coincide with the deployment of 
behaviours that serve the organisation. 
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successful entrepreneurs. More recently, Copestake, Gray, and Snowden (2013) found no 
association between EI and psychopathy (N=57 incarcerated adult offenders) and deduced that 
deficits in EI do not concern psychopaths. As Kahn et al. (2016) noted, however, the Copestake et 
al. study used a sample size that is likely to have precluded its authors from detecting the small to 
medium effect sizes that would have corroborated the leading trend, which I describe below. 
Overall, data show that ability EI is moderately, but significantly and negatively, associated 
with psychopathic traits, thereby confirming the hypothesis that psychopathy involves emotional 
impairments (Ermer, Kahn, Salovey, & Kiehl, 2012; Kahn et al., 2016; Visser, Bay, Cook, & 
Myburgh, 2010). Visser et al. (2010), for instance, analysed how EI, psychopathy, and antisocial 
behaviour were related (N= 429 undergraduate students). As the authors predicted, none of the EI 
subscales correlated positively with psychopathy. Total EI was also significantly and negatively 
correlated with all psychopathy scales, and negatively correlated with antisocial behaviour. On the 
other hand, correlations between antisocial behaviour and psychopathy were strong and positive.  
Evidence from trait EI studies is slightly more equivocal. Negative associations dominate 
(e.g., Malterer, Glass, & Newman, 2008; Petrides et al., 2011) but psychopathy has been associated 
with lower scores on alexithymia and higher scores on the emotional perception and emotional 
regulation scales of the TEIQue (Pham, Ducro, & Luminet, 2010). Elsewhere, the ability to feign 
deceptive facial expressions was found to relate to both psychopathy and trait EI (see Porter, ten 
Brinke, Baker, & Wallace, 2011). However, as I have critiqued before, because trait EI is strongly 
associated with personality (Visser et al., 2010), the higher trait EI scores are likely to stem from 
psychopaths’ overestimated judgment of their own emotional skills (psychopaths being prone to 
“egoistic bias;” Paulhus & John, 1998, p. 1025), or, maybe, a compulsion to lie. Either way, studies 
based on trait EI provide a credible indication of the extent to which manipulation is inherent to 
psychopathy. 
Compared to Mach, psychopathy appears more firmly incompatible with EI – psychopaths’ 
lack of behavioural control precluding perspective-taking and strategic long-term projection at a 
distinguishably higher level. Meta-analytic data reported no explicit differential relation between 
the individual facets of the DT and intelligence (O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & Story, 2013). Certain 
Mach experts (e.g., Jones & Paulhus, 2009) have also refuted the relation between Mach and IQ on 
the ground that data are clear that it is inexistent. The results of the research led by Bereczkei and 
his colleagues (cf. preceding Machiavellianism segment), however, tend to support the view that 
Machs’ behavioural elasticity demonstrates superior capacity for adaptation as well as a more 
evident finesse of global rationalisation. Jones and Paulhus’s (2009) position also seems 
paradoxical. They used themselves the term “bistrategic” (p. 101) to describe Machs’ ability to 
engage into short-term and long-term strategizing. Still compared to Machs, Psychopaths’ 
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manipulation attempts are more likely to be effective in the short-term or during brief encounters, 
forcing them to frequently renew their targets in order to remain undetected. In other words, 
psychopaths’ personal resources, including those pertaining to the realm of emotion management, 
are more rapidly exhausted, which arguably denotes lower (or rather unmaximised) intelligence. 
Assuming this logic proves to be valid, it would neutralise the possibility for psychopaths to benefit 
from the EI/IQ compensatory effect mentioned earlier in this review (i.e., a low IQ compensates for 
a high EI, and vice-versa). In this alleged scenario, both variables (EI and IQ) would be too weakly 
represented in the psychometric profile of psychopaths. 
Narcissism. Narcissism refers to a sense of exaggerated self-worth and a belief in the 
superiority or specialness of oneself (Emmons, 1987). Narcissistic individuals or high-narcs are 
generally preoccupied with grandiose fantasies and often display arrogance (Campbell et al., 2011). 
They can deploy extreme aggressiveness if they feel that their self-esteem is threatened (Bushman 
& Baumeister, 1998). Similar to the other DT dimensions, high-narcs demonstrate a deficiency in 
sincere empathic concern (Watson, Grisham, Trotter, & Biderman, 1984; Watson & Morris, 1991), 
which allows them to manipulate unscrupulously. On the other hand, narcissism has been found to 
exhibit a unique pattern of associations with a series of variables that are most commonly related to 
the other two DT dimensions in an opposite way. In particular, narcissism has been found to 
negatively correlate with alexithymia (Cairncross, Veselka, Schermer, & Vernon, 2013). 
Inconsistent patterns for narcissism are also present in EI research. I discuss below why these are in 
fact expected and are likely to be explained by measurement limitations.  
Petrides et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between trait EI and narcissism but 
reported negative associations between trait EI and the other two DT facets. As the authors 
recognised, however, the personality traits of high-narcs render these results somewhat trivial. 
Because narcissism entails the possession of a disproportionate amour-propre, its likelihood to 
correlate with desirable variables (e.g., self-esteem – itself a correlate of narcissism; Raskin, 
Novacek, & Hogan, 1991) is logically very high (Petrides, 2010). This, I believe, explains why 
narcissism has been positively associated with a long list of facets integral to the TEIQue (e.g., 
assertiveness, happiness, optimism, achievement motivation, and success in relationships; Petrides 
et al., 2011). This should also explain why other reports have described such a seductive profile for 
narcs (e.g., narcs are optimistic, charming, likeable, and popular; Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2010; 
Veselka, Schermer, Martin, & Vernon, 2010) and have noted an association between narcissism and 
prosocial tendencies (Veselka, Schermer, & Vernon, 2012) – narcs’ (in fact fragile) self-worth 
depending so strongly on their reputation (Miller, Campbell, & Pilkonis, 2007). It is worth noting 
that in more recent research based on another self-report measure of EI (the Bar-On Emotional 
Quotient Inventory, EQ-i; Bar-On, 2004), arguably containing less personality components than the 
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TEIQue, associations between mixed EI and narcissism were negative (Furnham & Rosen, 2016). 
The relationship between the two variables is thus likely to vary at the instrument level (not just per 
stream of EI research). 
The same two critiques that I expressed about the trait EI/psychopathy association apply to 
the findings presented so far on trait EI and narcissism: (a) their contribution is mostly limited to the 
elaboration of our understanding of narcs’ personality profile. From the perspective of EI as a 
mental ability, they do not permit to draw any robust conclusions with regard to the question of 
whether or not EI serves narcissism. At best it could be concluded that narcs need EI to maintain a 
certain level of subjective wellbeing (given the ambiguous relationship narcs have with their self-
esteem), and (b) the fact that trait EI relies upon self-report measures adds another problematic 
element that casts doubts on the incremental value of these same findings. Considering the inflated 
view that high-narcs have of their potential, the above-noted associations could in fact be reflective 
of clinical narcissism. Support for this assertion is provided by the critique that narcissism scales 
often lack construct validity (Miller et al., 2011).  
I now turn to ability EI. Recent results published by Czarna et al. (2016) in one longitudinal 
field study have distinctively illuminated the (limited) utility of narcissism. In brief, Czarna and 
colleagues measured participants’ popularity at zero acquaintance and three months later. They also 
collected participants’ level of EI and narc traits. They found that “narcissism is rather 
disadvantageous and that EI is rather advantageous for long-term popularity” (p. 1589). This 
finding is informative because it reveals that narcs are significantly restricted in their capacity to 
manipulate. It does not infer, however, that high-EI individuals are unlikely to be manipulative and 
to use their EI for self-focused reasons. Instead, it could be argued that Czarna et al.’s (2016) 
finding reveals a particularly subtle profile for high-EI individuals in terms of their potential to be 
effective manipulators. For example, high-EI individuals could exploit the longer time their 
emotional abilities allow them to hide their true motives to build strategic relationships and to 
develop complex stratagems.  
The leadership literature backs the existence of a link between narcissism and short-term 
adaptive outcomes, where narc leaders first intense impressions are gradually revealed to be in fact 
superficial and counterproductive for performance (see Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007 for a more 
balanced reasoning supported by data). Research shows that narcs who manipulate often and who 
have a strong sense of entitlement typically impress at zero acquaintance, narcs’ self-presentation 
(e.g., confident gait, flashy clothing and/or polished style, charming facial expressions and 
humorous way of speaking; Back et al., 2010) contributing to the temporary impact of their 
manipulation. 
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Another interesting finding concerns people’s perceived darkness of the DT components. 
Rauthmann and Kolar (2012) examined this question using three evaluation criteria (desirability, 
consequences for the self, consequences for others) and by considering two perspectives (others vs. 
self). Psychology students (N=213) rated DT behaviours on each evaluation criterion. Results 
demonstrated that, in comparison to the other two DT traits, narcissism was judged ‘‘brighter.” 
More interestingly, while the students rated all traits as less desirable for the self than for others, 
they perceived the consequences of same DT behaviours more favourably if the behaviours were 
directed toward others rather than directed toward themselves. Potentially this finding demonstrates 
the extent to which selfishness is inherent to human nature and how it may situationally manifest; 
here, as a self-preservation motive.  
Rauthmann and Kolar (2012) deduce that participants’ special treatment of narcissism may 
indicate a perception bias caused by narcs’ attractive attributes (e.g., charm, positive and upbeat 
personality). An alternative (albeit overlapping) interpretation might be that students 
subconsciously identified with the narcissistic profiles they had to judge. Recent findings support 
that (a) narcissism is stronger in young adulthood (Grijalva et al., 2015) and that (b) undergraduates 
tend to rate adult role models positively higher if they have a similar personality to themselves 
(Kim & MacCann, 2016). Assuming the authors’ bias hypothesis is found to be most scientifically 
valid than my interpretation, it could be argued that some narcs may indirectly demonstrate 
prosociality in inspiring non-narcs or low-narcs to develop, and possibly permanently acquire, the 
advantageous part of the traits that characterise them. In this imagined situation, high-EI individuals 
would arguably possess the greatest self-development potential.  
In summary, the EI/DT association has been mostly tested in trait EI studies, and, overall, is 
inconsistently validated across all streams of EI research, including at the EI instrument and DT 
facet level. While the plausibility is evident it is still too early to affirm the extent to which EI has a 
dark side. Another observation is that, conceptually, each of the three DT facets relates to the theory 
of EI through partially contradictory links (e.g., narcs use emotional manipulation to extract 
narcissistic supply from others and, through this process, self-regulate; a process which in fact 
denotes primary deficits in ER given it is externally alimented), which complicates the 
interpretation of the alleged association. Considering possible moderators (DT subfacets,33 age, 
interaction terms containing several DT variables) should clarify the DT profile most capable to 
misuse EI. 
 
                                                 
33 I have mentioned two subfacets for psychopathy (primary and secondary psychopathy). Narcissism can also 
be divided into grandiose and vulnerable narcissism (Besser & Priel, 2010). 
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2.4.3. Emotional intelligence and ethical leadership: A shared dichotomy 
 
A widely used definition of ethical leadership (EL) in western-based analyses is “the 
demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal 
relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, 
reinforcement, and decision-making” (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005, p. 120). This view of EL 
reveals that, like EI, EL is generally understood from a prescriptive perspective that values 
behavioural influence (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2009) through surface integrity (Simons, 1999) to 
the detriment of intentions (Eisenbeiss, 2012) that are most revealing of a person’s moral character.  
A selective list of ethical leader behaviours includes: showing ethical awareness, a capacity 
to empower followers through motivation (Resick, Hanges, Dickson, & Mitchelson, 2006) and 
affective trust (Härtel & Ganegoda, 2008). Again like EI, EL is traditionally associated with popular 
leadership styles such as AL, spiritual leadership, and TFL (Brown & Treviño, 2006) and quite 
opposed to the notion of self-focused goals (e.g., striving for power, status, or personal prestige). In 
fact, self-focused goals have traditionally been connoted in a pejorative manner in the OB literature 
(e.g., Williams, 2014), and treated as causal rationales for the emergence of destructive leadership. 
Like if prioritising self-benefits inevitably indicated the pursuit of corrupt goals (e.g., Khoo & 
Burch, 2008). I do not insinuate these connections are wrong but rather that they are often too 
rapidly made. They stigmatise self-interest (Ellen et al., 2016; Provis, 2006) and, in doing so, deny 
the normalcy of the act to seek personal elevation (Emmons, 2003) and to self-actualise (Maslow, 
1943/1954). 
Motives underlying EL and the benefits of its practice may be mixed (Den Hartog, 2015), 
and different normative ethical theories (e.g., egoism, utilitarianism, Kantianism34) would connect 
differently with various expressions of EL (e.g., AL, TFL, servant leadership) (Dion, 2012), 
rendering the ethical calculus complicated. Yet, EL approaches remain largely simplistic (e.g., EL= 
altruistic motives, unethical leadership = egoistic motives; Kanungo, 2001), and overly studied 
from a leader-centric stance (Thoroughgood, Sawyer, Padilla, & Lunsford, 2016).  
Consistent with this critique, and because I believe it provides a framework that has 
potential for reconciling the dichotomous treatment of the utility of EI, I choose to extend Kilduff et 
al.’s (2010) theorising of strategic emotional intelligence to build a case for the primary and 
functional role of self-interested motives in the guidance of EI behaviours.  
                                                 
34 According to ethical egoism, one ought to behave in a way that advances one’s own (perceived) self-interest, 
first and foremost (Machan, 1997).  
Utilitarians view an action as morally good if it maximises utility, i.e., if it generates the greatest amount of 
happiness for the greatest number of people (Beauchamp, Bowie, & Arnold, 2009).  
Kantian ethics is predicated on the deontological principle of the categorical imperative: agents have a moral 
duty to act in ways that can become universal laws (Kant, 1964). 
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2.5. Strategic emotional intelligence (SEI) 
Preamble and basic mechanism 
Progress in social sciences heavily depends on measurement tools quality (Danner et al., 
2016). But theory is often the first step for developing good social science research (Treviño, 1992). 
In the field of EI, former contributions have demonstrated how theory can inform data and lead to 
impactful research (e.g., MacCann & Roberts, 2008). Recent theorising such as Fontaine’s (2016) 
application of Scherer’s (2009) componential emotion approach to EI also shows much promise. 
More generally concerning organisational research, theoretical propositions that are original are 
considered vital - yet lacking - for the advancement of knowledge (Ashkanasy, 2016). 
Constructing a theory is not simple. While the task requires meticulousness, perfected 
fabrication should not be a concern. For example, Weick (1995) mentioned that abstractness and 
approximations are normal stages to reach for theoretical developments that are only recent. At this 
stage in my research on SEI, I am not claiming that I am developing a new theory. Rather, my goal 
is to extend previous theorising of SEI. My proposed extension of SEI, however, relies upon 
references to theoretical arguments and empirical findings and upon the causal explications that link 
them together, which aligns with Sutton and Staw’s (1995) interpretation of what constitutes strong 
theory, and is a challenge noticed as being rarely attempted in OB research (Gooty et al., 2010).  
Also, I am critiquing but not discrediting the perspectives adopted in previous research, 
which is another criterion that differentiates between true and pseudo theory (Sutton & Staw, 1995). 
To accomplish this, I am using the extant EI literature as a basis to highlight paradigmatic 
inconsistencies about the utility of EI. And, capitalising on paradoxes to build management and 
organisation theories is a recommended approach (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989) for generating data 
that are really useful for practice (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). I thus have enthusiastic expectations 
about the potential for SEI to become an established theory, while acknowledging that refinements 
will most likely be modelled on future unpredictable discoveries, and even trends (Whetten, 1989). 
SEI refers to the use of EI for self-interested goals.35 SEI’s mechanism, in its most 
elementary form, can be described as triarchic. First, it requires two situational variables to be 
activated: perceived competition and opportunity for personal goal pursuit. Second, it can be 
performed either deliberately or automatically. Third, SEI’s mechanism is predicated on a 
pragmatic view of EI where emotions are used, functionally, in the service of self-interest. I 
elaborate these parameters in the ensuing subsections. 
                                                 
35 Because I focus on individuals’ ultimate motives and goals, through this perspective, self-interested goals 
and self-interested motives become the same point of reference. The terms are thus used interchangeably in this thesis. 
Human motivation experts (e.g., Bernard, Mills, Swenson, & Walsh, 2005) consider that adopting this terminological 
compromise, for the same reason I just mentioned, is legitimate. 
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2.5.1. The term strategic: Why does it matter and what does it mean? 
 
Strategy originates from military thinking (“Strategy,” n.d.). Porter (1980) and Mintzberg 
(1985) were the most prominent thinkers who exported the term, and derived subdisciplines (e.g., 
strategic planning), to business. Alas, strategy has become one of the most misused words in 
academic writings and in everyday conversations. Still, one element that seems consensual among 
definitions is that a long-term view is inherent to a strategic effort. In defining SEI, this temporal 
distinction is critical for three reasons: (a) a behaviour that would provide transitory satisfaction 
(short-term view) would risk aligning with behaviours that are typically enacted by individuals who 
score high on the DT while SEI is conceptualised within the paradigm of healthy opportunism, 
which rejects unethicality, (b) OP and IM experts view strategic influencing behaviours as being 
long-term in nature (Ferris, Zinko, Brouer, Buckley, & Harvey, 2007; Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984), 
and (c) it is theoretically claimed (Mayer & Salovey, 1995) and empirically demonstrated that a 
positive application of EI serves long-term prospects (Czarna et al., 2016).   
The other critical point that justifies the incorporation of strategic in SEI, as defended by 
Kilduff et al. (2010), is the notion of getting ahead. Even if getting ahead simply involves 
prospering (e.g., maintaining a current position), as prospering allows the existence of an initial 
stable state, which is a classic prerequisite for healthy goal setting (Latham & Locke, 1991).  
Again like Kilduff et al., I also assume that calculating or premeditating an act is not 
necessarily required for it to be deemed strategic. Support for this assumption can be found in the 
goal literature. Bargh and Morsella (2008), for instance, deplore that goal research too frequently 
assumes that goal pursuit is intentional (what they refer to as ‘‘conscious-centric bias,” p. 73) while 
data support that goals can be both consciously and unconsciously pursued (Hassin, Bargh, & 
Zimerman, 2009) and, in each case, will actuate the same psychological processes and engender the 
same outcomes (Oettingen, Grant, Smith, Skinner, & Gollwitzer, 2006). One interesting hypothesis 
perhaps worth mentioning is that when unconscious goal pursuit is interrupted by difficulty that is 
when the pursuit continues in the conscious mind (see Bongers, Dijksterhuis, & Spears, 2010 for 
empirical evidence). Another interesting hypothesis is that once a goal is met by specific 
behavioural choices, the strategies that served its realisation, under comparable circumstances, are 
then reactivated automatically (see the automotive model; Bargh, 1990). In the field of EI, some 
scientists (Zeidner, Matthews, Roberts, & MacCann, 2003) have also evoked that emotional 
behaviours are often implicit, despite the fact that most models and assessment tools rest on 
assumptions that infer the opposite (Fiori, 2009).  
Finally, I wish to clarify that SEI, as I refer to it in this thesis, does not refer to one of the 
two area scores generated by the MSCEIT (combination of the understanding emotions and 
managing emotions branches) that is similarly labelled. The theorisation of SEI that I am proposing 
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is based on the more holistic view that EI, as a global mental ability, is most often utilised by 
individuals for self-serving ends that are not pursued at the expense of others36 (Bausseron, 2012).  
 
2.5.2. Emotional intelligence and goal pursuit 
 
Goal pursuit (GP) means striving (Emmons, 1986) for a desired outcome (Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, Lee Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) that one believes is achievable (Ajzen, 1985; 
Hassin et al., 2009). When the outcome is for the self, goal pursuit becomes personal 
(henceforward: PGP). In past works, the mention of goals has aided to highlight the benefits of self-
regulation (see Neal, Ballard, & Vancouver, 2017 for a review) and sometimes also ability EI. For 
example, Salovey and Grewal (2005) contend that high-EI people can “harness emotions, even 
negative ones, and manage them to achieve intended goals” (p. 282). This only emphasises the 
generic role of emotional data in facilitating the achievement of conscious goals, however.  
In my theorisation of SEI, I explicitly conceptualise EI as a tool that people most often use 
for innately selfish reasons (i.e., reasons explained by certain limitations of human nature). In the 
case of emotionally intelligent leadership, claiming that it is primarily concerned with inspiring and 
motivating followers, for instance, and stopping the sequential logic of cause-and-effect here, seems 
incomplete and, if I dare to push the critique further, dishonest.37 Perhaps the reader will consider 
this critique is self-evident given that, as identified in goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1984, 
1990), human behaviour is invariably purposeful (Latham & Locke, 1991). In several respects, 
given my psychological egoist position (subsection 2.5.3), I do too. Yet, truly balanced perspectives 
on the utility of EI (arguments beyond the good vs. bad use of EI where self-interest is 
unambiguously addressed) are presently absent in the EI literature.  
 
2.5.3. Attributing purpose to using emotional intelligence: The fit with self-interest  
 
Philosophical logic 
In the novel way of theorising SEI that I am proposing, I positively integrate the pursuit of 
self-interest in the purpose of EI. Philosophically, this integration represents a shift from established 
interpretations of the (EI) theory. As I have critiqued many times, the extant literature mostly 
describes EI as a tool that can promote either healthy or toxic interactions. Management scholars 
                                                 
36 From an egoist position (subsection 2.5.3), I argue, the opposite (causing harm to others) would not be 
strategic. It would be deemed too risky in that it could cause too many detrimental side effects. Negative consequences 
suffered by others (e.g., an employee feels angry toward his/her leader because he/she believes that he/she is being 
mistreated by him/her) might reverberate against the self (the employee complains about his/her perceived mistreatment 
to the leader’s superior; the leader’s reputation is then damaged: he/she loses a major promotion he/she was striving to 
get), which would then violate the most fundamental principle of egoism: prioritising long-term self-interest.   
37 I do not refer to any particular research group. 
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have also negatively interpreted the act of using EI abilities for personal gain (e.g., it is associated 
with the deployment of “dark side tactics” in Kilduff et al., 2010, p. 133). Outside the EI domain, 
perceptions of self-interest give the impression to be much more affirmed and optimistic. For 
instance, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1651/1950), in Miller’s (1999) words, “enthroned self-
interest as the cardinal human motive” (p. 1053). Conveying a similar message, social psychologist 
Haidt (2007) said “If you are asked to explain human behavior in two seconds or less, you might 
want to say ‘self-interest’” (p. 998). And Sigmund (2010), Professor of mathematics and pioneer in 
evolutionary game theory, has concentrated much of his thinking on exploring (probabilistically) 
how selfishness can lead to cooperative outcomes. Even falling in love has been theorised as being 
a self-expansion motivation (Aron & Aron, 2016). 
Reciprocal (or impure38) altruism (when one agent helps another and expects a reward in 
return; Becker, 1976) maybe epitomises much of the functioning of social relations; if they are 
indeed considered transactional (Grant, 2013). However, I prefer to choose the theory of 
psychological egoism to defend SEI intellectually because, in my view, it attributes more directly a 
rational sense to the concept of motives. Psychological egoism is both the observation and the belief 
that fulfilling self-interested needs is always the main reason that ultimately motivates human 
conduct (Slote, 1964). It differs from ethical egoism in that it does not necessarily endorse 
normative prescriptions (e.g., one always ought to act on the basis of self-interest in order to be 
considered ethical). Believers in altruism have developed interesting proposals (e.g., the empathy-
altruism hypothesis;39 Batson, 1987; Batson & Coke, 1981) but, I argue, fail to offer cogent 
arguments to justify the altruistic nature, for example, of the joy experienced by the empathic 
person. Can it (joy) not be exclusively felt within the empathic person by the empathic person? If 
the answer is yes, then maybe the Stoics 40 were right in supposing that “emotional thinking is often 
self-interested” (Lyons, 1999, p. 24). 
Against charges such as the “me-first caricature” (Frank, 1988, p. ix) or “narcissistic 
absolutists” (my own formulation based on a synthesis of the discussion in Nagel, 1978, p. 86) 
moderate egoists respond that they respect the interest of others (as the opposite would be 
counterproductive; what would be the benefit of living in a world where conflicts reign?) 
(Beauchamp et al., 2009) and are simply concerned about maximising their own existence (Regis, 
1980). 
Following Darwin (1859/1966), evolutionary biologists have rationalised “altruistic” 
behaviours using the kin selection model (making sacrifice on behalf of close relatives to ensure the 
                                                 
38 One scientific example of impure altruism is the fact that activation in brain reward centers is detected in 
people who have just acted altruistically (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; cited in Cain, Dana, & Newman, 2014). 
39 When having empathy for another person motivates altruistic acts toward that person. 
40 See also subsection 2.2.1. 
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perpetuation of one’s own genes; Hamilton, 1964). For some, kin selection seems to exemplify one 
mechanism of altruism (Cain et al., 2014; Frank, 1988; Kitcher, 1985). Presently, I do not share this 
analysis. For others (see the selfish-goal hypothesis; Bargh & Huang, 2009), the parallel between 
genes’ formation and behaviours engaged in PGP (based on the premise that they are often 
unconscious) is patent: both rely on a natural selection process. I note that this logic, by putting 
forward the argument of naturality, does not infer explicit moral arbitration and thus looks “purer.” 
I also note that evolutionary explanations of emotions provide pragmatic reasons for linking 
emotional arousal with selfishness (see Plutchik, 1994, 2001). Fundamentally, SEI is based on the 
same logic of these works, this time applied to EI. I finally note that if the condition for altruistic 
behaviour is the active preservation of others’ wellbeing sans conscious concerns for one’s own 
self-interest (psychological perspective; Hoffman, 1981), then a volume of actions could be deemed 
altruistic. As a benevolent riposte, I mention just a few studies.  
In one experiment – cited in Sigmund (2010, p. 13) – that took place in a British university, 
a picture of eyes put on a cafeteria wall near an ‘honesty box’ generated an increase of more than 
two hundred percent of the amount habitually given by staff members for snacks. This basic test 
reflects well how “generosity” may be instrumentalised to avoid undesirable judgments from others. 
Similar findings have led behavioural ethicists (e.g., Cain et al., 2014) to recommend the removal of 
observation from research designs. 
After conducting four experiments, Newman and Cain (2014) reported the presence of a 
"tainted altruism effect.” This effect refers to the empirical conclusion that people consider that it is 
more moral to act absolutely selfishly (when self-interested behaviours create no charitable benefit) 
than not acting fully altruistically (when charitable efforts produce both personal and charitable 
benefits) because pure selfish acts at least do not demonstrate any ambiguous compromises with 
regard to the utilisation of accessible resources.  
In a final OB study, negative and message-congruent leaders (i.e., negative feedback 
delivered with negative facial expressions) received more positive member ratings than positive and 
message-incongruent leaders (positive feedback delivered with negative facial expressions) 
(Newcombe & Ashkanasy, 2002).  
I selected these studies to illustrate that virtuous behaviour might in fact not be expected and 
does not appear to be representative of the norm; if there exists one [norm], then, perhaps self-
interest constitutes it (Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001). Unless contextual demands force it, 
lucky is the one who encounters a true altruist.  
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Problematization as theoretical support 
Spotting a gap in a literature or critiquing an established theory is not problematizing. 
Rather, Sandberg and Alvesson (2011) argue that problematization is an unorthodox process 
involving the detection of a problem and the elaboration of an original line of reasoning for 
demonstrating its existence. Boundaries need to be pushed; dominant assumptions need to be 
challenged. Many theorists subscribe to this idea of research ideal. For example, Whetten (1989) 
considers that formulating logics that dispute standard frameworks is a core mission of theory 
development.  
In this thesis, I identify a gap in the EI literature (i.e., EI is studied either as a prosocial or 
negative tool, which leaves room for another type of utilisation between those two extremes) but I 
do not restrict my contribution to signalling this gap. I also propose to envisage the utility of EI in a 
way that has not yet been formally introduced (the current thesis offers the first operational 
definition for SEI) and that disrupts past theorising. As noted earlier, Kilduff et al. (2010) have 
linked EI abilities with what they call “dark side tactics.” In choosing a lugubrious label, I argue, 
Kilduff and his colleagues have mostly associated SEI with negative utilisations of EI. Without the 
publication of their article, the robustness of the current research, to some extent, would be 
diminished. But the view I articulate and defend in my thesis endeavours to critique the existing 
state of the EI literature (including part of the Kilduff et al. general position), which I believe does 
not reflect a pragmatic interpretation of reality.  
In my work, SEI is positively conceptualised within the domain of self-interest and 
functional opportunism. It is separate from the dark side of EI. I propose that most individuals, 
ultimately, use their EI for self-interested reasons. I further propose that such utilisation is normal, 
i.e., it is an automatism instinctually shared among humans. Although my logic is simple, defending 
it requires the formulation of audacious critiques that go beyond demanding rudimentary revisions. 
As mentioned before, these critiques do not infer the denial of the importance of previous 
discussions and research findings, nor do they pretend to revolutionise the field. In its descriptive 
and purest form, I endorse the theory of EI. Interpretations that are made of its utility, however, I do 
not (fully). In shedding light on the primary role of self-interest in the selection of social behaviour, 
I hope to offer a new angle of appreciation for the purpose of EI. For Alvesson and Sandberg 
(2011), that is acceptable evidence for being validated as moderate problematizer. 
 
Competitiveness as a primary situational factor  
Competitiveness (CMP), as a trait, refers to the desire or the need to achieve and outperform 
others in interpersonal situations that provide an – actual or perceived – opportunity to win (Smither 
& Houston, 1992). For the purpose of the present research, CMP is conceptualised as a context-
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specific variable (Deutsch, 1949). Inherent to this view, from an SEI perspective, is the proposition 
that the presence of CMP requires at least two situational factors to be activated: (a) an environment 
that is propitious to PGP, and (b) the existence of a rival, or a group of competitors who serve as 
performance standard.  
CMP (purely contextual or mixed trait-context) can be either a positive or a negative force 
(Houston, Mcintire, Kinnie, & Terry, 2002). For example, it can trigger citizenship efforts and 
increase performance (Krishnan, Netemeyer, & Boles, 2002) or it can trigger unethical behaviour 
(e.g., sabotage acts directed at perceived competitors) (Charness, Masclet, & Villeval, 2013) and 
severely affects wellbeing (e.g., anxiety, stress, depression) when the maintenance of social status is 
endangered (Gilbert, McEwan, Bellew, Mills, & Gale, 2009).  
Compared to other domains, CMP is arguably most present in the workplace as work 
structures are hierarchical and resources (materialistic and others more broadly) are typically 
limited. When CMP is high (often because the organisational culture encourages it through reward 
systems; Kilduff et al., 2010), high-EI people, in theory, should have the advantage to be able to 
capitalise on their emotional abilities to develop strategies and advance their personal interests. 
Evidence in support of this hypothesis exists. In an EI study that utilised the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
paradigm,41 high-EI players chose, and knew when, to compete (instead of collaborating) when 
maximising their goal scores was at stake (Fernández-Berrocal, Extremera, Lopes, & Ruiz-Aranda, 
2014). Subsection 5.2.2 rationalises further the CMP-SEI link. 
 
Strategic behaviours 
In general, strategic individuals engage in actions with an expectation for a certain return or 
personal benefit (Kacmar & Ferris, 1993). They are aware of rivals, sense and memorise situational 
cues, and may spend substantial time to consider alternatives before acting. In the OB literature, 
strategic behaviours and tactics are often used interchangeably (e.g., Johnson, Griffith, & Buckley, 
2016; Kilduff et al., 2010; Turnley & Bolino, 2001). Because SEI is at an embryonic stage of 
development, I also chose to not elaborate on the distinction here.    
Management scholars have offered different taxonomies of strategic behaviours with 
evident overlapping definitions. I identified political behaviours (Mayes & Allen, 1977) and IM 
behaviours (Goffman, 1959) as the most cited types. Political behaviours involve “the management 
of influence to obtain ends not sanctioned by the organization or to obtain sanctioned ends through 
non-sanctioned means” (Mayes & Allen, 1977, p. 675). People who use IM behaviours aim to shape 
                                                 
41 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two-person game where, after being informed about the rules of the game, the 
players are asked to make strategic decisions simultaneously (e.g., cooperating by giving a donation to the other player 
vs. choosing to defect by donating nothing). Each time, four different outcomes (hierarchically organised in terms of 
how advantageous they are for each player) are possible (Sigmund, 2010). 
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in a certain way the image that others have of them (Leary & Kowalski, 1990) through ingratiation, 
self-promotion, exemplification, supplication, or intimidation (see Jones & Pittman, 1982 for single 
definitions).  
I understand non-strategic behaviours as casual behaviours not subjected to competitive 
pressures and not requiring particular self-regulatory efforts. To quote Latham and Locke (1991) 
“goal-directedness is inherent in the life process” (p. 240), but, I argue, all goals are not complex 
and desired enough to activate the use of SEI at a high level. 
 
2.5.4. Précis of the SEI case thus far 
 
In this chapter, I have presented a critical review of some of the major developments and 
findings in the area of EI and leadership ethics to gradually extend Kilduff et al.’s (2010) original 
conception of SEI. I conclude the review by recapitulating my view of SEI through two 
complementary lines of arguments. First, I explain why I believe that SEI has potential to influence 
future paradigmatic changes in EI/OB research. Second, I clarify what I think SEI is at this time of 
writing. 
 
A strategic revolution is under way? 
Strategic behaviours are important for survival and personal elevation. In spite of such 
virtue, they have often been a missing part in the puzzle of positive behaviours that can be fostered 
by emotionally intelligent leadership. More disconcertingly, strategic behaviours are often connoted 
in a pejorative manner, denying the very essence of what organisations are – political arenas 
(Pfeffer, 1981). I observe, however, that several OB scholars have recently devoted particular 
efforts to restore strategic behaviours as necessary and normal behaviours for leadership 
effectiveness (e.g., Ferris et al., 2007b), and that these efforts are accelerating (see Belschak et al., 
2015; Ellen et al., 2016; Grant & Mayer, 2009; Thoroughgood et al., 2016). For these reasons, I 
argue that a paradigm shift in the study of EI and leadership ethics, supported by continued research 
on SEI, might soon be under way. It has yet to fully bourgeon – but – a strategic revolution is likely 
to occur, I further argue. 
Interestingly, the timing of its occurrence (assuming my intuition is correct) seems to follow 
a decennial pattern (approximately: cognitive revolution=dictating research agendas up to 1995, 
affective revolution=formally conceptualised between 2003-2007, strategic revolution=presently 
crystallising). And, the typical hardship encountered by those desirous to transcend superiority 
clichés attached to (methodological and theoretical) trends (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014) seems to 
be present as well. Although the non-harmfully gained benefits resulting from a strategic utilisation 
of EI are acknowledged, this remains parsimoniously done and with a taint of ambiguity (like the 
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mention of the possible negative side of EI, e.g., Caruso, Bhalerao, & Karve, 2016). Perhaps the 
reticence for a clear recognition emanates from a cultural predisposition to conform to dominant 
paradigmatic norms, especially when doing so generates fruitful feedback (i.e., commercialisation 
of instruments, of training programs – for some averaging 3000USD for ½ week). Still speculating, 
security (in the sense of Maslow’s 1943/1954 need for belongingness) priming, it might be more 
intellectually comfortable to routinely defend the construct’s scientific worth this way; and routines 
are hard to abandon. If theory is meant to serve practice pragmatically (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011), 
then the idyllicism that is put forward through (some) existing EI training programs is a disturbing 
trend.  
In anticipation of future critiques that might surface due to an inadequate impression of my 
propos, I conclude by clarifying further my position. 
 
What SEI is and what it is not 
In developing SEI, my aim is to express a critical view of the way emotion knowledge is 
likely to be used by a large portion of individuals operating in (and outside of) an organisational 
context. I propose that such knowledge is most often used to facilitate PGP and self-interested 
motives. This is one philosophical position only; the one that today seems most realistic to me. I 
also aim to expose a leadership taboo in putting forward the satisfaction of self-interest as the 
ultimate cause that drives leaders’ actions.  
Further, my aim is not to provoke (in the brutal and frivolous sense of the term) but to 
problematize the established literature in the area of EI in general, and EI and leadership ethics in 
particular. As I have reiterated many times in this review, SEI seeks to theorise a novel angle of 
appreciation of the utility of EI. Scholars continue to compartmentalise the utility of EI into the 
altruistic or manipulative box. Kilduff et al. (2010) condemned the fact that research that focuses on 
the positive use of EI might be offering an embellished version of the theory. I concur with this 
view; but I also critique the dark side perspective for romanticising, in an inverted manner (because 
this time the focus is on the extreme negative application of EI), the function of leadership.  
Finally, I envisage the strategic use of EI from a functional perspective. That is, SEI does 
not tolerate unethical leadership, nor does it support Mach,42 or any other DT dimensions. Instead, 
SEI embraces healthy opportunism, not as a normative guide to act, but as a simple and rational 
interpretation of interactional dynamics between humans.  
                                                 
42 Mach, as used in this thesis, refers to interpretations of Machiavelli’s (1513/1962) thinking found in the 
psychology and management literatures. These have been made almost 500 years after his passing (if we stop counting 
at the year 1970, when Christie and Geis developed the Mach IV) and have quasi invariably been negative. Some 
nuanced views exist. Bass (2007), for example, described Machiavelli as the “ultimate pragmatist” (p. 4). See also 
Kessler et al. (2010) for a constructive understanding of Machiavelli’s writings.  
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Based on the preceding review, I advance the following three main research questions 
(RQs): RQ1: What ultimately motivates a leader to value emotions in interactions with followers? 
RQ2: What type of strategic behaviours high-EI leaders (in relation to low-EI leaders) 
favour for goal pursuit?  
RQ3: Is strategic emotional intelligence empirically a valid view of the utility of EI? 
 
I next present and justify the methodology employed to answer the RQs. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  Introduction  
In Chapter 3 I describe how I ensured the methodological rigour of the two studies 
conducted within this research program. Details provided are justifications for a mixed-methods 
design as well as for a maximum variation sampling strategy. I also justify the tools and techniques 
adopted for collecting and analysing the data, and the procedures used to tackle reliability and 
validity issues. Before entering this discussion, because it represents the philosophical foundation 
upon which the entire research is based, I outline the research paradigm selected. I also succinctly 
demonstrate how the problematization approach methodologically fits with the design employed in 
Studies 1 and 2. Figure 3.1 included (roughly) halfway summarises the main steps of the thesis 
from a methods perspective. 
 
3.2.  Epistemological stance: Post-positivism 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, I decided to base my research on the post-positivistic paradigm. 
Post-positivism is rooted in the ontological principle that there exists a tangible truth, or a superior 
coherence, that can solve research problems but that is unattainable with absolute certitude (Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000). In other words, a post-positivist trusts that, in the external world, all questions have 
a perfect answer with perfectly enunciable causal mechanisms but believes that no answer, despite 
their existence, can be immaculately apprehended and reported. Thus, a post-positivistic stance 
implies the belief that truth is (i.e., exists), a profound interest for chasing it as well as the 
intellectual resignation that it will always only be partially captured. The fact that post-positivism 
necessitates both a philosophical tolerance for imprecision and the conviction, or unconditional 
hope, that precision in fact is, constitutes one of the two major reasons for my decision to adopt it as 
the main paradigm guiding the current research.  
My intimate motivation for conducting research – as “moderate purist” – is to get as close as 
scientifically possible to discovering objective truth, while acknowledging the process is perpetual 
and the means are inexhaustible. Past this personal inclination, post-positivism is optimally suited 
for the current research because it theoretically aligns with the use of a mixed-methods design (see 
section 3.4 for an elaboration of this point). And mixed-methods designs, in particular, allow 
addressing research questions sequentially (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004), which is what I aim to 
achieve via the execution of Studies 1 and 2 (i.e., Study 1= qualitative study that focuses on 
exploring the plausibility of SEI, followed by Study 2= experimental study that focuses on testing 
SEI’s core mechanism).  
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3.3. Sub-methodological philosophy guiding the overall research: Problematization 
Problematization is implicitly integrated into the choice of design of the two studies. In 
Study 1, the use of problematization is reflected in the direct nature of the questions posed to the 
leaders (e.g., Are there times when you disguise your emotions at work?), notably questions about 
their motives for managing emotions in their interactions with other organisational members (e.g., 
Have you ever modified your behaviour to control your subordinates or other colleagues’ emotions 
at work? If so, why did you do this?). Obtaining data of this level of subtlety through quantitative 
surveys would have been unnecessarily arduous (Campbell et al., 2013; Golafshani, 2003; Treviño 
et al., 2003). The more general decision to use interviews as the principal data collection method in 
Study 1 was thus key to facilitate problematization. In Study 2, the aim is to test SEI 
experimentally, and SEI is predicated on an intellectualisation of EI that challenges the prevailing 
literature. So, the content of the hypotheses tested and the nature of the control variables selected 
(Chapter 5) are per se problematization outcomes. 
 
3.4.  Mixed methods research design  
Qualitative and quantitative works are often opposed (Hammersley, 1992) on the basis that 
qualitative research seeks to explore multilayered phenomena and to interpretively uncover the 
processes that underlie their emergence, whereas deductive thinking through hypothesis testing is 
most fundamental in quantitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Holloway & Todres, 2003). 
Achieving research integrity does not impose the selection of a single method, however.  
According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), methodological purism does not reflect a 
rational conception of reality. Instead, these authors argue that mixed methods research is for 
pragmatists as it permits to study complex problems creatively without superfluous restrictions that 
could denote paradigmatic obsessions. They conceive mixed methods research as a modern 
alternative, a “third wave” movement (p. 17). From a global intellectual standpoint, this argument 
aligns with the way I position SEI: I favour centrism (the benign self-interested use of EI) over 
extremism (the altruistic vs. destructive use of EI) when I appreciate the utility of EI. 
Mixed methods researchers intuitively endorse post-positivism in choosing to superpose, 
integrate or semi-integrate qualitative and quantitative logics (depending on how much strength is 
attributed to each paradigm and the order of their intervention in the research process); many 
combinations are possible (in fact as many as can be explained by reason). In all cases, the 
profoundness of the data obtained through subjective means (e.g., interviews) and the objectivity of 
predictive statistical models are valued.  
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I used Johnson and Onwuegbuzie’s (2004) guidelines to determine and justify my general 
design. Based on the authors’ descriptions, I employed a mix between (a) the mixed-model (i.e., 
mixing qualitative and quantitative techniques across of the stages of the research process) and (b) 
the mixed-method type (i.e., including both a qualitative and a quantitative phase in an overall 
research project). I attributed equal weight to the two studies, which I conducted in a consecutive 
order (hence QUAL QUAN43 in Figure 3.1).  
Study 1 explores leaders’ emotion management motives. Study 1 is thus crucial to provide 
confidence that testing SEI is a realisable and worthwhile goal. As first study, it also allows me to 
detect elements within the conceptualisation of SEI that might need refinement (e.g., higher-order 
strategic behaviours are likely to be insidious and covert) and to apprehend methodological pivots 
(e.g., the population most optimal to test SEI is early to mid-career managers).  
Study 2, on the other hand, includes an objective EI measure and aims to concretely test the 
mechanism of SEI. Combining the strengths of each type of study as illustrated here (deeper 
meaning captured + rapid quantification of the relationship between definite variables of interest) is 
a classic advantage of mixed methods (Creswell & Clark, 2007) that results in a more complete and 
erudite understanding of the problem scrutinised (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). Plus, 
given that results from one method can both contradict the results and inform the design of the 
other, premature conclusions are minimised (e.g., SEI is implausible) and, as evoked earlier, 
creativity is encouraged (which are two central objectives of problematization; Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2011). 
 
3.5.  Study 1: An exploration of senior leaders’ motivations for valuing emotions at work 
While there is an emerging interest in studying how motivations and emotional skills are 
linked, to my knowledge, no research has so far examined the nature of the motivations from an 
angle that explicitly targets the notion of self-interest and personal goals. Recent EI/motivation 
studies have either attempted to establish a general motivational profile for high-EI individuals (i.e., 
dominant intrinsic vs. extrinsic triggers for performance) (e.g., Giorgi, Pérez, & Mancuso, 2016) or 
to identify behavioural correlates of certain personality characteristics (see Bacon & Corr, 2017). 
Past works in this area have also uniquely been based on self-report measures of EI.  
In Study 1 I used qualitative, standardised semi-structured interviews to explore leaders’ 
emotion management motives. Qualitative designs suit explorations that center on topics about 
which, like SEI, little is already known (Conger, 1998). And interviews are helpful to use when the 
                                                 
43 Format utilised in Johnson and Onwuegbuzie’s (2004) matrix: Paradigm Emphasis Decision (equal status as 
used here vs. dominant status, e.g., QUAL  quan) x Time Order Decision (sequential as used here vs. concurrent, 
e.g., QUAL + quan). 
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phenomenon studied is complex and hardly observable in a direct manner (Campbell et al., 2013). 
They are also useful for generating rich data about people’s personal views and experiences 
(Turner, 2010), such as posing questions to leaders about the deepest reasons behind their ER 
efforts. To increase the validity of the findings, both leaders and followers participated in the 
interviews (fourteen triads total, each comprising 1 leader + 2 followers, see section 3.9 for sample 
size justification). Interview questions gradually led to discussing leaders’ ultimate motives for 
valuing emotions during interactions with followers. Before reaching this stage, leaders first offered 
their views of the importance of emotions in leadership and described their common approaches for 
managing emotions at work. 
To prepare the interviews for analysis (all were first transcribed verbatim), as recommended 
by Campbell et al. (2013) and Hruschka et al. (2004), I segmented the transcripts into meaningful 
units of text. The units consisted of a few words (rarely), sentences, or larger paragraphs – often 
combinations of fragments of the last two. Like Dasborough (2006) and others (Keenan & Newton, 
1985; Narayanan, Menon, & Spector, 1999), I then used thematic content analysis – a hybrid 
method combining thematic analysis (goal: generating themes) and content analysis (goal: 
quantifying text units into frequencies) – to analyse the data. Thematic analysis is widely used 
across different disciplines because it provides a foundational and flexible approach to analysing 
qualitative data (Boyatzis, 1998; Roulston, 2001), hence the viable integration with content 
analysis. Chapter 4 details the steps of the main coding scheme development and how I 
operationalised the unitization strategy and the negotiated agreement approach. 
 
3.6.  Study 2: Experimental testing of strategic emotional intelligence 
Study 2 aims to produce experimental data that complement the results obtained in Study 1, 
and is more direct in focus; it tests the mechanism of SEI. In brief, the experiment has a 2 (primed 
goal: desirable or undesirable) x 2 (level of CMP: high or low) between-participants design with EI 
treated as a continuous measure. Data are collected online through computerised scales and a 
computerised in-basket exercise. An in-basket simulates a selection of work situations and 
administrative tasks requiring decision-making, with subjects asked to play the role of the manager 
and to make decisions based on the provided materials (Treviño, 1992). Standard in-basket 
materials consist of a dozen memos (modernised as emails here) – possibly also letters and phone 
messages (e.g., Treviño & Youngblood, 1990) – that hide the manipulation contained in one of 
them. In-baskets are recommended for testing theory-based hypotheses that have an ethical 
dimension, especially when the research questions concentrate on organisational constructs such as 
motivation, leadership, and political behaviours (Treviño, 1992).
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Figure 3.1 Abridged logic of the thesis and sequential steps for conducting studies 1 and 2 
 
Critical Literature Review 
 
  
 
Study 1: Qualitative Study 
Aim: To explore the practical plausibility of strategic 
emotional intelligence 
 
 
Study 2: Experimental Study 
Aim: To test the basic mechanism of strategic 
emotional intelligence 
 
  Construction of arguments for SEI             QUAL exploration of SEI potential               QUAN test of SEI conceptual validity 
Recruit participants (senior leaders and 
followers) 
 
Refine main coding scheme with the aid of 
second coder (axial coding) 
 
Conduct semi-structured interviews 
Segment transcripts data and develop coding 
schemes (open coding) 
Data preparation, i.e., transcribe interviews 
 
Critical review of the literature on EI 
and leadership ethics (and related dis-
ciplines) to progressively conceptualise 
SEI 
Recruit participants from multiple 
organisations across Australia 
Pilot test and revise in-basket exercise 
 
Develop + program in-basket exercise online 
Administer three control variables – Phase 2 
    Analyse data in SPSS 24.0 
 
Administer MSCEIT (EI) test – Phase 1 
Administer in-basket exercise – Phase 3 
 
Analyse final data set using thematic content 
analysis 
Formulate conclusions about SEI’s potential 
and implications for theory, research & practice Inform experimental model tested in Study 2 
Develop interview guide and protocol 
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3.7.  Procedures for establishing reliability and validity in Study 1 (Qualitative) 
Typically, qualitative studies based on the post-positivist paradigm must fulfil four specific 
criteria to attest their validity or trustworthiness. These criteria are: credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability (Bryman & Bell, 2003). They are critical because they facilitate 
the production of high-quality data (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Riege, 2003), which in turn augments 
the likelihood of making influential contributions. As detailed below (see also Table 3.1 for a 
summary), in designing Study 1 I committed to utilise a minimum of two strategies to meet each 
criterion. 
Credibility refers to the internal consistency of the findings (Yilmaz, 2013), and in 
qualitative research it is often determined by who is judging the data (Shenton, 2004). To limit 
objectivity bias, two coders coded the full set of transcripts. I also recruited leaders and followers 
with a range of demographic and work characteristics as, in post-positivist work, maximising 
perspectives can further boost impartiality (Dasborough, 2006). Upon completion of the coding 
process, I used triangulation – via data sources (i.e., leader vs. followers) (Denzin, 1978) – to 
strengthen the overall validity of the findings (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Patton, 2002). Followers’ 
interview data served to confront perceptions between members of a same triad, and to identify and 
resolve divergences (see Chapter 4 for details). Incorporating methodological procedures 
successfully employed in previous research is also recommended to achieve adequate credibility 
(Shenton, 2004). Accordingly, I designed Study 1 based on a combination of methods extracted 
from two highly cited studies in the area of emotions and EL (specifically: Dasborough, 2006 for 
developing the main coding scheme; and Treviño et al., 2003 for part the unitization procedure and 
part of the intercoder reliability calculation). Another recommendation to increase credibility is to 
include, in the results section, citations from the interview transcripts (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). As 
section 4.6 (Chapter 4) demonstrates, I supported many of my interpretations with authentic 
citations. Finally, I also provided a comprehensive description of the methods (e.g., the overall 
process of generating intercoder agreement) so that the reader can appreciate the global coherency 
of Study 1. 
Transferability is affected by the level of generalisability of the findings past the study 
context (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In qualitative research, ascertaining transferability is difficult 
because many unique contextual factors often impinge on the results (Shenton, 2004). The current 
research (i.e., exploring the plausibility of SEI) is also the first of its kind, which further limits its 
potential of transferability (Borgman, 1986). The notion of generalisation, however, is not a priority 
in qualitative studies, creating meaning is (i.e., scrutinising the “how” and “why” of a given 
phenomenon) (Dworkin, 2012). Still, to promote transferability, I focused on two conventional 
strategies: (a) sampling adequacy/maximum variation sampling combined (Mason, 2002; Teddlie & 
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Yu, 2007): I recruited true leaders and followers from multiple work environments (e.g., 
consultants, public servants, lawyers, sport managers, scientists), and (b) in-depth description 
(Shenton, 2004): I provide, in the relevant Chapter 4, as much background facts as possible to 
establish the circumstances of the study (e.g., demographic and work characteristics of the sample) 
and to justify the strategic analytical choices I made (e.g., how I cross-validated data within triads). 
Researchers (when exploring comparable research questions) and practitioners (when considering 
how much they can identify) will reveal the transferability of Study 1’s findings more exactly.  
Dependability is the degree to which, if the exact same research was repeated (i.e., identical 
setting, sample, and procedure) results originally found would be found again (Krefting, 1991). 
Like transferability, dependability relies on fragile (subjective and highly contextual) 
demonstrations. To improve dependability, I applied Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) guideline and tried 
to render key stages of the research process trackable for the reader by detailing the reasoning they 
involved and by providing examples. Also, as mentioned under Credibility, I employed a second 
coder to minimise investigator bias. In fact, all strategies cited under credibility could potentially be 
transposed here. As Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue, reliability can be viewed as a corollary of 
validity (see also Patton, 2002).  
Confirmability depends on the extent to which a study’s outcomes are representative of the 
genuine experiences and opinions of the informants (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). It would be dishonest 
for a researcher to claim he/she has attained (categorical) confirmability, especially in qualitative 
research where subjectivity dominates the inquiry process. Instead, I claim that I pursued 
confirmability in four main ways. First, the triangulation approach (via data sources) served to 
cross-validate perspectives and to moderate potential misinterpretations due to investigator bias 
(Guba, 1981). Second, as previously explained, dual coding served a similar purpose. Third, I used 
qualitative content analysis to examine the coded data. According to experts, this method is “a 
systematic and objective means of describing and quantifying phenomena” (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 
108). Fourth, as advised (e.g., Shenton, 2004), I recognised the limitations of the study. Section 4.8 
is reserved to this intention.  
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Table 3.1 Strategies for meeting reliability and validity criteria in Study 1 
Credibility 
 Dual coding to minimise investigator bias  
 Maximum variation sampling (purposive sampling) 
 Triangulation via data sources (leaders and followers)  
 Adoption of well-established research methods 
 Authentic citations  
Transferability 
 Sample adequacy (leaders and followers currently in position) 
 Maximum variation sampling (purposive sampling) 
 In-depth description (overall narrative approach) 
Dependability 
 In-depth methodological description  
 Dual-coding to minimise investigator bias  
Confirmability 
 Triangulation via data sources (leaders and followers)  
 Dual coding to minimise investigator bias  
 Objective method of data analysis (thematic content analysis) 
 Acknowledgment of limitations 
 
3.8.  Procedures for establishing reliability and validity in Study 2 (Quantitative) 
The same criteria that served to justify the qualitative rigour of Study 1 may be applied to 
Study 2. In fact, they originate from quantitative research and were adjusted by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) to fit research performed within the qualitative paradigm; with substituted labels to mark the 
distinction. This approximate “transfer” was intended to address the critique that qualitative 
research is too loosely demanding in terms of reliability and validity testing procedures (Roberts, 
Priest, & Traynor, 2006). Social scientists have ardently debated the pertinence of the parallel 
through the years (Golafshani, 2003; Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002) but the 
Lincoln and Guba approach is becoming the “gold standard” (Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 
2003), hence its use here. Using the same sequence of their qualitative equivalents in Study 1, the 
criteria in Study 2 were: internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity. Below I 
explain the verification strategies employed. Table 3.2 provides a summary. 
Internal validity in experimental designs depends on whether causality is demonstrated 
between the predictor and the outcome (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2012). To enhance internal validity 
in Study 2 I pre-tested the in-basket exercise with a small group of managers (N=81). The results 
showed no significant effect of the manipulation on the strategic behaviours items and revealed that 
this was most likely due to the items’ overly sycophantic nature (poor construct validity). Based on 
the pilot data, I modified the items (clustered, in the end, into two rubrics: strategic external 
behaviours =SEB, and strategic internal behaviours =SIB) in the final version administered to the 
larger working sample (N=152). I also conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to check the 
factor structure of the revised strategic behaviours, which confirmed their decomposition (as SEB 
vs. SIB). Finally, I used randomisation (Campbell & Stanley, 2015) and included three key control 
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variables (Mach, IQ, and personality) in the regression analyses to prove the relationships tested 
were distinctively causal (Lynch, 1982).  
External validity (same definition as Transferability; section 3.7). Like in Study 1, I aimed 
to recruit an ecologically valid sample (i.e., managers working in a range of organisations, if 
possible not CEOs – see section 3.9 for explanations, and currently in position at the time of the 
study) to enhance the generalisability of the findings (Polit & Beck, 2010). Moreover, I adapted the 
content of the in-basket experiment from a previous study (Ashkanasy et al., 2006) and modernised 
it (computerised test with tailored role identification) to enhance realism and immersion (Treviño, 
1992) (see Chapter 5 for more detail). To further maximise external validity, OB experts provided 
critical feedback on the credibility of the pilot in-basket materials.  
Reliability consists in demonstrating measurement consistency (Golafshani, 2003). The 
measures I used in Study 2 are widely established measures with standard Cronbach’s alpha values. 
For example, internal reliability coefficients for the four MSCEIT branch scores are typically stable 
and range from .60 to .90 (Austin et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 2002b; Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 
2010). Past research also reported a test-retest reliability of .86 for the MSCEIT total score 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003). In addition, I verified that each measure had been previously 
administered and shown to have good reliability in several other workplace studies that 
concentrated on the topic of EI and/or EL and/or, more vaguely, individual differences (see Chapter 
5 for references). 
Objectivity concerns the quantitative robustness of the overall results (Yilmaz, 2013) above 
and beyond the interposition of the researcher’s biases (Shenton, 2004). Again, such perfection is 
not achievable (all tests are derived from human imagination) but efforts to maximise objectivity 
can be justified in logic terms. Study 2, for example, is experimental in nature. And, experimental 
designs are optimal for providing researchers with a controllable structure to capture immediate, 
authentic responses, for establishing causal inferences, and for reducing the intrusion of bias 
(Winer, 1999). In the case of realistic in-basket experiments, as inferred earlier, this is especially 
true when the study’s primary concern is to solve ethical problems (Treviño, 1992). Also, and 
consistent with the view of EI as a mental ability adopted in this research, I employed an objective 
measure (MSCEIT) to assess managers’ level of EI.  
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Table 3.2 Strategies for meeting reliability and validity criteria in Study 2 
Internal validity 
 Pilot test of the in-basket exercise with ecologically valid 
sample 
 Exploratory factor analysis to validate the categorisation of the 
dependent variables embedded in the in-basket  
 Control variables included in regression model 
 Random assignment of subjects to conditions 
External validity 
 Maximum variation sampling (purposive sampling) 
 Sample adequacy (managers currently in position) 
 Realistic and involving in-basket exercise 
Reliability 
 Established measures with standard Cronbach’s alpha values 
 Measures adequacy (widely used in relevant study contexts) 
Objectivity 
 Experimental design 
 Measures adequacy (performance test of EI) 
 
 
3.9.  Justification of sampling strategy for Study 1 and Study 2 
The choice of sampling strategy depends on the nature of the research questions (Kuzel, 
1992; Marshall, 1996). Below, I justify the type and the size of the two samples based on their 
adequacy for providing valid answers to the research questions that guide the current research.  
Study 1. Senior leaders, by definition, have extensive leadership experience (average length 
in Study 1 was close to 20 years). In addition, as leadership scholars noted (e.g., Bass, 1985; Kilduff 
et al., 2010), the journey toward reaching senior positions in an organisation often requires 
ambition, advanced emotion abilities, and competing with others who possess similar atypical drive 
and skills. Also, while it is consensually assumed in the OB literature that ethical values (which 
includes beliefs about what behaviours may be acceptable to deploy for advancing self-interest) are 
initiated from the top (Smith & Carroll, 1984; Stead, Worrell, & Stead, 1990) and infiltrate all 
organisational levels (Treviño et al., 2003), researchers tend to direct their attention elsewhere when 
investigating ethical questions (i.e., not on top leaders), which harms knowledge development 
(Detert, Treviño, Buris, & Andiappan, 2007). For all these reasons, I deduced that senior leaders 
would constitute an adequate reference point to retrieve rich data about how and why emotional 
skills may be strategically utilised in the workplace. Beyond the goal of increasing the 
generalisability of the findings, I also aimed for a diverse sample to verify the critique that EI does 
not have significant relevance for non-service roles (cf. Zeidner et al., 2004). 
I chose to capture both perspectives of the leader-follower interaction to dissect the data in a 
more conscientious and original way (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). My goal was to reduce three specific 
biases in the interpretation of the leaders’ data: (a) belief bias leading to the negation of the validity 
of alternatives that contradict one’s mental model (Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992), (b) 
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social desirability bias leading to an insincere description of one’s view of ethics (Treviño, 1992), 
and (c) self-rated bias leading to an inflated sense of self and of the benevolence of one’s actions 
(Paulhus & John, 1998). Theoretically, my approach is consistent with the relationship-based 
conception of leadership guiding this research (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). It is also consistent with 
Spradley’s (1979) contrast principle (cited in Treviño et al., 2003), which postulates that 
confronting perspectives creates truly exploitable meaning.  
Study 1’s sample principally qualifies as purposive because it is based on theoretical 
relevance and seeks comparability through maximum variation (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). Eligibility 
criteria for inclusion (leaders) were: (a) being currently in function, (b) having a minimum of three 
direct reports, and (c) accepting to nominate at least two for interview. The sample also qualifies as 
convenient because I recruited participants randomly based on accessibility (geographical and 
temporal) (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2016).  
I now turn to the sample size. Estimating sample sizes in interview-based qualitative 
research is a notorious challenge. Qualitative researchers do not agree on numerical targets and 
many approximate guidelines can be found in the literature (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). In a 
major report on sampling (Baker & Edwards, 2012), expert methodologists recommend estimates 
that range from six to over one hundred data sources. For Bertaux (1981), on the other hand, fifteen 
constitutes the smallest tolerable size. Other experts recommend about twenty data sources total 
(e.g., ideal minimum for Alexandersson, 1994; cited in Dasborough, 2006; and relative maximum – 
a dozen being the minimum – for Kuzel, 1992) when the goal is to achieve maximum variation and 
when testing for convergence between multi-level perspectives. 
To resolve the sample-size problem and identify a broad index, I further inspected the 
literature and looked at the strategies utilised in past emotion/EL studies. I located two relevant 
studies, Dasborough (2006; total N=34: 10 leaders + 24 employees; justification: theoretical 
saturation) and Treviño et al. (2003; total N=40: 20 senior executives + 20 ethics officers; no 
explicit justification provided). In the end, similar to most studies using nonprobabilistic samples 
(Guest et al., 2006), and more generally the majority of qualitative PhD studies (Mason, 2010), 
sample size was fixed by (a general conception of) theoretical saturation (ThS)– when data become 
redundant and cease to produce contextually relevant content (Dworkin, 2012). Bryman (in Baker 
& Edwards, 2012) contends that saturation “forces the researcher to combine sampling, data 
collection, and data analysis, rather than treating them as separate stages in a linear process” (p. 18). 
I viewed this disordered process as a vehicle for authentic exploration given the precision of the 
interview questions (Suri, 2011). The total number of interviewees was 42 (14 senior leaders and 28 
followers). A recent analytical review of 248 independent studies (Saunders & Townsend, 2016), 
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published for the majority in top tier journals, confirms that this number corresponds to the overall 
norm of between 15-60 interviews in organisation and workplace research. 
Study 2. I also chose to test SEI using a mixed (i.e., convenient and purposive; Suri, 2011) 
working sample (N=152 managers). Because the in-basket exercise uses a promotion scenario to 
test managers’ propensity for choosing different strategic behaviours under different competitive 
and goal conditions, I anticipated that lower-ranked managers (in relation to top executives) would 
be able to relate more naturally to the exercise. Furthermore, Study 1’s findings (Chapter 4) suggest 
that accomplished senior leaders find careerist advancement less appealing than developing others. 
Other recent data also show that middle-aged adults score higher on EI overall as compared to both 
younger and older adults (Cabello, Sorrel, Fernández-Pinto, Extremera, & Fernández-Berrocal, 
2016). To test the hypothesis that an individual’s EI influences his potential to be a gifted strategist, 
aiming for a mean age slightly lower in Study 2 thus seemed preferable. Finally, using Cohen’s 
(1988) guidelines for sample size determination in experiments, I performed a priori power analysis 
that assumed a medium effect size, setting the alpha at .05 and 80% power, which confirmed the 
final sample size was adequate.  
 
3.10.  Overall ethical considerations 
I conducted the current research in compliance with the ethics rules defined by the ethics 
committee of the UQ Business School. For each study, participants were provided with participant 
information forms and informed consent forms that stated the implications of, and the benefits and 
potential costs from, taking part. Both forms specified that participants could withdraw from the 
studies at any time without incurring any penalty or prejudice from the University of Queensland or 
their employer.  
In Study 1, I conducted the interviews individually so that participants could consider my 
questions without feeling pressured to answer in a socially desirable way. The leaders nominated at 
least three followers whom I could invite to participate in the interviews. To ensure participants’ 
confidentiality, and for validity purposes, I randomly selected two followers and did not discuss 
their names with their leader. I also kept confidential the identity of the followers within the pairs 
interviewed, although followers were free to talk about their participation to their peers. All 
interviewees consented to be anonymously cited.  
In Study 2, the main ethical consideration that emerged concerned the management of 
participants’ data. Given that there were three phases of data collection and that the administration 
of one variable in each of them necessitated collecting participants’ names, it was impossible to 
collect anonymous data. Specifically, the EI (Phase 1) and IQ (Phase 2) tests were externally hosted 
by a distinct testing company, which, in both cases, asked test-taskers identification questions. In 
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addition, to render the computerised in-basket exercise (Phase 3) credible and realistic, it was 
important that participants acted their decision-maker role under their real names (see subsection 
5.4.2 for explanations). To solve the issue, participants created a digit code by answering an 
identical series of five questions at the beginning of each phase. This code was then used to match 
participants’ responses across the three phases. Participants were made aware of this strategy. Upon 
completion of the data collection, all data were de-identified (codes and names were removed).  
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY ONE - AN EXPLORATION OF SENIOR LEADERS’ 
MOTIVATIONS FOR VALUING EMOTIONS AT WORK 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
In this fourth chapter, my goals are threefold: (a) to complement the details outlined in 
Chapter 3 with regard to the design choices adopted for the execution of Study 1, (b) to report Study 
1’s results, and (c) to assess the contribution of these results to the whole research project. To 
achieve this, I first reintroduce the research questions guiding the study. In a second instant, I 
present the characteristics of the research sample. I then describe the procedure employed for 
collecting the data. In the remainder of the chapter, I explain and justify the data analysis process, 
and, in a combined section, present and interpret the findings. Key conclusions and limitations are 
summarised at the end. 
 
4.2.  Purpose and research questions  
Study 1 aims to offer a first qualitative assessment of the plausibility of SEI in an 
organisational context. SEI, as defined in this thesis, refers to the functional exploitation of EI (i.e., 
no harm is caused to others in the process of manipulating emotions) for self-interested goals. 
Because SEI is predicated on a conception of EI as a mental ability (e.g., as tested in the MSCEIT), 
it is technically not possible, through subjective means, to capture EI and dissociate it from its 
utilisation to then assess the ethicality of the said utilisation. So instead, as a qualitative 
compromise, I chose to concentrate on obtaining rich data about the nature of leaders’ emotion 
management efforts and on scrutinising deeply their underlying motives. Specifically, Study 1 
targets three central research questions (RQs):  
RQ1: What ultimately motivates a leader to value emotions in interactions with followers?  
RQ3-a: To what extent do self-interested motives explain the importance that leaders give to 
valuing emotions in social interactions? 
RQ3-c (partially): Can EI serve leaders’ personal goal pursuit in a way that is compatible 
with ethical conduct? 
 
4.3.  Participants  
The sample consisted of two categories of workers: 14 senior leaders (Mage = 50 years, SD= 9 
years, age range: 29-65) and 28 followers (Mage = 43 years, SD= 12 years, age range: 25-63) 
recruited from different states across Australia. More precisely, 14 triads each comprising 1 senior 
leader and 2 followers were obtained in total (total N=42). Of the senior leaders 57% were male, and 
of the followers 61% were female– a distribution that confirms, albeit to a much lesser degree of 
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disproportionality, previous observations concerning the ratio of male and female occupying a 
senior position (including CEOs) in Australia (Fitzsimmons, Callan, & Paulsen, 2014), and more 
globally (Caruso et al., 2015). Followers and leaders knew each other for 1.7 years on average (SD 
= 1). With the exception of five cases (2 cases x 1 organisation; and 3 cases x 1 other organisation – 
but operating within unrelated departments), all senior leaders were working in separate 
organisations at the time the study was conducted (N=11 total number of organisations involved). 
Participants also represented a variety of industries and professional backgrounds. Some of the 
occupations included were: lawyers, consultants, bankers, scientists, public servants, managers of 
an NGO, university’s senior management staff, and sport managers. Table 4.1 provides additional 
demographic and work characteristics of the sample.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of respondents in Study 1 (N=42) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Leadership exp.= leadership experience; Env. sciences = environmental  
sciences; n-p= non-profit.  
*One value is missing in age (followers’ group) and ethnicity (idem). 
Demographics  Group averages (and %)  
 Leaders Followers 
Gender             .   Male 8 (57%) 11 (39%) 
                   Female 6 (43%) 17 (61%) 
Age*                    20-30 years 1 (7%) 4 (14%) 
.                            31-40 years 1 (7%) 8 (29%) 
                   41-50 years 2 (14%) 7 (25%) 
                   >50 years 
Ethnicity*i           Caucasian  
10 (71%) 
13 (93%) 
8 (32%) 
24 (86%) 
    .E                             Other 1 (7%) 3 (11%) 
Work characteristics Leaders 
Leadership exp.     0-10 2 (14%) 
      (years)              11-20 6 (43%) 
4 (29%) 
2 (14%) 
                21-30 
                >30 
No. of direct          <5 
reports                  5-10 
               11-20 
                >20 
Interactions          Daily 
      > once a day 
     Weekly 
      > once a week 
Industry               Env. sciences  
     Animal care (n-p) 
     Banking 
     Consulting 
     Higher education 
     Health care 
     Legal 
               Maritime  
               Sports 
4 (29%) 
5 (36%) 
4 (29%) 
1 (7%) 
3 (21%) 
6 (43%) 
1 (7%) 
4 (29%) 
2 (14%) 
1 (7%) 
1 (7%) 
2 (14%) 
3 (21%) 
2 (14%) 
1 (7%) 
1 (7%) 
1 (7%) 
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4.4.  Data collection procedure: Semi-structured interviews 
I collected the data over a five-month period. To recruit the leaders, I proceeded in two 
ways: (a) direct solicitation by email to random leaders (N=11) and (b) recommendations from 
personal contacts (N=3). Personal contacts recommended leaders whom they thought might be 
willing to take part in a doctoral research project, but not in direct reference to the topic under 
investigation. Moreover, to minimise researcher bias (Mehra, 2002), I contacted participants whom 
I did not know and had never been introduced to prior to performing the interviews.  
I kept the true purpose of the study reasonably vague to enhance the validity of the research 
findings. Specifically, in the ethics forms distributed it was stated that Study 1 intended to deepen 
current understanding about the role of emotions in leadership. To meet my objectivity goal of 
collecting multiple sources of data, participating leaders were required to nominate at least two 
followers for selection (cf. purposive sample criteria in section 3.9). All the followers invited 
positively responded. Due to time constraints, I restricted to two the number of followers selected, 
aiming whenever achievable for gender parity. In the end, 9 pairs of followers (64%) were evenly 
distributed by gender. All interviews were conducted on an individual basis. Leaders were 
interviewed first since they were the main focus of the study. 
As specified in Chapter 3, for ethical and validity reasons, I did not officially notify 
participants about the identity of others I interviewed, irrespective of their category. For the same 
reasons, I also kept my visits to the organisations as brief as professionally possible. To increase 
data authenticity, interviews took place face-to-face directly at participants’ workplace (32 cases) or 
at another location to accommodate their busy schedule (1 case). When face-to-face was not 
practically feasible interviews were conducted over the phone (9 cases).  
Again, as specified in Chapter 3, I used a semi-structured, open-ended format to conduct the 
interviews. Consistent with the problematization approach guiding this research, this allowed me to 
pose direct questions. Questions for the leaders were structured into three main areas: (a) leaders’ 
perception of emotions (e.g., “What does emotion mean to do you as a leader?”), (b) leaders’ use 
of emotions (e.g., “How often do you use emotions in your interactions with your subordinates and 
others at work?”), and (c) leaders’ motivations for using emotions (e.g., “Are there times when you 
disguise your emotions at work? Why do you do this? What outcomes are you looking for?”). 
Questions for the followers were reversed so that the focus remained on the leaders (like in a 360-
degree feedback instrument). 
For all respondents, I applied the protocol reported in Guest et al.’s (2006) methodological 
article: I asked the same questions in the exact same order but I also explored strategic answers 
inductively. Appendices A (leaders) and B (followers) provide the full content of the interview 
guides. Interviews averaged 90 minutes in length and were recorded digitally. A professional 
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transcribed the recordings verbatim as Word documents. Leaders and followers also completed, in 
their own time, a short demographics questionnaire adapted to their respective roles (see Table 4.1).  
 
4.5. Data analysis using thematic content analysis 
4.5.1. Development of coding schemes  
 
Like Dasborough (2006), I adopted a hybrid approach of inductive and deductive coding 
and theme development (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The interview questions fixed the 
majority of categories and codes (primary coding), and, based on this initial coding, additional and 
more detailed codes were developed (secondary coding).  
For the primary coding scheme, I identified key categories and codes following a simple and 
logical method that consisted in grouping leading questions from the interview guides and 
attributing a label to each group. The in-depth semi-structured format of the interviews generated 
rich data, with an average number of 15 pages per transcript. To reduce coding errors (Fahy, 2001; 
Hodson, 1999), I aimed for a small number of categories and codes (Larsson, 1993). The final 
scheme extracted from this primary coding included 7 categories and 15 individual codes. 
Appendix C provides a list of each with guiding definitions and representative citations. 
For the secondary coding scheme, I directly generated the codes from the transcripts; given 
the objective was to discriminate subcategories of motivations this could only be done post-
interview. Codes’ labels and definitions for the submotivations are presented in Table 4.3 (see also 
Appendix D for some selective citations). 
 
4.5.2. Unitization process: Meaningful segmentation  
 
In-depth semi-structured interview data are complicated to manage and prepare for 
qualitative content analysis (Campbell et al., 2013). Text that corresponds to a pre-established code 
(e.g., self-focused motivation) may be provided in unequal blocks (e.g., in a clearly cut and short 
sentence/paragraph, in the middle of a long sentence only) and/or be dispersed in an interview 
transcript (e.g., a paragraph on a page + another sentence on a later page that completes the 
meaning of the initial paragraph = 1 unit of analysis) (Krippendorff, 1995). As I familiarised myself 
with the transcripts, it became evident that exploitable data were unevenly located. To solve this 
problem, and to ensure the discriminant capability of the coding scheme (Garrison et al., 2006), a 
unitization strategy was required. Unitizing is a standardization task that consists of delineating the 
portions of text to be coded by all coders (Campbell et al., 2013). 
Similar to the approach “thought units” used in Treviño et al.’s (2003) qualitative study on 
EL, I adopted a strategy that focused on meaning units (instead of static units, i.e., the units that 
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naturally materialise in the transcripts). In exploratory research with complex interview data such as 
the present, using meaningful segmentation is appropriate because it prevents interviewees’ 
responses from being decontextualised (Garrison et al., 2006). As an example of this technique, 
units that were coded as self- or others-focused motivations contained motivational rationales that 
were linked to an emotion management strategy. Campbell et al.’s (2013) guidelines also served to 
perform the segmentation of all transcripts (leaders + followers) and were followed for the two 
dimensions of the coding process (i.e., primary and secondary coding).  
I marked as a codable unit any part of text – irrespective of size – to which a code applied, 
while aiming for the briefest units possible to facilitate future coding decisions made during the 
negotiation phase (subsection 4.5.3) (Hruschka et al., 2004). Concretely, I electronically highlighted 
the units in the transcripts using different random colours to demarcate their exact commencement 
and end. Most units were portions of a paragraph, and sometimes combinations of portions of 
several paragraphs. The fully unitized transcripts (original Word documents) or only the individual 
units to be coded (copied in Excel with minimal textual context) constituted the respective bases for 
the primary and secondary coding. 
 
4.5.3.  Reliability of thematic content analysis  
 
In the following paragraphs, I describe the three-phase process used to attain adequate levels 
of reliability in the content analysis: (a) open coding, (b) axial coding, and (c) negotiation. Figure 
4.1, adapted from Hruschka et al. (2004), details several substeps. Note that in both, to facilitate 
understanding for the reader, I concentrate on the execution of the primary coding. The principal 
difference with the secondary coding is that Coder 2 was not involved in the axial coding phase. 
The coders. Two coders, equally qualified in coding qualitative data, independently coded 
the transcripts: I, the interviewer and chief investigator (CI, Coder 1), and a psychology graduate 
student employed as research assistant (RA, Coder 2). To preserve the authenticity of the coding 
schemes (Larsson, 1993), Coder 2 was blind to the RQs and to the concept of SEI.  
Open coding aimed to create the two previously described coding schemes (subsection 
4.5.1) and to segment the transcripts’ data into meaningful units (subsection 4.5.2). This involved 
reading and analysing each transcript, line-by-line, as well as listening to tapes, and to repeat the 
exercise multiple times to ensure no important categories or codes were omitted. Given that the 
segmentation required knowledge of the RQs, which only Coder 1 had, Coder 1 alone coded the 
transcripts during this phase. Conditions of initial immersion in the raw data (i.e., reading the 
transcripts and listening to tapes; Rabiee, 2004), however, were identical for Coders 1 and 2. 
Axial coding is a standard iterative process used to reduce the number of categories and 
codes based on similarity in order to avoid anecdotes and to improve the practicality of the coding 
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scheme (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Here, both coders coded separately a 
random representative sample of transcripts (5 leader interviews and 5 follower interviews). To 
enhance intercoder reliability, only mutually exclusive codes were permitted44 (Campbell et al., 
2013; Kerlinger, 1964). Respecting this rule, the coders could still allocate new categories and 
codes if they judged that doing so would enhance the integrity of the scheme. In the end, no 
additions were made. Instead, two codes (“Attention to emotions frequent” and “Attention to 
emotions infrequent”) were eliminated. Only a trivial number of units emerged for these codes (in < 
5 leaders; threshold used in Treviño et al., 2003), and most of these units significantly overlapped 
with the “Perception of emotions” category to which they were transferred.  
Negotiation. The coders applied the revised scheme to the entire set of transcripts. Upon 
completion, the two sets of coding were compared. The final codes were determined using the 
negotiated agreement approach (Campbell et al., 2013; Garrison et al., 2006). This approach entails 
discussing differences in coding until agreement is reached. It is particularly useful in qualitative 
exploratory studies because in such studies the analysis process relies on sensing meaning and 
uncovering subjective logics, which are activities that are both subjected to biased interpretation 
(Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Morrissey, 1974).  
Four negotiation rounds were performed. Each time the focus was solely on the motivation 
codes45 given the goal of Study 1 is to explore leaders’ motives for valuing emotions at work. The 
adjustments made, however, impacted the quantification of units pertaining to other codes, leading 
to further similarity in the coding of the coders. In preparation for the negotiations, Coder 1 first 
inspected the coding tables of Coder 2 and counted the number of units coded analogously for all 15 
codes. Discrepancies (individual units) were reported in new tables that then provided the basis for 
discussion. Only those that concerned the motivation codes were deliberated until 100% agreement 
was reached. After each round, Coder 1 calculated intercoder agreement. Final agreements, across 
all codes, were 83 percent for the leaders’ transcripts and 87 percent for the followers’ transcripts. 
This degree of accord was deemed satisfactory because it suggests a consistent application of the 
coding scheme (Currell, Hammer, Baggett, & Doniger, 1999). Figure 4.1 (bottom part) provides the 
initial proportions of agreement and the final ones achieved per time point.  
                                                 
44 Basic rule decided between coders to optimise the coding process and to render the data more exploitable. 
45 Because the primary coding ascertained the principal decomposition of the leaders’ motives (main 
dimensions: self-focused motives vs. others-focused motives) at satisfactory levels of agreement, to meet time 
constraints, the secondary coding was applied only to the motivation codes extracted from the leader transcripts. 
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Figure 4.1 Process of generating intercoder agreement in Study 1  
 
N
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
 
(C
o
d
er
s 
1
 a
n
d
 2
) 
O
p
en
 c
o
d
in
g
 
  
 (
C
o
d
er
 1
) 
A
x
ia
l 
co
d
in
g
 
(C
o
d
er
s 
1
 a
n
d
 2
) 
Random sample generated  
Aim: Preparation for test of coding scheme. 
 Random selection of a sample of transcripts (5 leaders + 5 
followers) distributed to Coder 1 (CI) and Coder 2 (RA). 
  
Coding of random sample 
Aims: Test coding scheme, practice dual coding, achieve deeper 
familiarization with transcripts data, and detect problematic codes. 
 Independent coding of transcripts data. 
 Record emerging problematic codes.  
Coding scheme modification (unique round) 
Aims: Improve reliability of scheme and achieve systematic coding. 
 Lengthy discussion about problematic codes. 
 2 codes eliminated, revised total codes = 15 (categories intact). 
 Redefinition of discriminatory parameters for remaining codes. 
Unitization of text  
Aim: Segment transcripts’ data into meaningful units of text.  
 Segmentation of 42 transcripts aiming for units of meaning that capture the 
17 codes (can be individual words, sentences, paragraphs – combined and 
situated at different places within a transcript). 
 Segmentation of text generated 1607 units (663 leaders; 944 followers). 
Coding scheme creation  
Aims: Develop a main scheme applicable to the totality of transcripts (leaders and followers) 
using a hybrid or “abductive” approach.  
 Development of the coding scheme based on the RQs, the structure of interview guide 
(both derived from a priori established theoretical frameworks), and emerging themes.  
 Initial number of codes created = 17 (distributed among 7 categories). 
 
Coding of entire dataset 
Aim: Apply final version of coding scheme to all transcripts. 
 Independent application of the coding scheme to the full set of segmented 
units within the 42 interview transcripts. 
 Independent counting of frequencies per code and per transcript. 
Data merging and reliability check 
Aims: Merge coding tables, identify and correct inconsistencies across all codes. 
 Absolute correction of inconsistencies detected (e.g., uneven number of units 
reported in total count of individual transcripts).  
 List incongruences between attributed codes – comparison at the unit level. 
 Intercoder agreement pre-negotiation: 60% (leaders); 63% (followers). 
Negotiation and final reliability analyses 
Aim: Reach 100% agreement for all motivation codes (i.e., codes targeting the 
general distinction between self-focused (SF) and others-focused (OF) motivations + 
specific subcategories of motivations) using the negotiated agreement approach.  
Time indicator (T1-T4)=negotiation iteration when 100% agreement was achieved. 
 T1: 1-14 leaders (leading to 83% of agreement across 15 codes). 
 T2: 1-14 followers; T3: 15-28 followers (87% agreement across 15 codes). 
 T4: 14 leaders (pre-negotiation agreement for submotives: 68% SF, 81% OF). 
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4.6.  Results and interpretations  
I identified five major findings from the thematic content analysis: (a) emotions matter for 
leadership effectiveness, (b) leaders have mixed motives: self-focused and others-focused motives; 
the two types are quasi-equal in importance, but self-focused leaders are slightly dominant in 
numbers, (c) self-focused and others-focused motivations are multiple and reflect different degrees 
of opportunism, (d) there is only modest congruence between followers’ perception of their leader’s 
motives and leaders’ self-reported motives, and (e) congruence achieved in (d) does not predict 
followers’ satisfaction of their leader’s leadership style. Apart from (a) (more generic theme serving 
as threshold for the others), each major finding addresses a pre-established RQ. Subsections 4.6.1 - 
4.6.5 present and interpret the results. Four tables illustrate the analyses performed. One central 
element mentioned in the analyses is the corrected frequency count. Given that responses from both 
parties (leaders and followers) are compared, a compromise had to be decided as to which 
perspective would be favoured in situations where incongruence occurred. I justify below how I 
managed this delicate task.  
Senior managers, because of their high position, often identify with the organisation’s 
reputation (Treviño, Weaver, & Brown, 2008) and thus should care more about preserving it than 
lower-level employees. From an IM motive perspective (Grant & Mayer, 2009), this suggests there 
may be social desirability bias in the leaders’ data. On the other hand, lower-level employees tend 
to be more critical of the ethicality of organisational practices and procedures because they are more 
detached from their roles (Treviño et al., 2008).  
The literature review revealed that established leader-member models (Dasborough & 
Ashkanasy, 2002), reflections on/definitions of EL (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Treviño et al., 2006) 
and definitions of leadership in general (Lord & Maher, 1991), and past EL studies (Treviño et al., 
2003) have frequently attributed most importance to the followers’ perceptions in shaping the 
quality of LMXs. Consequently, I chose to resolve discrepancies within triads primarily based on 
followers’ viewpoint (Vpt). Three configurations are possible:  
 Leader (Vpt a) vs. Follower 1 (Vpt b) + Follower 2 (Vpt b) = Vpt b  
 Leader (Vpt a) + Follower 1 (Vpt a) vs. Follower 2 (Vpt b) = Vpt a 
 Leader (Vpt a) vs. Follower 1 (Vpt b) vs. Follower 2 (Vpt c) = irreconcilable  
Another precision to note is that when I employ the terms self-focused leaders (as done once 
already above) and positive leaders,46 I refer to leaders who, as identified in the content analysis, 
possess a majority of self-focused motives and who perceive emotions predominantly in a positive 
                                                 
46 The terms positive and negative are not inferring a hierarchical view of different professions with regard to 
the importance and role emotions play in them. 
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light (and the same logic applies to their opposite equivalents: the “others-focused leaders” and 
“negative leaders”). Also, the citations selected highlight findings that I believe most contribute to 
existing knowledge about the EI/leadership and EI/EL intersections. I used them in my 
interpretations in accordance with Treviño et al.’s (2003) integrative approach.  
 
4.6.1.  Emotions matter, mostly as a positive force  
 
Confirming previous claims (Ashkanasy & Dasborough in Antonakis et al., 2009) and 
findings (Rosete & Ciarrochi, 2005), the first emerging results show that leaders perceive the role of 
emotions predominantly as important and positive for leadership effectiveness. Table 4.2 indicates 
that 50% of the sample shared this position, followed by 29% who, overall, viewed emotions as 
being rather neutral in impact, and 21% who reported to see emotions mostly as a burden or an 
obstacle to performance that needs to be suppressed.  
 
Table 4.2 Key codes of primary coding cross-matched 
 Perception of emotions 
 
Type of motives Level of processing  
 Positive/ 
important 
Negative/ 
interfering 
Neutral Self-
focused 
Others-
focused 
Automatic Deliberate Neutral 
E positive    4 2 4  1 
E negative    1 2 2 1  
E neutral    2 2 2 2  
EM self 4  2 4 2 5 1  
EM others 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 
EM neutral  1   1  1  
EA self 2 1  2 1 2 1  
EA others 4 1 1 5 5 5  1 
EA neutral 1 1 3 4 1 2 2  
TOTAL 7(50%) 3(21%) 4(29%) 7(50%)* 6(43%) 9(64%)* 3(21%)  1(7%) 
Note. Numbers indicate the number of leaders who belong to the matched codes. E positive= positive perception of 
emotions; E negative = negative perception of emotions; E neutral = neutral perception of emotions (i.e., when the 
cumulative number of segmented units for the category Perception of emotions is evenly distributed between the codes E 
positive – E negative – E neutral or between any two of them if one contains zero units); EM self= emotion management in 
self; EM others= emotion management in others; EM neutral= emotion management neutral (i.e., when frequencies are 
identical for EM self and EM others; EA self= attention to emotions in self; EA others= attention to emotions in others; EA 
neutral=  attention to emotions neutral (i.e., when frequencies are identical for EA self and EA others); Automatic= 
automatic emotion management; Deliberate= deliberate emotion management. TOTAL= total number of leaders with the 
highest number of units found for each given code. For example, 7 leaders perceive emotions mostly in a positive way, 6 
leaders have a majority of others-focused motives, and 9 leaders manage emotions mostly on an automatic basis. *Data for 
one triad are irreconcilable.  
All data are based on the corrected frequency count. 
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Positive leaders mentioned that emotions could not be avoided because they “play a role at 
all levels” and that “every interaction involves emotion and emotional control,” verifying the 
veracity of multi-level models of emotion (e.g., Ashkanasy & Jordan, 2008). Another finding that 
corroborated previous research (Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2014; Tamir & Ford, 2012) refers to the 
notion of flexibility that is inherent to the practice of EI. As emphasised in the literature review, 
managing emotions does not (necessarily) imply the suppression of negative affect. Expressing 
anger, for example, can foster adaptation by helping leaders to affirm their power and moral values. 
Specifically, in negotiations when “they put a position to you that is not acceptable, then there are 
times when just being angry and say ‘Well, you’re wasting my time, this is ridiculous,’ pack up, 
walk out, is quite a powerful tool. But you’ve got to be careful.” This finding also corroborates 
other empirical works that identified EI as a correlate of subjective wellbeing (see Matthews, 
Zeidner, & Roberts, 2017 for a review) – “got to be careful,” in this context, denotes a causal 
relationship between danger detection and self-regulation. 
Neutral leaders described emotions in a simplistic way such as “people’s feelings and how 
they react to what they are doing, what they are asked to do,” sometimes emphasising a temperate 
distinction with logic (but not enough to deduce a bias toward emotion) such as “I like to think of 
emotion as the sort of mythos side, if you think of the mythos and the logos, the logic is the sort of 
intellect and the emotion is more the subjective side, but it’s an intuitive natural response.”  
Negative leaders provided the most interesting answers. In particular, one isolated group 
supported Alvesson and Sveningsson’s (2003) critique that social and emotional accountabilities are 
overestimated in contemporary leadership approaches: “Most of my interactions with my direct 
reports are about work and fairly administrative or management related issues. I mean, typically 
the emotions come in when the direct report has a problem, either in their work or outside their 
work and sometimes that’s a sensitive thing. But (…) the vast majority of interactions are pretty 
unemotional because it’s just a work situation.” 
A second isolated group partially validated Zeidner et al.’s (2004) assumption (and thereby 
invalidated mine; cf. subsection 2.3.1) that all leaders are probably not equally concerned by EI. For 
example “it’s hard to see where emotion plays a role” when “we literally don’t know what we’re 
doing because we’re trying to make (…) discoveries,” “it’s a very different business I think from 
leadership where you’re told to meet a set of very specific goals.” However, other data contradicted 
this statement, suggesting a possible cognitive bias (belief bias) specific to scientific expressions of 
leadership. For example, it could be argued that the description of making discoveries as “a highly 
creative activity. 90% of what you do goes nowhere and that can be a little frustrating so it requires 
enormous patience” reveals how uniquely helpful EI could be for leaders who perform complex 
tasks (Humphrey, 2002). Supporting the deduction of belief bias, Newstead et al. (1992) found that 
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people tend to fail to recognise alternatives that conflict with their mental model of reference unless 
they become convinced that the alternatives are superior in believability. But this is unlikely to be 
the case here as reflected in the retrospective notion that “[emotion] does play a role but usually 
negatively in fact. (…) Keeping emotion out of it is the number one emotional skill I think.” More 
generally, this group of citations seems to substantiate the claim that there is a bias that emotions 
are unprofessional (Caruso et al., 2015).  
Finally, matching responses within triads for emotion perception x emotion management (in 
self vs. in others) and emotion perception x attention to emotions (in self vs. in others) generated 
other constructive observations. A first observation is that, during or when anticipating interactions, 
negative leaders tend to devote most efforts to managing the emotions of followers and to only 
marginally self-introspect. In comparison, positive leaders prioritise a more balanced approach. 
They first47 attend to the emotions of their followers and then adjust their own accordingly. These 
last results thus illustrate quite well how central followers are in dictating the affective demands of 
the leader-follower relationship. They also qualitatively demonstrate the intuition that maximising 
interpersonal efficacy is an energetically taxing exercise (cf. segment EI and transformational 
leadership (TFL) in subsection 2.3.2). Table 4.2 further indicates that interactions are handled 
mostly automatically (for 64% of leaders), which might explain the feasibility of the said exercise 
(less cognitive rumination). 
 
4.6.2.  Self-focused vs. others-focused motivations: Quasi-identical in importance 
 
As predicted in Chapters 1-2, leaders reported mixed motives for valuing emotions at work. 
Before matching responses, the main dimensions (self- vs. others-focused motives) generated quasi-
similar frequencies (155 vs. 181 text units; Table 4.3). After correction, however, self-focused 
leaders dominated slightly (50% of the sample vs. 43% for the others-focused leaders; Table 4.2), 
supporting the contribution of LMX theorists (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) who have differentiated 
between leader-based, relationship-based and follower-based outcomes. 
An expressive self-focused citation is “I go to work for a reason. I go to work to be 
successful, to have fun, to make money and enjoy myself mostly by and large, and meet a lot of 
people. So, it’s [emotions] just a tool for everybody, every day.”  
Overall, the distinction with others-focused leaders related to a stronger sense of duty such 
as to “have a personal sense of accountability if somebody in my team is not happy. I think that I 
need to play a role in helping them to work through that.”  
                                                 
47 The order (1) attention to emotions followed by (2) emotion management was assumed based on Mayer and 
Salovey’s (1997) hierarchical model of EI abilities. 
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Age and leadership experience emerged as basic factors that influenced leaders’ competitive 
drive and the necessity to capitalise on their emotional skills to satisfy it, irrespective of the nature 
of their predominant type of motives. Older male leaders (age group: > 50 years old; average 
leadership experience: 29 years) believed they cared more about looking in control in the 
transitional/middle part of their career to attain self-interested goals such as “to get to a higher 
level” or to “get national recognition for what I was doing, to get international recognition.” Now 
they have “ticked those off,” their new driver is to “kind of going more back now and trying to 
develop people” and to help lower-level employees to “get credit for things” because they felt they 
personally “had enough [credit].” Likewise, leaders with the longest time in current role (average 
in total sample: 4.3 years, range: 0.5-19) expressed a manifest motivation to manage emotions in 
situations perceived as unfair for “my client might be being taken advantage of, that’s when I can 
feel my blood pressure sort of going.” In contrast, younger leaders (age group: <40 years old; 
average leadership experience: 2 years) were determined to “definitely do want to move up career-
wise, be promoted, be the head of a big business unit or a corporation.” To achieve this, a strategy 
might be to “sitting next to someone that’s important” during key meetings because “they are more 
senior” and “more powerful.”  
In previous goal studies, other researchers arrived at the same general conclusion with 
regard to the impact of age. Ebner, Freund, and Baltes (2006), for instance, found that acquisition-
related goals and maintenance goals tend to respectively decrease and increase from early to late 
adulthood. Paralleling this finding, individualistic and competitive proclivities were observed to 
decrease during the same period in a study on developmental socialisation (Van Lange, De Bruin, 
Otten, & Joireman, 1997). 
Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984) moral reasoning theory also provides some support for the claim 
that age predicts egoistic tendencies. Specifically, the theory identifies three levels of cognitive 
moral development: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional. Individuals in the pre-
conventional level are guided by egoistic values. This would translate, for instance, by being 
particularly alert about organisational sanctions and opportunities for career advancement. The 
conventional level regroups individuals who rely upon pre-established guidelines to judge the 
appropriateness of a given behaviour. In the post-conventional level, conceptions of morality are 
cardinal. Individuals are more capable to live their true selves and are more receptive to indicators 
of injustice (Rest, 1994).  
Taken together, interviewees’ comments signal that self-actualisation is a credible 
precondition for others-focused motives. This reminds the logic of Maslow’s (1954) theory where 
reaching self-actualisation requires to have already satisfied several individual needs (physiological, 
safety, belonging, and esteem). Here, however, the finding is that, in actuality, actualisation seems 
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to dictate much of the road that leads to “altruism.” If that is true, then perhaps characterising it as 
an optional, somewhat elitist need is not sufficient (Slote, 1964). Seeing actualisation instead as a 
“non-hierarchisable,” instrumental motive that promotes personal happiness might be more 
intellectually accurate. On this basis, it could be concluded – to quote Nagel (1978, p. 87) – that 
“altruism probably requires it” [it =egoistic conduct]. 
A second conclusion is that serving others, as evoked by the leaders, does not appear to 
involve any evident acts of self-sacrifice. Rather, helping others was “more satisfying now” that 
they had reached their “big goals,” and that in the hypothetical scenario where these goals would 
be removed they would “probably not” enjoy being a leader anymore. So, in fact self-interest 
seems to transcend altruism as at commencement (actualisation motive) and ultimate end (derived 
self-satisfaction) it causes leaders’ initiatives, supporting my earlier, broad insinuation (subsection 
2.5.3) that only very few humanists might qualify as veritable altruists. 
A final finding is that followers might resolve dilemma of manipulation tolerability, also, 
through self-interest (note the link with Rauthmann & Kolar’s 2012 finding; see Narcissism 
segment, Chapter 2). Figure 4.2 illustrates this general impression using anonymous citations. If this 
finding is replicated elsewhere, then it could suggest that past attempts to link management 
behaviour with an ethical philosophy (e.g., utilitarianism in Fritzsche & Becker, 1984) might need 
revision, perhaps, in favour of (psychological) egoism. Interestingly, none of the leaders self-
attributed immoral values but quasi all mentioned they had met, or worked for, or heard about, or 
speculated the existence of other leaders described, for example, as “megalomaniacs,” or 
individuals with “doses of ego which were beyond the norm” and an interest limited to “just taking 
credit for everything” (78.6% of the leader sample perceived the motives of other leaders mostly 
negatively). 
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Figure 4.2 Schematic representation of manipulative leadership (ML) appraisals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Citation illustrates ML exists.                       [Citation illustrates techniques of ML vary depending on the target] 
70/30    = random estimate of the proportion of manipulative 
leaders. 70% refers to leaders who are perceived to be 
well-intentioned and to manage others’ emotions for 
others’ best interest.]  
 
“70/30 and the 70% are the people like [Leader]. […] I’ve 
done a fair bit of travelling […] so I’ve definitely come across 
leaders who are very ruthless and very determined to further 
their career at any cost and these people I think do use 
emotions – do use controlling other people’s emotions to get 
an advantage for their careers. They’re very cunning and very 
ruthless.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Citation illustrates the detrimental effect of ML 
behaviours on followers’ performance.  
Question: Did the fear make you perform more?] 
 
“No, quite the opposite and I just started working with 
different people. I just kind of isolated myself from these 
particular people […] I realised I wasn’t getting anything 
productive done this way so I just decided that for my career I 
needed to do something else and that’s what I did and also it 
just wasn’t an enjoyable experience. I didn’t want to go 
through that anymore.”  
                                          [Citation illustrates the normalcy, neutrality and temporality of self-focused motives] 
“When you’re in the early part of your career […] you need to think about this sort of stuff. I 
mean even advice that [Leader] has given me – [he/she’s] like at the end of each week you 
should sit down and think ‘how have I furthered my career this week? Have I done things 
that will help me out or have I just wasted my week?’ This is how you should think about it 
in order to get to the more senior levels.” 
 
 
 
“This has happened to me a few times; using fear as a motivating factor 
is something that some of the leaders […] use a fair amount. Putting 
people on the spot and making them feel small if they don’t have 
sufficient answers is something that some people do use as just their 
way of getting […] done. I think that’s completely counterproductive 
and I try to avoid these sorts of people […] In terms of how they use this 
to sort of jump the ladder in terms of a […] career I guess I can’t 
comment on that. I suppose not using fear to talk to the […] of the […] 
and things like this, but for everyone who are lower than themselves, 
they try to use fear to motivate people.”  
 
 
 
 
[Citation illustrates the primary nature of self-interest.  
Question: If the leader uses his emotional abilities to manipulate you 
for self-interested motives, and you detect it, would this affect you?] 
 
“Not as long as I can get something out of it as well, I suppose […] So 
the currency that we deal in is […]. So if someone’s trying to use some 
sort of positive feedback to get you to […] more, I think that’s a win-
win type of situation […] So if they’re trying to get you to do something 
and you’re not going to gain anything out of it, I don’t think that will 
last very long.”  
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4.6.3.  Further dissection of the motivations: Neither “saints” nor “evil geniuses” 
 
A deeper analysis of the motivation codes discriminated 12 submotives, distributed 
evenly between the self-focused and others-focused domains. Table 4.3 presents the 
cumulative frequencies for each subcategory across all leader transcripts first (see All 
leaders), and then specifies their distribution by predominant type of motives pre- and post-
reconciliation of the responses within triads (see DSF and DSF-c; DOF and DOF-c). 
Among the self-focused subcategories, self-actualisation (45 units), overall, emerged 
as the main submotive. Interestingly, when the total leader sample was divided by type of 
predominant motives, self-preservation (25 units) slightly dominated for the self-focused 
leaders (pre and post). A speculative explanation might be that self-focused leaders are 
distinctively vulnerable to competitive (or other external) pressures (hence their self-
centeredness, i.e., it does not emanate from a need to “take” or “conquer” against others but 
to “keep” what they value as essential to their personal functioning). The vulnerability 
hypothesis is consolidated by the fact that self-focused leaders also attributed particular 
significance to external approval (22 units or 22.5% of the DSF-c units) while it was a not a 
priority for the others-focused leaders (3 units or 7% of the DOF-c units).  
Among the others-focused subcategories, frequencies for advancing organisational 
goals were the highest in all five codifications (see Table 4.3), denoting thus a clear 
attachment from the leaders’ part to contributing to the organisation’s performance. This 
attachment perhaps derives from the reputational identification process Treviño et al. (2008) 
alluded to (section 4.6). The second principal submotive differed based on leaders’ 
predominant motivational tendency. Self-focused leaders privileged preserving others’ 
wellbeing (16 and 18 units) and others-focused leaders were secondarily concerned about 
developing others (22 and 15 units). From a “hard-core” psychological egoist position (to 
echo Wilson’s 1978 concept of “hard-core altruism;” cited in Frank, 1988, p. 25), it could be 
imagined (not my interpretation here) that self-focused leaders care about followers’ welfare 
to ensure followers’ effective instrumentalisation as generators of profit. Finally, possibly 
the most eloquent finding is the unanimous ultra minority of self-reported altruistic 
aspirations (5 units, or 1.5% of all motive units combined, shared between 4 leaders only).  
To conclude, then, these supplementary analyses suggest that compartmentalising the 
use of emotional data by leaders under the extreme labels “saints” and “evil geniuses” (Côté 
et al., 2011) has limited coherence. Here, for example, if we concentrate on the observation 
that frequencies for the total others-focused motivations are (marginally) more important for 
the self-focused leaders (79 units; see TOTAL percentages DSF-c and DOF-c in Table 4.3 
bottom part) then the alleged “evilness” of self-focused leaders becomes an absurd threat.  
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Table 4.3 Frequencies count per subcategory of motivation  
 SELF-FOCUSED MOTIVATIONS  
Subcategories Example definition All leaders DSF DSF-c DOF DOF-c 
Status-related benefits  Interest in promotion, in power (e.g., opportunities to impact and influence), in income. 16 13 11 3 4 
External approval  Concerns about one's image/reputation. Desire to be perceived as being professional. 26 16 22 10 3 
Self-actualisation  Achieving personal goals, concretising one's vision and ideas (including extracting 
information from others to achieve the vision). 
45 23 22 22 19 
Self-satisfaction 
Meaning 
 Pride, sense of achievement, feeling successful, having fun. 
 Alignment with own personality, fulfilment of spiritual needs, authentic interest in 
the characteristics of the job. 
24 
8 
13 
4 
13 
5 
 
11 
4 
7 
1 
Self-preservation  Protecting one’s current position and/or health. Easing one's life (e.g., avoiding 
conflict), maintaining one’s lifestyle. Having a sense of duty to care for oneself; 
importance given to self-esteem and self-respect. 
36 25 25 11 11 
TOTAL   155 94(61%) 98(63%) 61(39%) 45*(29%) 
 OTHERS-FOCUSED MOTIVATIONS  
Subcategories Example definition All leaders DSF DSF-c DOF DOF-c 
Meeting leadership 
expectations  
 Meeting others' expectations of what the leader's role entails. Having a sense of duty 
with regard to meeting these expectations (e.g., to inspire, to be emotionally 
regulated). 
25 6 13 19 12 
Preserving/fostering 
others' wellbeing 
 Caring about others' overall wellbeing and happiness. Valuing others’ work-life 
balance. Attempting to prevent the experience of negative feelings in others. 
32 16 18 16 11 
Developing others  Creating opportunities for others to develop their own competencies and/or to evolve 
in the organisational hierarchy (or elsewhere). Providing support to others (e.g., 
resources, time, guidance, direction, inspiration) to help them accomplish their 
assigned tasks. 
33 11 9 22 15 
Advancing organisational 
goals  
 Concerns about business prosperity. Desire to increase organisational performance. 
Focus on team effectiveness, productivity. 
66 22 30 44 28 
Social connectedness  Connecting/socialising with others. Valorising communication, groups, and the 
social culture. 
20 7 8 13 6 
Altruistic values 
/aspirations 
 Concerns about society, the future of mankind. Having a strong sense of justice. 5 0 1 5 3 
TOTAL  181 62(34%) 79(44%) 119(66%) 75*(41%) 
Note. DSF= Dominance Self-Focused = leaders who possess a majority of self-focused motivations (as perceived by the leaders strictly); DSF-c= Dominance Self-Focused-corrected 
or “by default” = when any one member in the triad did not share the same perception about the leader’s dominant type of motives as the other two members. In this case, the 
perception shared by the majority of the members in the triad was used to attribute a final orientation to the leader’s motives; DOF=Dominance Others-Focused = leaders with a 
majority of others-focused motivations (as perceived by the leaders strictly); DOF-c= Dominance Others-Focused-corrected (same explication as for DSF-c but adapted to the others-
focused motives). Numbers under the column All leaders are based on the total leader sample (N=14) and refer to the cumulative frequencies (i.e., the cumulative number of coded 
units) reported per subcategory in this sample before data are matched. *Data for one leader are not included in any of the DOF-c frequency counts because they are irreconcilable. 
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4.6.4.  Congruence test 
 
Table 4.4 differentiates leaders based on their dominant type of motives, as perceived by 
themselves first and then when all perspectives in the triads are matched (Uncorrected). Results 
indicate that most leaders (64%) self-attributed a majority of others-focused motives. After testing 
for congruence (Corrected), 7 triads matched perfectly, with the self-focused triads showing the 
highest agreement percentage (28.6%). As previously noted (Table 4.2), a similar difference 
emerged when the triads were reconciled (50% vs. 43% of triads contained a predominance of self- 
vs. others-focused motives). These discrepancies suggest that, in general, a leader’s tendency to 
self-enhance might not be rare (Sedikides, Skowronski, & Gaertner, 2004). 
This is one interpretation only. Nevertheless, it seems possible given that the EL literature 
identifies followers’ estimates of supervisory-level EL as the most faithful indicators of a leader’s 
goals and of his/her treatment of others (Den Hartog, 2015), providing that, like Table 4.1 
demonstrates it was the case for Study 1, followers and leaders interact frequently (Brown & 
Treviño, 2006).  
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Self- vs. others-focused motives: Congruence test between L-M* perceptions 
 
       Leaders’ self-perception        Followers’ perceived attribution  
EXAMPLES   Self-focused     Others-focused     Follower 1   F      Follower 2 
Leader 1 X   X X 
Leader 2  X    Self-focused   Self-focused 
Leader 3 X          X Others-focused 
Leader 4  X  X Self-focused 
Leader 5 X   Neutral  Others-focused 
TOTAL in data 
set 
       5(36%)             9(64%)    
                                    Matched triads (out of total 14)  
 
                       % 
 
Uncorrected 
 
 
Corrected** 
 
Self-focused 
Others-focused 
 
4 
3 
 
28.6% 
21% 
 
Self-focused 
Others-focused 
 
 
7 
6 
 
50% 
43% 
 
Note. Examples (Leaders 1-5) show different possible configurations for analysing the data but are 
not extracted from the real data set. X (leader columns) = predominant type of motives as perceived 
by the leader (highest cumulative number of units found in the corresponding leader transcript); X 
(follower columns)= indicates congruence with the leader’s self-perception. Others-focused/self-
focused/neutral (in follower columns)= followers’ perception of their leader’s principal motives 
(highest cumulative number of units found in the corresponding follower transcripts). Neutral= exact 
same number of units found for the two motivation codes. TOTAL in data set= number of leaders, in 
the actual data set, who possess the highest cumulative number of units either for the code self-
focused motives or the code others-focused motives.  
*L-M=Leader-Member. **Data for one triad are excluded because they are irreconcilable (for 
example, like in the imagined case of Leader 5). 
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4.6.5.  The somewhat paradox of intentionality attribution 
 
I further matched triads by level of processing and dominant type of motives (see Table 4.5). 
Results show that, out of the total leader sample, an identical portion of self- and others-focused 
leaders (28.6%) primarily tackles interactions unconsciously. This finding supports the claim that, 
contrary to the assumption of Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) model, affective behaviour is often 
implicit (Fiori, 2009; Zeidner et al., 2003). It also supports the other claim that PGP is a form of 
automatic self-regulation (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) and corroborates my earlier critique (section 
2.5) that judging self-interested motives as premeditated attempts to get ahead at all costs risks to 
reflect limited thinking. 
I also coded followers’ transcripts for leadership satisfaction. Not surprisingly, negative 
comments most coincide with deliberate emotion management (variable 1) and mainly concern self-
focused leaders (variable 2) (in ¾ of the cases for each variable), but, overall, their frequency of 
occurrence is trivial (isolated group of 3 cases), suggesting that most detected manipulative 
attempts are benign and thus not perceived as unethical. This subfinding is interesting insofar as it 
partly contradicts previous postulations that followers’ perceived behavioural intentions of the 
leader and their liking for the leader should align (e.g., Ferris et al., 1995). However, as evoked in 
the speculative interpretation of Figure 4.2, this may be explained (in clearly more explicit 
scenarios than reported here) by the amount of benefits followers think they can extract from the 
consequences of the leader’s behaviour (Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002). In sum: followers and 
leaders maybe harmlessly use each other for personal gain. 
 
] 
 
 
Table 4.5 Followers’ satisfaction with leadership in Level of processing x Type of motives 
Level of processing – Type of 
motives 
Total         
..leaders* 
% (out of total leader 
sample, N=14) 
Negative appraisal of 
leadership style** 
Deliberate – Others-focused 1               7% 1 
Deliberate – Self-Focused 2 14.3% 1 
Automatic – Others-focused 
Automatic – Self-focused 
Neutral – Others-focused 
4 
          4 
          1 
28.6% 
28.6% 
  7%                                
        –  
1 
        – 
Note. Deliberate = deliberate emotion management; Automatic = automatic emotion management; Neutral= same 
number of frequencies found for deliberate and automatic; Self-focused= self-focused leaders; Others-focused=  
others-focused leaders. *Number of leaders who have a majority of units in each of the corresponding  
cross-matched codes. Data for two leaders are excluded because they are irreconcilable: one leader as noted in  
Table 4.4, and a second leader as noted in attempting to match responses for the codes deliberate and automatic. 
**Numbers indicate the number of followers who criticised an aspect of their leader’s leadership style in the 
corresponding cross-matched triads. All data are based on the corrected frequency count.  
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4.7.  Conclusions 
The aim of Study 1 was to explore the plausibility of SEI in the context of the leader-
follower relationship. I raised the provocative question of whether the argument that egoistic needs 
are decisive in activating EI behaviours is more cogent than a classification of leaders as good or 
bad users of EI.  
One principal finding is that leaders’ emotion management efforts are explained by mixed 
motives (self-focused and others-focused) in quasi-equal proportion with a slight majority of self-
focused leaders. This finding, to some extent, corroborates my original critique that emotional skills 
cannot be qualified as serving either pure (altruistic) or deviant goals and that benign “selfishness” 
ultimately controls most intents. It also provides qualitative support for past comments (e.g., Bolino, 
1999; cited in Grant & Mayer, 2009; see also Ellen et al., 2016), theorising (Carroll, 1987, 1999) 
and empirical conclusions (Treviño et al., 2003) that have stressed that distinguishing between 
ethical and unethical leaders often reflects a simplistic understanding of human ambitions and 
hierarchical structures. For example, in their interview-based study on the fundamental constituents 
of senior executive ethical leadership, Treviño et al. (2003) concluded “based on our data and our 
experience with thousands of MBA students over the years, we believe that most organizational 
contexts fall somewhere between the highly ethical or highly unethical extremes” (p. 32). From a 
behavioural perspective, data show that even the strategies (cooperative vs. exploitative) deployed 
by Machs cannot be decoded dichotomously (Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1998).  
Another principal finding is that results from the analyses of leaders’ motives are highly 
dependent on the source of the entity questioned. In the present case, the quantification of 
followers’ perceptions altered the direction of the leaders’ data in that the total number of self-
focused leaders, initially a relative minority, was augmented and in the end marginally 
predominated. The inclusion of direct reports in the triangulation process, rarely valued in research 
designs (Avolio et al., 2009; Shamir, 2007), thus appears vital to stop disseminating a romanticised 
portrait of the leadership function (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Ehrlich, 1985). 
 
4.8. Limitations and prospects 
Study 1 generated original qualitative data that are supporting the probable existence of SEI 
but these data should be interpreted cautiously. Six main limitations must be acknowledged.  
First, although the sample (N=42) is similar in size to other samples used in previous leader-
other member studies (e.g., N=34 in Dasborough, 2006; N=40 in Treviño et al., 2003) it remains 
relatively small. A larger sample might have facilitated a deeper exploration of SEI, notably 
through the identification of additional submotivations, leading to a more accurate delineation of 
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the SEI spectrum. Utilising a more sophisticated ThS technique (see Rowlands, Waddell, & 
McKenna, 2016 for one recent proposition) might have then helped to determine the optimal cut-off 
point to stop interviewing. 
Second, I identify three limitations specific to validating SEI conceptually. First, no 
objective measure of EI or SEI was used. Instead, I constructed the interview questions by mixing 
assumptions from different established frameworks (i.e., Kilduff et al., 2010 for SEI, and Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997 for the general EI theory). This approach is consistent with the exploratory nature of 
Study 1 (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004) but it risks conceptual confusion (cf. sixth limitation 
below). Second, I assessed leaders’ approach to managing emotions but not that of the followers 
while it is likely to have influenced how followers perceived their leader’s intentions (Dasborough 
& Ashkanasy, 2002) and how satisfied followers expressed to be of their leader’s leadership style 
(Miao et al., 2016). Supporting this postulation, the considerable amount of inconsistencies that 
were found in estimations of the nature of the leaders’ motives (without correction, congruent 
perceptions within triads just reached 50%) suggests the presence of moderating and/or mediating 
factors. For example, based on the above-cited literature (i.e., Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002 and 
Miao et al., 2016) it could be hypothesised that followers’ level of EI moderates the relationship 
perception of the motives/real vs. imagined use of SEI. Most importantly, transposing this logic to 
the assessment of the predictive utility of SEI, which would consist of assessing whether the 
application of SEI predicts personal goal achievement (since SEI denotes PGP), would allow to 
compare which of the leaders and followers’ EI (assessed qualitatively, like it was the case here for 
the leaders, or by a published scale) is likely to be the most significant moderator. The third and 
final limitation is that CMP, an integral component of the mechanism of SEI, did not emerge as a 
major theme. But Study 1 aimed to qualitatively explore the more basic hypothesis that self-focused 
motives are primarily instrumental in predicting leaders’ emotion management efforts. Moreover, 
an unanticipated finding is that leaders’ others-focused motives tend to positively correlate with 
aging, and the leader sample mostly consisted of accomplished mature leaders. It thus seems 
reasonable to deduce that the absence of CMP is normal here. 
Third, the fact that no leader appeared to possess psychopathic or other deviant tendencies 
could be intriguing given that past research shows that destructive leadership is not rare (Schyns & 
Schilling, 2013). A first speculative explanation might be that perhaps leaders nominated followers 
whom they thought would portray a positive image of them and of their intentions (Conger, 1998). 
Another possibility is that followers perhaps approached the interview questions inauthentically 
either (a) as a self-protection mechanism (Conger, 1998) or (b) as a strategy to elicit future 
favourable treatment if they choose to share the content of their interview with their leader (a IM 
manipulation tactic) (Wayne & Liden, 1995), or (c) as a natural compliance reflex (Ferris et al., 
  91 
2007b) to align with their perceived interpretation of their leader’s belief about what is 
un/acceptable to share. A final speculative explanation is that followers might have viewed their 
nomination as a special act of attention from their leader and felt indebted to reciprocate by 
focusing on the leader’s desirable traits and skills during the interview (Greenberg & Westcott, 
1983). However, the fact that a group of followers did critique certain aspects of their leader’s 
leadership style suggests that the way I managed the interview was effective in minimising the 
occurrence of socially desirable answers, further suggesting that if a positive bias were indeed 
present it should be only modestly significant.  
Fourth, and in part reinforcing my third point, the fact that all participants were volunteers 
very likely indicates that they had particularly sociable and benevolent personalities (Burns, Reid, 
Toncar, Fawcett, & Anderson, 2006) and/or an existing interest in (and perhaps even knowledge of) 
emotion research, in which case the generalisability of the findings would be affected (Thompson, 
1999). Comparing non-clinical and clinical working samples (e.g., business managers with a NPD 
diagnosis) could be one way to alleviate these concerns in future research. In addition, providing the 
positive others-focused motive/aging association is generalisable, using lower-ranked managers in 
replicative studies should better serve the goal of exploring SEI than presently attempted. 
Fifth, although I adopted and scrupulously applied strategies to reduce researcher bias  (i.e., 
no affinity with participants, dual coding, and negotiated agreement approach), interpreting 
qualitative data is a process that is inherently subjective (Burnard, 1996). It is thus inevitable that 
some bias still exists (Shenton, 2004), the most probable one being my personal ambition, as 
pragmatist, to validate SEI empirically. 
Sixth, in conducting this research my goal was to capture leaders’ ultimate motives for 
valuing emotions in interactions with followers (i.e., exhausting the “whys” of their motives). The 
content of the transcripts (too much overlapping data, as it would be expected from studies that 
focus on complex organisational realities; Langley, 1999), however, did not permit me to establish a 
causal and hierarchical order between each single motive (e.g., motive A  motive B  motive C 
absolute ultimate motive) and to consider intervening factors such as, as aforementioned, followers’ 
level of EI, to which could be added many more (e.g., organisational culture, familial pressure, self-
esteem, personality). Replicative studies might want to use network analysis (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994) to achieve an even more advanced level of scrutiny of the data.
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY TWO - EXPERIMENTAL TESTING OF STRATEGIC 
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (SEI) 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
Study 1 provided some preliminary evidence in support of the claim that leaders practice 
SEI frequently. But it did not include an objective EI measure, nor did it explicitly consider the 
conditions of the link between EI and the use of strategic behaviours as theoretically established in 
my conceptualisation of SEI. I argue that two specific variables are most likely to activate the need 
to act strategically: (a) an opportunity to pursue a personal goal, i.e., a goal that depicts an authentic 
desire for self-elevation, and (b) the presence of competitiveness, i.e., when at least one other 
person is perceived as being interested in pursuing the same goal and as being likely to concretely 
act on her interest. To address the aforementioned limitations, and to extend the encouraging results 
of Study 1, I develop, and test via the use of an in-basket exercise, a model incorporating the 
MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002a) as one key predictor of the propensity to deploy strategic 
behaviours. In Chapter 5, I present the experimental model and explain how Study 1’s results partly 
informed the operationalisation of the outcome variable embedded in the in-basket (i.e., the types of 
strategic behaviours). I then describe Study 2’s design and report and interpret the results. The 
model I propose aims to test three hypotheses. I start by introducing and justifying each hypothesis.  
 
5.2.  Conceptual model and hypotheses development 
5.2.1.  Personal goal pursuit (PGP) predicts strategic behaviours  
 
Essentially, an individual’s drive to act varies as a function of the derived hedonic pleasure 
that he/she (consciously or unconsciously) expects to be generated from the action (Bozarth, 1994; 
Miller, 1999). PGP, by definition, denotes a personal attachment to a goal that one sees as being 
especially meaningful (Emmons, 2003). When PGP is activated, attention increases (e.g., attention 
to the interpersonal needs of others who can be decisive in facilitating goal achievement), and 
behaviours are adjusted, naturally or in a more calculated manner, and overtly or in a more discreet 
manner (Farmer, Maslyn, Fedor, & Goodman, 1997; Jonason, Slomski, & Partyka, 2012).  
In the workplace, for example, status enhancement ambitions can elicit covert IM 
behaviours (Oh et al., 2013), where the pursuer’s goal deliberately deploys important verbal and/or 
non-verbal efforts to establish and/or maintain a positive social identity (Johnson et al., 2016).  
To organise and simplify the various ways strategic behaviours may crystallise, I propose 
three types of behaviours: impression (strategic external behaviours, SEB), deliberation and 
discretion (strategic internal behaviours, SIB). SEI and SIB differ based on the direction and the 
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degree of efforts required to execute the behaviours. SIB are internally oriented because they 
involve either (a) social interactions that serve a consultation purpose, and whose ultimate utility is 
to rationalise and introspect based on the outcome of the consultation, or (b) to provide responses 
that aim to keep the length of the interactions minimal. SEB are externally oriented because they 
explicitly seek interactions with what Kilduff et al. (2010) called “strategically important targets.” I 
assumed that less effort was needed for the area level SIB because the two types of behaviours 
pertaining to this level do not infer a strong form of inauthentic or calculated presentation of the 
self.  
Congruent with this proposition, the literature shows that mild to “hard-core” manipulative 
behaviours (to echo, here again,48 Wilson’s 1978 concept of “hard-core altruism”), such as IM 
(when the gap between one’s true values and one’s use of IM in interpersonal relationships is 
substantial), are most likely to activate neural responses that require the mobilisation of superior 
information processing skills (Bereczkei et al., 2013, 2015). In accordance with these global 
assumptions, it could be expected that:  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Managers with high PGP will exhibit greater SEB and SIB than 
managers with low PGP. 
 
5.2.2.  PGP x competitiveness (CMP) interaction 
 
Management theorists regard CMP as a causal factor for the emergence of atypical 
behaviours (i.e., behaviours that are logical but that are singularly situational) whose associated 
efforts aim at fulfilling a self-serving goal (Kilduff et al., 2010; Sendjaya et al., 2016). Selfish 
tendencies naturally escalate under competitive pressures, often irrespective of the degree of 
attachment a leader has for Morality (Blasi, 1980). When competition is inexistent (or perceived as 
such), pursuing a personal goal should require less behavioural alteration than when competition is 
highly present. For example, a perceived threat to an achieved desired reputation (e.g., a peer 
catching up with one’s reputation as “most deserving employee” before a job promotion is decided) 
is likely to provoke a need to reassess ordinary (authentic) adaptation to social situations in 
employees who truly care about preserving their image (Johnson et al., 2016).  
According to Porter (1980), strategy is created or emerges when there is competition. In this 
research, I propose that PGP on its own can be a trigger for strategic actions and that the contextual 
presence of CMP augments it. Because the variables PGP and CMP remain neutral at this stage in 
the reasoning (i.e., not related to individual differences), I do not differentiate between SEB and 
                                                 
48 See subsection 4.6.3. 
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SIB when estimating their weight as outcomes. On this basis, I develop the following second 
hypothesis predicting a two-way interaction between PGP and CMP:  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Managers with high PGP will exhibit greater SEB and SIB than 
managers with low PGP, particularly in situations of high versus low CMP. 
 
5.2.3.  PGP x CMP x EI interaction 
Thus far I have argued that managers’ propensity to deploy strategic behaviours is a product 
of the interaction between PGP and CMP, where managers favour either SEB or SIB when an 
opportunity for PGP exists (H1) and when CMP is high (H2). To complete my reasoning, I further 
argue that in situations where a choice to compete for accomplishing a personal goal is made, the 
access to extra resources becomes critical. For example, because competitive situations are usually 
experienced with apprehension, resources may mean being able to observe and examine accurately 
potential rivals, searching for cues with regard to the rivals’ current mood state (e.g., do they appear 
to be in a good phase, feeling confident or instead are they showing signs of vulnerability?), their 
goals and planned ways to pursue them. And, to assess accurately others and events, like Kilduff et 
al. (2010), I hypothesise that EI logically constitutes a determining resource.  
Past research demonstrates that EI can facilitate effective ER based on the type of goal 
pursuit49 (Tamir & Ford, 2012) and promote competitive interests (Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2014). 
So, it seems reasonable to assume that high-EI individuals should be predisposed to sense, store, 
and exploit strategic information; either in a benign or passive form (e.g., observing and analysing 
others’ emotional reactions) when competition is not salient and when self-interest has been 
preserved for a long time already (e.g., through reframing, wisdom), or in a proactive form (e.g., 
networking with strategically important targets) when goal achievement is threatened by the 
emergence of a rival. 
Support for this logic can be found in Gardner, Fisher and Hunt’s (2009) model of leader 
emotional labour and authenticity where EI, self-monitoring,50 and political skill are identified as 
the main individual differences moderating the relationship between affective events (e.g., an 
opportunity for PGP surfaces and creates excitement) and leader emotional displays. Additionally, 
some empirical evidence (e.g., Oh et al., 2013) shows that high self-monitors can disguise egoistic 
                                                 
49 For example, confrontational goal pursuit vs. collaborative goal pursuit (Tamir & Ford, 2012).  
50 Self-monitoring is the degree to which individuals “monitor (observe, regulate, and control) the public 
appearance of self they display in social settings and in creating and managing their interpersonal relationships” (Day & 
Kilduff, 2003, p. 207). 
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intentions behind simulated disinterested behaviours - thus not the overt or sycophantic type of 
behaviours often associated with IM and said to risk alerting targets (Jones & Pittman, 1982). 
Study 1’s results also suggest that leaders might employ forms of benign emotional 
“manipulation” to manage personality differences in their team, to promote self-actualisation and to 
meet external expectations yet remain largely perceived by followers as positive role models; 
further suggesting a sensitive, regulated, diplomatic and minimally extrovert approach to managing 
social interactions. I thus formulate the final hypothesis that predicts a three-way interaction 
between PGP, CMP, and EI: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Managers with high PGP will exhibit greater SIB than managers with 
low PGP, particularly in situations of high versus low CMP, and particularly among 
managers with high versus low EI. 
 
To sum up, I predict that a manager’s propensity to engage in strategic behaviours is 
determined by the manager’s sensed opportunity for PGP (H1). I further predict that the direct 
effect of PGP on strategic behaviours is moderated by the manager’s perceived presence of CMP 
(H2) and his/her level of EI (H3). Figure 5.1 provides a global résumé of the relationships I expect 
to find.  
 
Figure 5.1 Conceptual model and hypothesised relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.4.  Control variables (justification for selection)  
To test the incremental validity of the predictions, I identified three control variables 
(Subsection 5.3.2 specifies the measures selected, and Appendix G illustrates the items).  
Machiavellianism (Mach). From a theoretical point of view, the minimum presence of Mach 
is essential to demonstrate the potentiality of SEI (self-interested goals must be compatible with 
ethical conduct). Furthermore, given that Mach is considered to be a set of internalised values and 
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norms that are not easily detectable in others (Den Hartog & Belschak, 2012; Sendjaya et al., 2016) 
and that CMP tensions can trigger behaviours that serve unethical intents (Blasi, 1980), controlling 
for Mach allows to anticipate a confusion effect of high-Machs manipulative skills on the data. For 
example, high-Machs could favour a type of strategic behaviour (e.g., discretion to fake disinterest) 
over another (e.g., overt IM) to mask a manipulation tactic. And, sometimes, surface passivity may 
be a poignant vehicle for destructive leadership (Einarsen, Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007). 
Personality. Past research has reported small to moderate correlations between EI and personality 
traits (Côté & Miners, 2006). As a result, and consistent with prescriptions (Antonakis et al., 2009; 
Côté et al., 2010; Walter et al., 2011), I chose to control for personality to prevent spurious 
predictive effects of EI on managers’ propensity to deploy strategic behaviours. More recent data 
also show that personality predicts deviant behaviours (Austin et al., 2014; Oh et al., 2013). In 
competition situations, deviant behaviours might manifest through the use of IM as represented in 
the SEB items (Table 5.1). Cognitive ability (CA). I included CA for the same top reason described 
in Personality. I also included CA to account for respondents who may compensate specific 
cognitive deficits with a superior level of EI, or vice-versa (an effect found in two studies: Côté & 
Miners, 2006; Fiori, 2015). As mentioned in Chapter 2, in past research where high-Machs were 
conceptualised as poor mind readers and emotionally detached individuals, high-Machs (in relation 
to low-Machs) scored higher on an IQ test and demonstrated higher strategic skills (Bereczkei & 
Birkas, 2014), including in a competitive game (Czibor & Bereczkei, 2012), suggesting the 
aforementioned compensatory effect is possible to occur within this population. 
 
5.3. Method 
5.3.1.  Participants  
 
One hundred and fifty-two managers (61.8% male; Mage = 45.70 years, SD= 10.26 years, age 
range: 25-73) from a range of organisations across Australia successfully completed all components 
of the study. This primary group comprised three subgroups: (a) 126 managers who were members 
of, or indirectly related to, an institute that specialises in providing leadership training for 
corporations, (b) 16 working students enrolled in a MBA program at a university, and (c) a more 
heterogeneous subgroup of 10 managers connected in some ways to the MBA subsample (e.g., a 
relative or a personal contact of a MBA student, a staff member of the university). Out of the total 
group, 103 managers had direct reports, 138 had been in their current position for at least one year 
and 132 described themselves as full-time workers. Overall, the sample was racially homogenous, 
with 135 managers who self-identified as White, 7 as Asian, and 1 as Hispanic. The remaining 9 
managers did not specify their ethnicity.  
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To maximise participation, participants were informed that they would receive their EI and 
IQ scores in exchange for their full involvement (i.e., completion of Phases 1-3). The institute 
advertised the study to its members in an official email. The MBA students learned about the 
existence of the study either via social media (i.e., LinkedIn and Twitter accounts of their school) or 
via in-class interventions that I was able to perform.  
 
5.3.2.  Procedure and measures 
 
I collected the data online at three time points: Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3; with an 
interval of approximately one week between each phase. All phases were programmed in the 
software Qualtrics and conducted in a strict order (i.e., Phase 2 required completion of Phase 1, 
Phase 3 required completion of Phase 2). Prospective participants were instructed to email me 
directly to take part in the research. Confirmed participants were added to a first mailing list 
corresponding to Phase 1. To complete the phases, participants received an online link with brief 
instructions in a confidential email. The link directly led them to the relevant Qualtrics survey. 
Before they could proceed with Phase 1, participants signed an electronic consent form, valid for 
the entire study. Similar to Study 1, the ethics forms stated a relatively imprecise research title 
(Emotions in decision-making at work) to enhance internal validity. I monitored participants’ 
completion of the phases on a daily basis to manage the different mailing lists and to send 
reminders. The content of each phase is described below.  
Phase 1. Ability EI. I used the MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002a) to assess managers’ level of 
EI. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the MSCEIT consists of 141 items that measure the four abilities or 
branches of the Mayer–Salovey 1997 model: the ability to perceive, use, understand, and manage 
emotions in the self and in others. I purchased the MSCEIT through Multi-Health Systems. The test 
company generates seven scores: one total EI score, one score for each branch, and two area scores. 
In my proposed conceptualisation of SEI, I consider EI as a global ability (each branch matters but 
it is the product of their aggregation that matters the most since it is what ultimately constitutes EI). 
Here I thus only report participants’ overall EI. As mentioned earlier as well, two scoring options 
exist, expert or consensus scoring. I followed previous published works and used expert scoring 
(Schneider et al., 2016). Participants also completed a brief questionnaire to complete the basic 
demographic questions comprised in the MSCEIT (e.g., “How many direct reports do you have?”, 
“How long have you been working in your current organisation?”).  
Phase 2. Participants were administered the three control variables. The corresponding 
measures are described per order of administration. Mach. The Machiavellian Personality Scale 
(MPS; Dahling et al., 2009), comprising four subscales (Amorality, Distrust of others, Desire for 
control and Desire for status) assessed by 16 items total, served to measure Mach. I chose the MPS 
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because it is more subtly constructed than other Mach tests available. In particular, the items of the 
MPS are not as obviously detectable as being representative of the thoughts of a manipulator (and 
thus less prone to social desirability bias) compared to the ones included in Christie and Geis’s 
(1970) popular Mach IV (Paulhus & Jones, 2015). The MPS is progressively gaining recognition 
and has shown good reliability in past research on moral leadership (e.g., .82 in Sendjaya et al., 
2016). A sample item is I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they threaten my own 
goals. I averaged managers’ ratings on the four dimensions to calculate a composite score for total 
Mach. Personality. I used the Big Five Inventory, 44-item version (BFI-44; John et al., 2008), to 
assess agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience. The 
BFI-44 is widely used and validated across studies, including in EI research (e.g., Fiori & 
Antonakis, 2011; Rey, Extremera, & Trillo, 2013). Cognitive ability. I measured participants’ 
cognitive ability with the Wonderlic Personnel Test – Quicktest (WPT-Q; Wonderlic Inc., 2004), 
which consists of 30 items that must be completed within 8 minutes. Items types include, but are 
not limited to, comparisons, antonyms, dates and times, number comparisons, simple math, 
sentence forming, and syllogisms. Individual scores on the WPT-Q correlate .93 with scores on the 
classic WPT (Noe, Tews, & Marand, 2013), itself highly correlated with longer and well 
established cognitive ability tests such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Dodrill, 
1981) and previously used in other EI and workplace studies (e.g., Côté et al., 2010; Noe et al., 
2013; Yip & Côté, 2012). 
Phase 3. Phase 3 constitutes the experimental component of Study 2. Participants completed 
an online in-basket exercise adapted from Ashkanasy et al. (2006), itself adapted from an early 
study by Treviño and Youngblood (1990) published in the prestigious Journal of Applied 
Psychology. The exercise targeted four experimental conditions; each participant was randomly 
assigned to one condition. 
 Condition 1: PGP and high CMP (N= 37)51 
 Condition 2: PGP and low CMP (N= 38) 
 Condition 3: no PGP and high CMP (N= 39) 
 Condition 4: no PGP and low CMP (N= 38)  
Manipulation check. Participants completed a short funneled debriefing questionnaire 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) at the end of the in-basket. The questions controlled that participants 
were not aware of the goals of the study and perceived the different levels of PGP and CMP in a 
way that coherently aligned with their assigned condition. No data were removed from analysis.  
 
                                                 
51 Sample sizes provided in parentheses refer to the number of managers who completed the final version of 
the in-basket.  
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5.4. The in-basket exercise 
5.4.1.  Initial design and pilot test 
 
I pre-tested the effectiveness of the in-basket experiment on 81 managers employed in the 
US and in Australia. The in-basket consisted of 10 emails – 9 were “fillers” that served to mask the 
manipulation inserted in Email 3 (Treviño, 1992). The overall design of the pilot corresponds to the 
description provided in subsection 5.4.2.  
OB scholars frequently refer to position rivalries as triggers for strategic behaviours (Kilduff 
et al., 2010). Accordingly, Email 3 individually invited participants to interview for a higher 
position of known personal interest (PGP) or of suspected disinterest (no PGP) by the hierarchy. 
Email 3 specified whether the position was advertised in priority to existing employees (low CMP) 
or to both internal and external candidates (high CMP). To prime the presence and level of CMP 
key words such as “competition” or “compete” (high CMP) were emphasised in the email. In past 
research (Hassin et al., 2009; Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002), goal theorists have used this 
strategy to prime goal pursuit. And, as noted in the preceding review, CMP and PGP are 
definitionally linked through context (i.e., perceiving an opportunity for PGP is a contextual 
threshold for CMP), hence the logic of the transposition of the strategy here.  
The first action of the exercise required participants to either chose to accept or decline to 
interview for the position. If they accepted, they ranked five IM behaviour items (DV items) of 
increasing degree of ingratiation (1= most favourite response; 5 = least favourite). I initially chose 
to focus on ingratiatory behaviours (i.e., using flattery or doing personal favours to become more 
likeable; Turnley & Bolino, 2001) because the literature reveals that they can be effective IM 
behavioural techniques and are commonly employed by careerists and high self-monitors (Gordon, 
1996; Judge & Bretz, 1994; Orpen, 1996). Before collecting the data, six OB experts rated several 
tentative propositions for the DV items (the five included obtained the highest scores), and provided 
critical feedback on the format of the exercise.  
I performed a series of hierarchical regression analyses to test the three hypotheses (with the 
five ingratiation items). No significant interaction emerged. Open-ended questions from the 
manipulation check revealed that the managers judged that choosing to be interviewed was always a 
lower-risk decision than declining (>95% accepted across the four conditions). As I envisaged it 
might occur (given IM theorists warn that IM tactics have a 50-50 chance to succeed, e.g., Jones & 
Pittman, 1982), the managers also judged the items were too sycophantic. To address these 
problems, I replaced the ingratiation items with the more refined rubrics SEB and SIB, and revised 
the text of the manipulation to render the position clearly more or less desirable (to better induce 
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PGP/no PGP) and more or less competitive (see subsection 5.4.2). I also reduced the number of 
emails to six total (more convenient for a working sample). 
 
5.4.2.  Version used 
 
The final version of the exercise contained: (a) an introductory page, (b) six emails, and (c) 
one organisation chart. Below I describe the purpose of each and how I operationalised (d) the 
manipulation and (e) the DV items.  
(a) The introductory page notified participants about the role they were asked to play in the 
exercise. Participants were told they were a national sales manager working for Micrometre, a large 
electronics organisation, and that they had been occupying this position for five years. At this point 
in previous in-basket experiments participants are given a fake, identical name. In the present study, 
to enhance the realism of the exercise, participants were directly addressed by their real names. To 
capture participants’ spontaneous responses, participants were introduced to the exercise with a 
stressful scenario: 
 
This is a hectic month with more out of town travel than usual. It's 
Friday afternoon. You have been out of the office all week on 
business and must catch another plane on Monday. You have briefly 
returned to your office and see 6 new emails in your mailbox. As 
you will notice, most of the material mentioned in the emails relate 
to the massive staff restructuring that is about to take place at 
Micrometre. 
 
You have maximum 25 minutes to dispose of all the 6 emails before 
you leave to meet your spouse. You are doing some renovations at 
home that are supposed to be finalised this weekend and you 
are both supposed to meet with the representative of the company 
who is taking care of your house. 
 
When you are under so much time pressure, prioritising is of the 
utmost importance. 
 
 
(b) The six emails (Email 1, Email 2,...Email 6) described different basic work situations 
necessitating decision-making or basic information processing (one email required no action). Like 
in the initial design, only Email 3 contained the manipulation and the two manipulated variables, 
PGP and CMP, were conscientiously embedded in its text.  
(c) The organisation chart (Appendix E) showed the location of participants in the hierarchy 
of Micrometre. The chart also specified the names and functions of other key organisational 
members (subordinates/peers/and superiors, senders of the emails or mentioned in them). 
Participants could visualise the chart consistently before each email.  
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(d) The two manipulated variables.  
PGP. Email 3 stated that an existing position at Micrometre would soon become vacant. To 
induce PGP, I rendered the position desirable (Conditions 1 and 2). The desirable position offered a 
much higher income than the one participants were told they were currently earning as national 
sales manager. The organisation chart also revealed that the position was a higher-level position 
(i.e., Director of marketing sales = 1 level above national sales manager). Conversely, when the 
position did not represent any hierarchical elevation and was lower in income, it was considered 
undesirable and thus improbable to stimulate PGP (Conditions 3 and 4). Other criteria that aimed to 
render the vacant position more or less desirable were (a) the state of the portfolio (rich vs. small) 
left by the last employee, and (b) opportunities to travel internationally (significantly augmented vs. 
significantly reduced). In retrospect, I believe this latter point related to travelling was not an 
objective desirability parameter. The overall situation portrayed in the different conditions, 
however, was clearly reflective of a more or less desirable job description. Appendix F presents the 
full text of the four versions of Email 3 (1 per condition). 
CMP. In addition to the strategies mentioned in the pilot description (subsection 5.4.1), Email 
3 was either addressed to all national sales managers or uniquely to the participants to induce 
different levels of CMP. When it was addressed to all national sales managers it indicated that 
eligible candidates were multiple, inducing an augmented level of CMP. When the email addressed 
participants individually, it was hypothesised that this would create a form of reassuring 
personalisation that would be conducive to a lower level of perceived situational CMP.  
(e) The DV items: Strategic behaviour choice. Participants’ ratings of six options presented 
under Email 3 (i.e., after exposure to the experimental manipulations) were the DV in this study. 
The six options were six items targeting three types of behaviours (impression, deliberation and 
discretion) divided into the two previously described strategic area levels SEB and SIB (subsection 
5.2.1; see also section 5.6). Participants rated the behaviours on a five-point scale (1= very unlikely; 
5= very likely). Table 5.1 presents the six items per type of behaviour and per area level. In the 
actual experiment, the items were not listed in the exact same order to prevent participants from 
suspecting the ethics focus of the study. 
Upon completion of Phase 3, participants were debriefed and received in a confidential email 
their EI and IQ scores as well as generic feedback reports to help them interpreting their results. 
Five managers were also randomly selected and offered an Amazon e-giftcard of the equivalent of 
$100 (Australian) in exchange for their participation.  
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        Table 5.1 Response items per type of behaviour and strategic area level (DV in Study 2) 
Area 
level 
Strategic 
behaviour 
Items 
 
 
 
 
SEB 
 
 
 
 
Impression 
1 
“I make sure that I don't speak out of turn in the next meeting 
with HR or management present so as to avoid leaving them 
with a bad impression of me.”  
 
2 
“I intentionally deploy extra efforts to finish a task or project 
quickly and effectively to demonstrate the extent of my 
potential to my superiors.” 
3 
“I seek to know who is on the Hiring Committee by asking a 
contact of mine who works in HR during a coffee break so that 
I can research their profiles and interests to put on my best 
behaviour next time I encounter the persons in question.” 
 
 
 
SIB 
 
 
 
Deliberation 
 
4 
“I consult with my family about the position and check my 
personal budget for the coming year before making a 
decision.” 
 
5 
“I ask Mary Hern (PA to the HR director) quick administrative 
questions about the procedure such as if there is a deadline to 
apply for the position.” 
 
 
Discretion 6 
“I quickly make my decision about whether or not I am 
interested in the position and whenever I am asked about it at 
work I will simply say what I decided keeping it to the facts.” 
 
 
5.5.  Results  
5.5.1.  Descriptive statistics and correlations  
Table 5.2 presents the means, standard deviations, internal reliabilities, and correlations 
among the study variables. I centered the continuous predictor (EI) to attenuate potential issues of 
multicollinearity. With the exception of SIB (Cronbach’s alpha = .47), all variables had good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .74 to .91). Still, the internal consistency of 
SIB is higher than the one computed for established scales used in highly cited EI studies (e.g., the 
alpha for the passive scale created from the COPE52 was .41 in Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 
2002). Acknowledging this, I next report the most meaningful correlations that emerged from the 
data. 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Austin et al., 2007; Côté et al. 2011; Zhang, Zou, 
Wang, & Finy, 2015), EI negatively correlated with Mach, r(150) = -.17, p = .035. Correlations for 
the other two covariates, personality and IQ, also replicated the tendencies found in the literature. 
                                                 
52 The COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989) is one of the most validated instruments to assess coping.  
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Agreeableness, r(150) = .32, p < .001, and Conscientiousness, r(150) = .19, p = .017, positively 
correlated with EI whereas the trend was reversed for Neuroticism , r(150) = -.22, p = .007.  
In contrast, IQ did not demonstrate a significant relationship with any of the variables tested. 
This invalidated my speculation that the logic of the EI/IQ compensatory model (i.e., a lower IQ is 
compensated by a higher EI, and vice-versa) discovered in past studies would replicate here on the 
IQ/Mach relation. On the other hand, the non-significance of the relation corroborates more recent 
meta-analytic results that show that, overall, the DT and IQ are unrelated (see O’Boyle et al., 2013). 
SEB and SIB were significantly, but modestly, related, r(150) = .18, p = .031 which, albeit 
speculatively, reinforces my proposition that each variable is representative of a theoretically 
distinct orientation (external vs. internal) within a larger construct (strategic behaviours). Finally, 
divergent associations emerged between SEB and Mach, r(150) = .19, p = .021, and SEB and EI, 
r(150) = -.17, p = .032. A possible interpretation may be, in order, that high-Machs favour the 
deployment of IM behaviours as manipulative tactics and that individuals favouring SEB have 
deficits in comprehending the subtleties of others’ emotional functioning. If true, this would bring 
additional support to my view of SEI. That is, SEI involves higher-order strategic behaviours, such 
as SIB, that allow the satisfaction of self-interested needs via benign forms of emotional 
manipulation. 
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  Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables in Study 2 (N=152) 
 
Correlations 
  
Variable     Mean SD     1     2  3       4        5       6      7 8 9      10 
             
1. SEB  2.75 0.99 (.74)          
2. SIB 3.71 0.81      .18*     (.47)         
3. Emotional intelligence 103.29 13.52     -.17*  .11 (.91)        
4. Cognitive ability 26.52 3.56    -.12      -.13       .02 (.87)       
5. Agreeableness 3.92 0.55    -.12   .05      .32*** -.10       (.75)      
6. Conscientiousness 4.05 0.63    -.07   .06   .19* -.06       .29*** (.84)     
7. Extraversion 3.43 0.74   -.02   .05 .15 -.10 .19*      .22**  (.84)    
8. Neuroticism 2.58 0.74    .12   .01    -.22** -.05    -.47***   -.36***  -.31*** (.83)   
9. Openness 3.84 0.59   -.01  .08 .03 .03      .02    -.05 .21** .03 (.80)  
10. Machiavellianism 2.28 0.49      .19*  -.11 -.17* -.11  -.42***    -.07   -.02 .18* -.10     (.84) 
     
           Note. SEB= Strategic External Behaviours; SIB= Strategic Internal Behaviours. Scales reliabilities are reported on the diagonal. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.  
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5.5.2.  Hypotheses tests 
 
I performed a series of hierarchical regression analyses described by Aiken and West’s 
(1991) guidelines to test the interactive effects of PGP, CMP, and EI on managers’ likelihood to 
engage in SEB and SIB. I constructed all the models in three steps. The three covariates were 
entered in Step 1; the direct effects of PGP, CMP, and EI in Step 2; and all the two-way and three-
way interactions terms in Step 3.  
Table 5.3 presents the results of the regression model predicting SEB. A main negative 
effect of CMP occurred in Step 2, b=-0.34, SE=0.16, p=.035, indicating that managers are less 
likely to engage in SEB under high CMP conditions than low CMP conditions. In the absence of 
interaction terms, none of PGP or EI emerged as significant predictors (all ps > .16). Thus, so far in 
the analysis, Hypothesis 1, which proposed that managers with high PGP exhibit greater SEB and 
SIB than managers with low PGP, is not supported.  
 
 
Table 5.3 Multiple linear regression tests of strategic external behaviours (SEB) 
 
Variable 
Step 
 1        2      3 
Covariates    
    IQ            -0.03 (0.02)          -0.03 (0.02)        -0.04 (0.02)† 
    Machiavellianism             0.31 (0.18) †           0.34 (0.18) †         0.33 (0.18) † 
    Agreeableness            -0.04 (0.19)           0.02 (0.19)      < 0.01 (0.19) 
    Conscientiousness            -0.06 (0.14)          -0.07 (0.14)        -0.12 (0.14) 
    Extraversion             0.01 (0.12)           0.01 (0.12)        -0.01 (0.12) 
    Neuroticism             0.09 (0.13)           0.08 (0.13)         0.10 (0.13) 
    Openness          < 0.01 (0.14)           0.03 (0.14)         0.01 (0.14) 
Personal Goal Pursuit (PGP)            0.23 (0.16)        -0.08 (0.22) 
Competitiveness (CMP)           -0.34 (0.16)*        -0.71 (0.23) ** 
Emotional Intelligence (EI)           -0.01 (0.01)        -0.01 (0.01) 
PGP × CMP           0.69 (0.32) * 
PGP × EI           0.01 (0.02) 
CMP × EI           0.01 (0.02) 
PGP × CMP × EI          -0.04 (0.03) 
ANOVA      F (7,144) = 1.18  F (10,141) = 1.77 † F (14,137) = 1.85 * 
R2 Change    0.05                0.06 *              0.05 
Note. The dependent variable for all equations was Strategic External Behaviours (SEB). Personal Goal Pursuit (0 = No PGP, 
1 = PGP); Competitiveness (0 = Low Competitive, 1 = High Competitive); Emotional Intelligence (mean-centered).  
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Step 3, however, revealed a significant interaction between PGP and CMP, b=0.69, 
SE=0.32, p=.031. Probing the effect of PGP separately under conditions of high and low CMP 
showed that PGP significantly predicted SEB in the high CMP conditions, b=0.71, SE=0.23, 
p=.009. On the other hand, as seen in Figure 5.2, PGP was unrelated to SEB in the low CMP 
conditions, b=-0.08, SE=0.22, p=0.707. To this point, Hypothesis 2, which anticipated that 
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managers with high PGP would exhibit greater SEB and SIB than managers with low PGP, 
particularly in situations of high versus low CMP, is partially supported. 
 
  
                          Figure 5.2 Interactive effect of PGP and CMP in predicting SEB 
 
I now turn to the results of the regression model predicting SIB (Table 5.4). Three key 
findings emerged.  
First, in Step 2, a significant direct effect of PGP was found, b=0.34, SE=0.13, p=.011 (all 
ps were > .22 for CMP and EI). Based on these supplemental results, it can therefore be concluded 
that Hypothesis 1, which speculated that managers with high PGP would exhibit greater SEB and 
SIB than managers with low PGP, is partially supported.  
 
Table 5.4 Multiple linear regression tests of strategic internal behaviours (SIB) 
 
Variable 
Step 
 1        2     3 
Covariates    
    IQ  -0.03 (0.02)           -0.04 (0.02) †         -0.05 (0.02) * 
    Machiavellianism  -0.21 (0.15)           -0.21 (0.15)         -0.27 (0.15) † 
    Agreeableness  -0.04 (0.15)           -0.03 (0.15)         -0.11 (0.15) 
    Conscientiousness 0.08 (0.12)            0.06 (0.11)          0.06 (0.11) 
    Extraversion 0.02 (0.10)            0.01 (0.10)         -0.01 (0.10) 
    Neuroticism 0.04 (0.11)            0.08 (0.11)          0.10 (0.11) 
    Openness 0.09 (0.12)            0.12 (0.11)          0.10 (0.11) 
Personal Goal Pursuit (PGP)             0.34 (0.13) *          0.37 (0.18) * 
Competitiveness (CMP) 
Emotional Intelligence (EI) 
PGP × CMP  
 
 
 
           0.04 (0.13) 
           0.01 (0.01) 
 
        -0.02 (0.19) 
        -0.01 (0.01) 
         0.06 (0.26) 
PGP × EI            0.02 (0.01) † 
CMP × EI            0.04 (0.01) ** 
PGP × CMP × EI           -0.05 (0.02) * 
ANOVA         F (7,144) = 0.88       F (10,141) = 1.44  F (14,137) = 1.72 † 
R2 Change      0.04                0.05 *              0.06 † 
Note. The dependent variable for all equations was Strategic Internal Behaviours (SIB). Personal Goal Pursuit (0 = No PGP, 1 
= PGP); Competitiveness (0 = Low Competitive, 1 = High Competitive); Emotional Intelligence (mean-centered).  
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
PGP No PGP
SE
B High CMP
Low CMP
  107 
Second, and unlike for SEB, there emerged no significant interaction between PGP and 
CMP in Step 3. So Hypothesis 2, which predicted that managers with high PGP would exhibit 
greater SEB and SIB than managers with low PGP, particularly in situations of high versus low 
CMP, remains partially supported. 
But, and third, Step 3 also showed that CMP and EI significantly interacted, b=0.04, 
SE=0.01, p=.003. This positive result was prolonged by a significant three-way interaction between 
PGP, CMP, and EI, b=-0.05, SE=0.02, p=.022. Probing the two-way interaction between PGP and 
CMP separately at (relatively) high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of EI revealed no significant 
interaction between PGP and CMP at high levels of EI, b=-0.57, SE=0.37, p=.127.  
Conversely, a marginally significant interaction emerged between PGP and CMP, b=0.67, 
SE=0.38, p=.073 at relatively low EI. Probing then the direct effect of PGP on SIB separately under 
the conditions of high and low CMP at low levels of EI indicated a significant effect of PGP on SIB 
when CMP was high, b=0.73, SE=0.30, p=.014, such that PGP (relative to no PGP) was associated 
with greater SIB. Figure 5.3 below presents the plot of this interaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Figure 5.3 Interactive effect of PGP, CMP and EI in predicting SIB 
 
In conclusion, Hypothesis 3, which projected that managers with high PGP would exhibit 
greater SIB than managers with low PGP, particularly in situations of high versus low CMP, and 
particularly among managers with high versus low EI, is not supported. 
 
5.6.  Post-hoc analyses 
I conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using a principle components analysis 
(PCA) with varimax rotation to verify the optimal factor structure for the DV items. The analysis 
yielded two factors (with all eigenvalues greater than 1) accounting for 59.3% of the variance. As 
expected, the three impression behaviours (impression1, impression2, impression3) loaded on the 
first factor (> .73, α = .74), and the other three strategic behaviours (deliberation1, deliberation2, 
discretion) loaded on the second factor (> .45, α = .47). These results suggest that the six items tap 
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into two distinct types of strategic behaviours and that they are grouped in the way that I 
theoretically proposed. Appendix H shows the full results of the EFA.  
I also asked a sample of 13 expert raters53 (61.5% female; Mage = 36.62 years, SD= 12.25) to 
evaluate the content validity of the same DV items. For this, I first provided the raters with a 
definition of the terms SEB (behaviour that aims to impress others via self-promotion or controlled 
impersonation in view of achieving a personal goal. Knowledge about others is socially exploited) 
and SIB (behaviour that aims to gather information via deliberation or self-reflection in view of 
achieving a personal goal. The information gathered is kept privately within the self). I then asked 
them to rate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = none to 5= a great deal) how much they thought each of 
the items had of SEB and SIB.  
I finally conducted paired-samples t-tests to compare the raters’ responses. These analyses 
revealed that the raters perceived the three items classified as SEB as significantly more reflective 
of external strategic behaviours (M=3.41, SD=0.73) compared to the three items classified as SIB 
(M=2.05, SD=0.94), t(12)=4.67, p=.00. The experts did not differentiate reliably between the SEB 
and SIB items in terms of how reflective they are of internal strategic behaviours, t(12)=0.42, 
p=.68, but at least the pilot data (see Appendix I for the full analysis) provide some additional 
support for the results of the PCA.  
 
5.7.  General discussion  
In Study 2 I tested for the first time the interactive effects of ability EI, CMP, and PGP on 
managers’ likelihood to engage in strategic behaviours. Contrary to my expectations, results 
indicate that such interaction exists, and is detectable at a significant level, but among low-EI 
individuals exclusively. Condition 1 in the in-basket exercise (opportunity for PGP + presence of 
high CMP) failed to produce any statistically discernible effect on the high-EI managers in terms of 
predicting their propensity to engage in SIB. I propose a few theoretical and methodological 
explanations to this apparently paradoxical finding.  
Theoretical explanations. Low-EI individuals (relative to high-EI individuals) possess less 
ER knowledge but may be able to exploit it more effectively. According to Alvesson and Spicer’s 
(2012) “functional stupidity” theory, sophisticated cognitive processing can cloud the mind of 
organisational members and cause unproductive ruminations while minimal reflexivity promotes a 
virtuous circle of certainty and proactivity, leading to higher (or at least unaffected) functioning. 
From this perspective, it is possible to envisage that low-EI managers favour SIB in situations of 
high CMP and when PGP is activated because they are instinctive pragmatics, which allows them to 
                                                 
53 9 raters self-identified as OB expert (all had a PhD) and 4 as PhD student (all were specialising in a OB-
related topic). 
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act faster and in ways that are likely to engender lasting advantageous resolutions (like in classical 
economics, an agent is considered rational if he maximises his utility; Bourgine, 2004). Or perhaps 
high-EI people tend to behave more consistently and formally in comparison to low-EI people who 
might be more prone to Mach behaviour and, in turn, more innately comfortable with altering their 
conduct in response to context. Either way, if correct, both options would render low-EI people 
strategically skilled by default. 
New theory and data (Fiori & Ortony, 2016) suggest that certain high scorers on the 
MSCEIT could process emotion knowledge hypersensitively and might miss opportunities to 
“strategize” (my own term) as a result. During the exercise, high-EI managers might have been 
more conservatively preoccupied by their performance (i.e., reading all emails, respecting the timer) 
and less receptive to the manipulation and to the excitement of competing and making strategic 
decisions. Maybe they lacked political will. Political will corresponds to the level of energetic 
involvement one is willing to risk for optimising political goals (Treadway, Hochwarter, Kacmar, & 
Ferris, 2005). 
In my view, the most plausible explanation is that assessing true, subtle strategic behaviours 
is exceptionally complicated. In developing the DV items, I aimed for behaviours observable in real 
life. But strategic content can take a plethora of more or less insidious forms, which is a major 
contributory factor to failed experiments (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Two scenarios are conceivable: 
(a) managers chose what appeared to them as the most socially desirable answers (which would 
render the content validity of the SIB items questionable), or (b) the link between the manipulation 
and the DV items lacked pertinence (Treviño, 1992). 
Methodological explanations. Using a Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG) to test SEI may 
have been more useful than using an in-basket exercise for generating purer findings. The in-basket 
seemed an appropriate option at the time because it is a classic EL research tool (Treviño, 1992) 
proven to be effective for capturing behaviours that match real (i.e., on-the-job) work behaviours 
(Brass & Oldham, 1976). Questions that relate to altruism and self-interest, on the other hand, are 
often tested in ingenious game experiments (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Sigmund, 2010). Post-facto 
speculations are difficult, but my intuition is that Study 2’s results would have shown a significant 
high-EI/SIB association in a PDG; the negotiation choices required from the players being explicit 
in revealing a person’s degree of selfishness and competitive drive. A PDG would have also 
allowed me to collect observational data about the managers’ emotional states while they are 
playing (Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2014) – a possible qualitative substitute for testing emotion 
abilities in action.  
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In retrospect, I believe the wording of the DV items could be further improved so that the 
SEB items appear slightly less sycophantic and, conversely, the SIB items less discreet or less 
neutral. It is probable that, because of these presupposed limitations, high-EI managers could not 
really identify with any particular response. I further believe that distinguishing between the SEB 
and SIB items offers an incomplete range of strategic options. Adding another set of items targeting 
strategic relational behaviours (SRB) (e.g., focused listening, use of body language, use of humour, 
tone of voice) might be one solution to capture the more subtle aspects of SEI (Eberly, Holley, 
Jonhson, & Mitchell, 2011).  
Another, but less plausible, explanation concerns the WPT-Q. A meta-analysis on the DT 
and IQ revealed that using the Wonderlic can yield weaker Mach-IQ relations (O’Boyle et al., 
2013). Perhaps another IQ test would have shown that the lower EI of certain managers was in fact 
compensated by a higher IQ and advanced Mach skills, allowing them to pinpoint behavioural 
tactics of highest strategic potential (e.g., discretion often prevents intentions from being detected). 
Lastly, working samples are recommended for OB/EI studies (Walter et al., 2011) but 
typically represent a class of hard-to-reach individuals with busy schedules and thus little attention 
span for research projects. A more stressful exercise might have ensured more reactivity from the 
(unmonitored) managers, which may have oriented a portion of the findings differently. For 
example, data show that a cortisol (stress hormone) increase augments the motivation to 
autonomously master challenging tasks (Schultheiss, Wiemers, & Wolf, 2016). 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1. Research issues addressed  
Kilduff et al. (2010) pointed out that research on EI has overly focused on the EI/prosocial 
outcomes association and neglected the possibility that high-EI individuals might also use their 
emotional abilities for personal gain. They proposed the existence of a strategic use of EI, where the 
four EI abilities of the Mayer and Salovey (1997) model serve to develop dark side tactics and to 
facilitate PGP. I believe the emphasis on the strategic potential of possessing a high level of EI is 
pertinent. But one problem I see in the Kilduff et al. general approach is that it principally advances 
arguments and logics that associate SEI with a Machiavellian form of manipulation of EI. While I 
fully adhere to the idea that EI can have a dark side, I believe that tackling the scientific study of the 
utility of EI through a Manichaen paradigm is a method that has major limitations. I argue that such 
method reduces opportunities to capture the deepest motives that influence human behaviour. I 
locate these motives in what I called earlier in the thesis “the middle zone,” i.e., between the 
positive and the dark exploitation of EI, which, I argue, are two extremes of a same continuum.  
In response to this problem, I posit that an in-depth dissection of leaders’ motives for action 
(cf. the expression “exhausting the ‘whys’” in section 4.8), rather than a strict measurement of self-
reported behaviours, would produce more authentic characterisations of the ethicality of the way EI 
is utilised. 
My vision for SEI derives from another analysis of the notion of self-interest. Consistent 
with the conclusions of evolutionary biologists and economists (Frank, 1988), I hypothesise that 
self-interest predicts most choices, acts, and dynamics within interpersonal relationships. Most is 
critical here because it reinforces the view that selfishness concerns the majority of people 
(Sigmund, 2010) and because it assumes a possible compatibility between self-interested motives 
and the ethical respect of externalities (=all that is not the individual). Finally, I identify two 
conditions for the activation of SEI: the sensed presence of CMP and of an opportunity for personal 
elevation through PGP.  
The present research aimed to extend Kilduff et al.’s (2010) theorising by exploring and 
testing the plausibility of the above-described vision of SEI. Three research questions (RQs) have 
guided my efforts: 
RQ1: What ultimately motivates a leader to value emotions in interactions with followers? 
RQ2: What type of strategic behaviours do high-EI leaders (in relation to low-EI leaders) 
favour for goal pursuit? 
RQ3: Is strategic emotional intelligence empirically a valid view of the utility of EI? 
Table 6.1 presented next summarises the findings for each RQ.
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Table 6.1 Summary of research findings 
Research question Key finding(s)  Source of study 
 
RQ1: What ultimately motivates a leader 
to value emotions in interactions with 
followers? 
 
All leaders have mixed motives (self-focused and others-focused motives) for 
valuing emotions in interactions with followers.  
 
Study 1 
 
RQ1-a: What is the proportion, in 
frequency terms, of others-focused 
motivations in comparison to self-
focused motivations? 
 
From a leader-based perspective, the others-focused motives (181 text units) occur 
with slightly greater frequency than the self-focused motives (155 text units). From 
a relationship-based perspective (i.e., when leaders and followers’ data are 
reconciled), frequencies vary, affecting the least the self-focused motives (-12 
units); but the leading direction remains unchanged (others-focused motives 
dominate with 154 units). 
 
Study 1 
 
 
RQ1-b: How does the nature of leaders’ 
motivations for valuing emotions in 
interactions with followers vary on a 
continuum of different levels of egoistic 
motivations?  
 
 
Qualitatively, this research discriminates 12 submotives: self-preservation, self-
actualisation (highest frequencies reported among self-focused submotives), self-
satisfaction, external approval, status-related benefits, meaning, meeting leadership 
expectations, preserving/fostering others' wellbeing, advancing organisational 
goals (highest frequencies reported among others-focused submotives), social 
connectedness, developing others, altruistic values /aspirations. Without contextual 
information, ranking the egoistic nature of the submotives is complex. Plus, 
different ethical theories would favour different orderings. The lists above are 
tentative classifications assuming long-term wellbeing is the goal and, consistent 
with the SEI paradigm, psychological egoism the theory of reference. 
 
 
 
 
Study 1 
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RQ1-c: Is the perception of leaders with 
regard to the nature of their own 
motivations congruent with the one that 
followers have of them on the same 
topic?  
 
14 leaders and 28 followers (2 per leader) were interviewed. Before reconciling or 
“correcting” data within the 14 triads, 4 triads (or 28.6% of the total sample) 
perfectly matched in perceptions for the self-focused motivations (i.e., cumulative 
frequencies within the transcript of each triad member indicated a prevalence of 
self-focused motivations) vs. 3 (or 21%) for the others-focused motivations. Post-
reconciliation, the proportions were: 7 matched triads for the self-focused 
motivations (or 50% of the total sample), and 6 matched triads (or 43%) for the 
others-focused motivations; data within 1 triad were irreconcilable. This summary 
shows that leaders and followers’ perceptions only modestly converge. One 
speculative interpretation is that leaders might sometimes overestimate how 
altruistically intentioned they are.  
 
Study 1 
 
 
RQ1-d: Does follower satisfaction of 
the leader's leadership style vary as a 
function of the answer to RQ1-c? 
 
 
 
A minority of followers (N=3) criticised aspects of their leader’s leadership style or 
skills. As it could have been expected, targeted leaders (N=3) pertained to the 
groups deliberate (N=2) and self-focused leaders (N=2), generating a small result in 
the cross-matched codes deliberate-self-focused (N=1). In spite of the critiques 
formulated and the conflicting attributions found within the triads, all followers 
enjoyed working for their leader and admired many of their skills. This finding 
suggests that, regardless of whether congruence is found (cf. RQ1-c), leaders 
perceived to be occasionally “manipulating” emotions are still effective and liked. 
As no cases of destructive leadership emerged (e.g., psychopathic leaders), however, 
this finding should be interpreted with caution. 
 
 
 
Study 1 
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RQ2: What type of strategic behaviours 
do high-EI leaders (in relation to low-EI 
leaders) favour for goal pursuit? 
 
This question was tested in an in-basket experiment. Contrary to expectations, a 
statistically significant inclination to deploy strategic internal behaviours or SIB (as 
opposed to strategic external behaviours, SEB) for personal goal pursuit (PGP) 
(primed goal: promotion goal) in the presence of high competitiveness (CMP) 
emerged among low-EI leaders, exclusively.  
 
Study 2 
 
RQ2-a: To what extent does the type of 
strategic behaviours favoured by high-
EI leaders represent an obvious choice 
from a theoretical standpoint? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to SEB, which reflected IM, SIB were conceptualised as more discreet, 
subtle, and covert types of behaviours. In theory, both SEB and SIB could be 
employed for PGP by high-EI leaders given EI is a neutral ability and contextual 
demands dictate behavioural adjustments.  
 
From an SEI perspective, it was hypothesised that high-EI leaders would be more 
prone to favour SIB because SIB are not clearly detectable as being strategic in 
nature. Choosing SIB was deemed to be a more insidiously sophisticated approach 
to processing emotional information. On the basis of this assumption, the fact that 
my initial hypothesis was not supported (the low-EI leaders favoured SIB rather 
than the high-EI leaders, as I anticipated based on the extant theory and literature) 
was not evident to interpret theoretically. Linking the concepts of functional 
stupidity (the less intellectualisation one engages into the more productive one tends 
to be; Alvesson & Spicer, 2012) and hypersensitivity (EI, via an abundant access to 
affective data, can cultivate rumination and inaccurate situation appraisal; Fiori & 
Ortony, 2016), I speculate that, in competitive conditions where meaningful 
personal goals are at stake, low-EI leaders may be more predisposed to act 
pragmatically.  
 
Study 2 
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RQ3: Is strategic emotional intelligence 
empirically a valid view of the utility of 
EI? 
 
 
The current thesis provides some preliminary evidence for the probable existence of 
SEI in qualitatively revealing that the SEI logic (in brief: exploiting – in the 
constructive sense of the term – emotional data for self-interested goals) is, in 
practice, a credible representation of the way and reasons why most leaders value 
emotions in interactions. But, when tested under experimental conditions, the logic 
could not be verified. Empirically, the validity of SEI is thus only partial. More 
research is needed to determine the strategic behaviours that high-EI leaders 
situationally endorse. One proposition for moving forward is to test an additional 
prediction, EI  strategic relational behaviours (keeping SEB and SIB as other 
outcomes, and PGP and CMP as moderators), in a game experiment.  
 
Studies 1 & 2   
(each partially) 
 
 
RQ3-a: To what extent do self-
interested motives explain the 
importance that leaders give to valuing 
emotions in social interactions? 
 
Study 1 (N=14 senior leaders + 28 followers) shows that when leaders and 
followers’ perceptions are compared and matched self-focused leaders (leaders with 
a majority of self-focused motives) increase in numbers (from 4 to 7 cases) 
(justification for choosing this approach to analysing the data: leadership is a 
socially constructed phenomenon). By contrast, when leaders’ self-reported 
rationales for using emotions are the only rationales considered (justification for 
rejection: heroic conception of leadership), others-focused leaders dominate (9 
cases). In this research, the extent to which self-interested motives explain the 
importance that leaders give to valuing emotions varied as a function of the 
leadership approach adopted. The need to self-actualise was another major factor. 
 
 
 
 
Study 1 
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RQ3-b: Are high-EI leaders (in relation 
to low-EI leaders) significantly more 
prone to engage in strategic behaviours 
in competitive situations that present an 
opportunity to achieve a personal goal? 
In other words, does EI have a utility 
that is significantly higher for leaders 
that are sensitive to the pursuit of 
personal goals and the presence of 
competitiveness? 
 
RQ3-c: Can EI serve leaders’ personal 
goal pursuit in a way that is compatible 
with ethical conduct? 
 
 
In Study 2 (N=152 working managers), the situational variables presence of CMP 
and opportunity for PGP interacted with EI to predict one type of strategic 
behaviour (SIB) above and beyond IQ, personality, and Mach. The 3-way 
interaction emerged only among low-EI managers, however; with methodological 
limitations likely to explain this unexpected result (cf. section 5.7). 
I conclude that the declarative knowledge that (in fact) principally constitutes EI, 
taken in isolation, has limited utility for facing the tensions of PGP. In action, the 
philosophical postulates of SEI (e.g., pragmatism, self-preservation) might be most 
incremental in predicting effective PGP, with or without the use of emotional data. 
 
 
The response is partially positive: 
In Study 1 no objective measure of EI is administered but, overall, findings suggest 
compatibility: (a) leaders have mixed motives (self-focused and others-focused 
motives, quasi-equal in importance) for utilising emotions during interactions, but 
self-focused leaders are slightly dominant in numbers, (b) followers like their leader 
regardless of whether they believe he/she might be intentionally self-centered, and 
(c) self-focused leaders are not perceived as unethical by followers. 
Study 2’s results contradict the belief espoused in this research that being higher in 
EI predicts SIB. They do support parts (in bold) of the mechanism of SEI: high EI+ 
high CMP+ high PGP +/- awareness – harm (e.g., Mach) = functional 
strategizing (e.g., through SIB); but the missing EI component renders here the 
claim of compatibility impossible.  
 
Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studies 1 & 2 
(each partially) 
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6.2. Key contributions  
6.2.1. Contributions to emotional intelligence literature   
 
A first major contribution of this research, from a theoretical standpoint, is its critical 
approach to advancing existing knowledge about the utility of EI by continuing the discussion 
pioneered by Kilduff et al. (2010) on the topic of SEI. As I have recapped numerous times, I share 
the authors’ critique that prior EI studies have largely focused on the EI/prosocial outcomes 
association and, in doing so, have presented an idealised image of the (EI) theory. But I also believe 
that the authors’ initial description of SEI is problematic because it mostly associates SEI with 
abusive utilisations of EI, adding density to the current Manichaen state of EI research. In my 
thesis, I tried to propose a more pragmatic vision for the term (SEI) through the formal definition 
capitalising on one’s EI to pursue self-interested goals ethically. The view of SEI I have articulated 
firmly disconnects self-interested motives from unethical leadership and aligns SEI with the notion 
of functional opportunism. In realising this subtle repositioning, the thesis thus offers the 
commencement of an audacious philosophy of EI. Furthermore, through the aforementioned 
repositioning, the thesis also upgrades research on the utility of EI to the novel phase of 
Centralisation (the three anterior phases identified in reviewing the literature being: pre-
popularisation, expansion and exploration; subsection 2.4.1), where balanced and critical views are 
valorised and prioritised. 
A second major contribution is the qualitative verification of the plausibility of SEI in an 
organisational context. Specifically, Study 1’s results reveal that while leaders’ motives for 
managing emotional information are mixed, self-focused leaders slightly dominate in numbers.  
A third major contribution is the fact that the thesis responds to the call for producing 
research that helps to elucidate the boundary conditions that could minimise the negative use of EI 
(Brackett et al., 2016). Through the literature review (e.g., my interpretation of Mach’s rare benign 
effect), the results of Study 1, and the hypotheses tested in Study 2, I have commented on one 
distinct condition: the opportunity to self-actualise. I have previously reflected on the (boundary 
conditions) issue and made more elaborated propositions elsewhere (see Mikolajczak & Bausseron, 
2013). Combined, these contributions might inspire future EI/ethical principles models. 
Finally, the thesis advances a series of secondary issues. One concerns the question, 
formalised by Fiori (2009), of the deliberate and automatic processing involved in the application of 
EI. Similar to the co-developers of EI, the Dasborough and Ashkanasy’s (2002) model (most 
relevant model incorporating EI and leadership motives) prioritises the deliberate use of EI in 
considering “emotions in the conscious process of forming attributions of intentionality” (p. 12). In 
contrast, the results of Study 1 indicate that leaders tend to process emotion knowledge mostly 
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unconsciously. The thesis therefore points out the necessity to consider the subproblem of 
intentionality in future definitional and measurement revisions of EI.  
Another secondary advance, which overlaps with the methodological contributions, 
concerns the credibility of EI as independent construct (Walter et al., 2011). Study 2’s results 
suggest that low-EI individuals might be more adept than their high-EI counterparts at processing 
emotional stimuli strategically, which invalidated my intuition that the opposite was uniquely 
probable. Although results were not in the predicted direction, the variables (IQ, personality, and 
Mach) controlled for verified EI’s incremental viability.  
In fact, these unexpected results are doubly useful because they reinforce the significance of 
the recent appeal to study the possible hypersensitivity of high-EI people (Fiori & Ortony, 2016). If 
we analyse them a little bit further, they could also highlight the general superior potential of SEI 
for practice. For example, certain high-EI leaders may know how to self-regulate strategically (e.g., 
via a contained enthusiasm involving minimal sharing of their personal goals with others; a SIB 
tactic) but may be incapable to implement their strategic knowledge successfully because they have 
internalised too much negativity from past interactions (cf. point on declarative vs. procedural 
knowledge; subsection 2.2.2, segment Measurement issues). So far in this reasoning, SEI and EI 
appear to be equally limited for real life. However, SEI is predicated on a pragmatic analysis of 
human nature that promotes mental alertness precisely about events that may be a threat to self-
interest. Consequently, attempts to lead with SEI, through repetition, I argue, should have greater 
chances to be realised.  
 
6.2.2. Contributions to other bodies of literature  
 
Despite calls by organisational scientists to examine the role of intentions in moderating 
levels of EL in action (Den Hartog, 2015), most empirical works have adopted a consequentialist 
approach to judging ethicality. EI experts have also stressed the importance to study the EI/EL 
intersection but mostly from a behavioural standpoint. In other words, looking at original and 
personal motives has been, and continues to be, overlooked. Study 1 (qualitative study) addresses 
this missing perspective and in this sense expands our existing understanding of EL. In Study 1, my 
goal was to capture and quantify leaders’ self- and others-focused motivations for valuing the role 
of emotions in interactions with followers. I also identified 12 subcategories of motivations and 
examined multiple links between major emerging themes (e.g., I matched triads by level of 
processing and type of motives). Through its richness of content, Study 1 might inspire hypotheses 
about the EI/EL relationship that will surpass the ones articulated in the overall thesis in criticality.  
Most importantly, Study 1’s results reinforce the prediction of other scholars (Bolino, 1999; 
cited in Grant & Mayer, 2009; Treviño et al., 2003) that ethical behaviours should be more 
  119 
effectively studied (i.e., in a way that most faithfully aligns with reality) from a mixed motives 
perspective (out of which isolating the dominant type of motives becomes a more complex but more 
authentic exercise). 
Debates within the altruism literature are de facto interminable because moral philosophy is 
not an exact science. In the midst of the cacophony, the results of this thesis (Study 1) add empirical 
substance to the theory of psychological egoism (Slote, 1964) in revealing that self-actualisation, a 
natural and perpetually revisited self-interested goal, might explain transformational/EI types of 
behaviours. 
Vroom (2013) said he wished he had made two precisions about expectancy theory54 in his 
earlier writings (Vroom, 1964). One is to have formally marked the distinction between extrinsic 
and intrinsic goals, both exemplified as self-interested (in order, “promotion” and “feeling good 
about oneself,” Vroom, 2013, p. 273). As he reflects about the future of the theory, he proposes four 
avenues for intensifying intrinsic motivation (stated before the brackets below). I note that SEI has 
direct implications for each proposition: goal setting (sei: valorisation of PGP), job design (sei: 
providing autonomy through responsibilisation), connecting work to values (sei: choosing 
autonomy through strategic alignment), and creating devoted work teams (sei: derived outcome of 
generalised strategic alignment). If these notions prosper and become further intellectualised, then 
SEI has a chance to contribute to the not so old resurgence of the concept of motivation, which 
apparently was, also, a victim of the cognitive revolution (Pervin, 1992).  
Regarding the goal literature, the finding that leaders tend to assimilate emotional 
information at the unconscious level (Study 1) supports the call for more integration of 
nonconscious processes in motivational models (Bargh & Huang, 2009). 
Finally, examinations of the (self-reported55) EI/(perceived) OP association have only 
recently been undertaken. In theory, SEI shares with OP the frank recognition of the role of self-
interest (e.g., building reputational attributes; Ferris et al., 2007b) in explicating leader behaviour. 
For now, positive correlations between EI and OP are not established (in the two studies below 
associations were -.13 (ns56) and -.24) and OP has been reported to negatively moderate (Shrestha 
& Baniya, 2016) and mediate (Meisler & Vigoda-Gadot, 2014) the relationship between EI and 
performance outcomes (e.g., in both studies: job satisfaction). The negative impact of OP, I 
                                                 
54 Vroom (2013, p. 273) proposed the following (revised) equation for expectancy theory: “Force = (Valence 
+ Instrumentality) x Expectancy.” In the equation: 
 Force is the motivation (to perform the task effectively) 
 Valence is the intrinsic motivation (same as above) 
 Instrumentality is the extrinsic motivation (same as above) 
 Expectancy is the conviction that effort will be amortised (i.e., it will produce the desired performance outcome) 
55 Stream 2 measure used in the cited literature: Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS; Wong 
& Law, 2002). 
56 ns= non significant. 
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speculate, perhaps indicates the added value – inexplicit in EI and integral to SEI– of strategic 
skills. Strategic leaders, speculatively, would manage the presence of OP to their own advantage, 
even advantages that seem minor in appearance. Particular consequences of doing so may be: (a) 
increase of self-esteem (by finding meaning in their experience of work) and (b) multiplication of 
allies (via effective networking efforts achieved, in part, through the sincere display of empathy) – 
both identified as key components of the agenda for future research on political skills (Munyon, 
Summers, Thompson, & Ferris, 2015). In conclusion, I believe that SEI can contribute to alleviating 
unconstructive interpretations of OP and/or help organisational members to elevate their EI skills 
(through training) to the next level (strategic).  
 
6.2.3. Contributions to methodology  
 
I have previously discussed the benefits of adding the three covariates (IQ, personality, and 
Mach) in Study 2 (subsection 6.2.1) and of using working samples (enhanced ecological validity 
and generalisation; Lopes, 2016; Treviño et al., 2003). Perhaps the main methodological 
contribution of the thesis is the realisation, for future studies, that game experiments (rather than in-
baskets) should be a more judicious choice for testing SEI. At least the use of a mixed methods 
design here has permitted the speculation that (true) strategic behaviours are not sycophantic or 
merely about impression (unless the impression is so excellent that it remains undetected), but 
rather subtle, discreet, and private (only known by the strategist and, possibly, some allies).  
 
6.2.4. Practical implications 
 
Frank (1988) wrote “views of human nature are not merely a subject of debate among 
behavioral scientists. They also have important practical consequences” (p. xi). He then enumerated 
a fairly long list of the domains that he thought were concerned (e.g., a corporation’s HR strategy, 
government policy, structure of taxation). Here, I focus on training because I believe it is the 
practical domain within which SEI could produce the most valuable impact. 
Manipulative behaviours are a constant threat to employee subjective wellbeing and may 
become particularly hard to detect when performed by high-EI individuals (Lindebaum & 
Cartwright, 2011). For example, a leader with a high level of EI may exploit emotional information 
about a subordinate to force a certain level of performance. And the nefarious repercussions of 
abusive supervision are well documented (Tepper, 2000). To reduce toxic leadership in 
organisations, EL scholars (e.g., Sendjaya et al., 2016; see also Stead et al., 1990) recommend the 
development of training programs that concentrate on introducing leaders to the forms of pressures 
and ethical challenges they may face during the exercise of their function. I believe this 
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recommendation is vital to foster EL. From an SEI perspective, I would push it further and advise 
that such programs include the themes of personal goals and tactics to pursue them, career 
prospects, competition, theory about the DT traits, and even legal information; especially when the 
audience consists of junior leaders. As Study 1’s results suggest, leaders tend to be particularly 
ambitious, seduced by power and driven by self-interested motives in the early stages of their 
career.  
Many EI training programs are commercialising versions of the theory. Teaching the tenets 
of EI is cardinal and comes first, but without connecting them to the intentions and needs that will 
ultimately drive people to utilise the knowledge, the benefit of such teaching is restricted. For this 
reason, the pragmatism upon which SEI is built, I think, has potential not only to promote the 
inclusion of philosophy in EI research as some EI scientists have recommended (e.g., Schutte, 
Malouff, & Thorsteinsson, 2013) but also to inspire much needed reforms of content.  
 
6.3.  Limitations  
Theoretical. The strategic use of EI is a novel area of research (Walter et al., 2011) and 
current knowledge on strategic behaviours is far too diffuse to draw firm conclusions from the 
present research. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that some of the arguments I presented to 
defend my view of SEI (e.g., IM behaviours often contain poor strategic potential) can contradict 
others (e.g., IM is an effective strategy for reaching self-interested goals). It is worth noting, 
however, that this imperfection is likely to reveal that I have problematized efficiently given that 
self-contradiction is integral to the problematization process (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011).  
Furthermore, the reader might get the impression that my interpretation of the results 
sometimes is pedantic. Because strategic thinking, by definition, is subtle, its demonstration implies 
meticulous deconstructions. Such impression would thus be normal and hard to avoid. 
Methodological. Study 2’s results show that the complex nature of strategic behaviours 
requires special methods to test their mechanism. In this respect, one major limitation of the thesis 
is that none of the two studies tested the use of EI in action while the assumption is that SEI, 
ultimately,57 involves capitalising on one’s EI in concrete social interactions to maximise 
successful PGP. This limitation is in fact the direct consequence of an existing challenge for test 
developers as implicit measures of ability EI are yet to be validated. In the meantime, as evoked in 
Chapter 5 and earlier in this one, using PDGs might be a constructive way to qualitatively remedy 
this issue.  
                                                 
57 The strategies and tactics can be planned, in their entirety, in isolation (i.e., outside of social interactions). 
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Concerning the size of the two samples (i.e., Study 1: N=42 and Study 2: N=152) the 
literature easily provides ways to justify that they are acceptable. Still, in Study 1, a larger sample 
would have allowed me to analyse more deeply the extent to which self-interest influences senior 
leaders’ emotion management efforts. For example, one or even several extreme cases of deviant 
leaders may have emerged in a larger sample and generate critical new data concerning the 
plausibility of SEI (Teddlie & Yu, 2007).  
Albeit components of the two designs were meticulously selected and ordered, one or two 
supplemental experiments might have helped to provide a less speculative interpretation of Study 
2’s results. I utilised several strategies to render the in-basket simulation credible and realistic but 
the managers completed it online and without supervision (due to their geographical dispersion). 
Thus, in Study 2, data representativeness concerning managers’ true strategic tendencies might be 
poor. Also, given the controversial theme of the study, administering the control variables in Phase 
3 (instead of Phase 2) perhaps would have further reduced participants’ suspicion about the nature 
of the RQs and maximised the proportion of uncontaminated responses in the in-basket (Treviño, 
1992).  
Studies 1 and 2 are cross-sectional. Several scholars have deplored the lack of longitudinal 
studies in the field of EL (Den Hartog, 2015) and EI (Lindebaum & Cartwright, 2011). More 
generally, Gooty et al. (2010) note the existence of a misalignment between theory (affective 
constructs are not stable) and research designs in leadership and emotion studies (cross-sectional 
correlational research is dominant). It would not have been achievable within the PhD timeframe 
but if I had used a longitudinal design to conduct the two studies, the thesis’ contributions would be 
enriched. As SEI refers to the use of EI for PGP, it would have been ideal to observe if and how 
strategies and goals evolve over time, to identify the factors that stimulate strategic behavioural 
alterations, and most crucially to determine whether the efforts SEI requires are worth it (i.e., Does 
SEI lead to goal achievement? If so, what is the incremental prediction of SEI? Does it vary as a 
function of goal temporality58?).  
Past research has shown that moral judgments are not universal (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 
1993). And tests of the generalisability of the MSCEIT across cultures have produced encouraging 
results (Karim & Weisz, 2010) but have yet to be replicated (Brackett et al., 2016). The thesis’ 
results are based on Australian samples and should be appreciated in the context of these 
limitations. 
In sum, with improved designs, both studies need to be repeated to refine the way I 
attempted to extend Kilduff et al.’s (2010) conceptual work. As additional research on SEI is 
                                                 
58 Short-term goals vs. long-term goals. 
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undertaken, the “black box effect” that Johnson et al. (2016, p. 112) noted when referring to the 
uncertain antecedents and outcomes of IM, which also applies to my proposed extension of SEI, 
should progressively evaporate.  
 
6.4. Recommendations for future work on SEI 
Based on my current understanding of SEI, I formulate five recommendations for future 
researchers interested in advancing the ideas discussed in this thesis. First, identifying boundary 
conditions for the ethical use of SEI is probably the ultimate theoretical challenge to address. Since 
SEI is predicated on the idea that egoism and ethical conduct can coexist, delineating which entities 
(e.g., self? relatives? peers at work? shareholders? society in general?) should be considered when 
estimating whether potential harm may be caused from behaving strategically would be a critical 
contribution. The NORMS model (acronym for Neutrality, Operationality, Reactivity, Malleability, 
Sanity; Mikolajczak & Bausseron, 2013) and a more recent probabilistic model for calculating 
ethicality (Appendix J), both requiring sophistication but that I conceived for this purpose (i.e., to 
delineate boundaries and assess their effectiveness), should be of assistance. Second, how SEI and 
political skills may interact and whether they may be constructively combined to form a new type of 
intelligence59 could be an original research project. Third, with regard to the development of an 
ability measure of SEI, I imagine that a distinct version of the measure may be useful in three 
applied domains: (a) personnel selection, (b) clinical assessments, and (c) strategic profiling (SEI 
targets skills intelligence agents need). Fourth, elaborating and testing practical guidelines for the 
practice of SEI that could be later incorporated into leadership training programs might help to 
modernise the neutral approach of existing EI interventions. Fifth, establishing whether SEI leads to 
different achievement results when it is applied consciously and unconsciously is key in elevating 
the term to the status of important (i.e., really useful) theory. If SEI can be deliberately controlled, 
then its mastery would be open more quickly to the greatest number. 
 
6.5. Closing comments  
I would like to reassert that my conception of SEI is driven by positive intents; three in 
particular: (a) to express an observation about human nature (self-interest primarily governs 
behaviours and societal individualism is progressing) that, I think, is realistic yet absent in EI 
                                                 
59 Tentative label and description:  
Mutative intelligence: the ability to deeply transform one’s internal emotional functioning and approach to 
social interactions in a way that is positive, credible, and that can be maintained in the long-term. If necessary or 
desired, the transformation process might be repeated again to form a new profile.  
In support for this proposition, Attali (2009) has identified “becoming another” as a key strategy for surviving 
crises when they become impossible to manage.  
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research; thus the goal is to inform about one other point of view, and stimulate people’s intellect, 
(b) to encourage the elaboration of new coping strategies that, given the above observation, can help 
the weakest (e.g., those who lack assertiveness) and most troubled personalities (e.g., those most 
tempted by retaliation) to face challenging interpersonal situations healthily, and (c) to open up 
exciting opportunities for future research (cf. five points discussed in section 6.4).  
I also would like to stress the merit of daring to pursue what Alvesson and Sandberg (2014) 
have termed “box-breaking research,” that is, research that does not seek to conform for the sake of 
conforming and to avoid publication bias. Unfortunately, if Alvesson and Sandberg are sensing the 
world of research correctly, the current system is parasitic and there is a long way to go until it 
rejuvenates itself. The following quote from these authors is eloquent: “scholarly work is 
increasingly situated in narrowly circumscribed areas of study, which are encouraging 
specialization, incremental adding-to-the-literature contributions and a blinkered mindset. 
Researchers invest considerable time and energy in these specialized areas in order to maximize 
their productivity and career prospects. We refer to this way of doing research and structuring 
careers as boxed-in research. While such research is normally portrayed as a template for good 
scholarship, it gives rise to significant problems in management and organization studies, as it tends 
to generate a shortage of novel and influential ideas” (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014, p. 967).  
Yet, I trust the strategic revolution I predicted will occur. In this individualistic era, 
commentaries that confuse pragmatists with cynics (e.g., Wrightsman, 1991) are too painful to hear 
to persist without major counter-arguments.  
I hope to have convinced the reader that, like other scholars before me (e.g., Dasborough & 
Harvey, 2017 on the benefits of schadenfreude; Dawkins, 1976 with the Selfish Gene theory; Ferris 
et al., 2007b risking the expression strategic bullying), I have dared.
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Appendix A. Guiding questions for semi-structured interviews with leaders in Study 1 
 
1. What does emotion mean to you as a leader? 
1.1.  How often do you think about emotion in your practice of leadership? 
 
2. What role do emotions play in your interactions with others at work?  
2.1. Do you think that it is important for a leader to have skills around recognising 
emotions in others and regulating others’ emotions as well as one’s emotions? Why 
or why not? 
2.2. What emotional skills does a leader need to have to be an effective leader? 
2.3. Are they specific situations where managing emotions is important in your practice 
of leadership? Is so, what situations? Can you give me an example?  
2.4. Do you manage emotions differently according to whom you are interacting with? 
2.5. If so, with whom emotions play the most and least important role for being an 
effective leader? (Subordinates? Peers? Supervisors? Clients?) Why? 
2.6. How often do you interact with subordinates and other work colleagues at work? 
Who do you interact the most with? 
2.7. How important are relationships to your position of leader? 
 
3. How may you use emotions in your interactions with others at work? 
3.1. Can you tell me about a time when emotions played an important role in your 
leadership capacity? 
3.2. What was the situation like? Why did emotions play an important role in this 
situation? What emotions were involved? 
3.3. In retrospect, are you happy about the way you used emotions at the time? 
3.4. How often do you use emotions in your interactions with your subordinates and 
others at work?  
3.5. Are you careful about the way you use emotions in your leadership role? Why or 
why not? 
4.  What may motivate you to use emotions in your interactions with others at work? 
4.1. Do you try to be aware of your emotions in the moment?  
4.2. Is it important to you to understand how your subordinates and others at work 
function emotionally? Why or why not? 
4.3. Do you make a conscious effort to anticipate how your behaviour will affect your 
subordinates’ emotions? Why or why not?  
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4.4. Do you think that being aware of your own emotions and the emotions of your 
subordinates at work is helpful or detrimental for you as a leader? 
4.5. In what way can it be helpful or detrimental? 
4.6. What are the benefits or disadvantages of being aware of your own emotions and the 
emotions of your subordinates and others at work during your interactions with 
them?  
4.7. Can you think of a time when you used your emotional skills in your interactions 
with your subordinates and others at work and noticed these benefits or 
disadvantages?  
4.8. Why did you use your emotional skills in that situation?  
4.9. Was there anything in particular at stake that motivated you to do so?  
4.10. If so, what was at stake? What was the scenario?  
4.11. When you use your emotional skills at work do you plan to do so or is it totally or 
mainly natural? Does it depend of whom you are meeting with/talking to?  
4.12. Are there times when you disguise your emotions at work?  
4.13. Why do you do this? What outcomes are you looking for? 
4.14. Have you ever modified your behaviour to control your subordinates or other 
colleagues’ emotions at work? If so, why did you do this? 
4.15. What are the principal reasons that are likely to make you use your emotional skills 
in your interactions with your subordinates or other colleagues at work? 
4.16. Have you ever used your emotional skills (manipulate emotions) to achieve personal 
goals?  
4.17. If so, what were these goals? How important were they to you and why? 
4.18. Do you think that wanting to achieve personal goals is normal when you are a 
leader? Why or why not?  
4.19. Do you think that there are typical personal goals that leaders have? If so, are these 
personal goals goals that you also have?  
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Appendix B. Guiding questions for semi-structured interviews with followers in Study 1 
 
1. What’s your perception of the role of emotions in leadership? 
1.1. Do you think that emotions have a role to play in leadership? What type of role and 
why? 
1.2. Do you think that is it important for your leader to have skills around recognising 
emotions in others and regulating others’ emotions as well as his/her own emotions? 
Why or why not? 
 
2. How does your leader use emotions with you or other people at work?  
2.1. Can you tell me about a time when, according to you, emotions played an important 
role in your leader’s capacity to practice his/her leadership? 
2.2. What was the situation like? Why did emotions play an important role in this 
situation?  
2.3. What type of emotions were involved? How did your leader handle them?  
2.4. How often does your leader interact with you and others at work? Who does he 
interact the most with? Why? 
2.5. Are emotions often involved when your leader interacts with you and others at 
work? Why or why not?  
2.6. In general, are you happy about the way your leader uses emotions with you and 
others at work? Why or why not? 
2.7. Do you think that your leader is careful about the way he/she deals with emotions in 
his/her interactions with you and others at work? Why or why not? 
2.8. Do you think that your leader makes an effort to understand how you and others at 
work function emotionally? If so, is that effort mainly calculated or mainly natural?  
2.9. Have you ever noticed that your leader used his/her emotional skills differently with 
different people? Can you give me an example of a time when he/she used his/her 
emotional skills differently with different people? What was the situation like? Why 
do you think that he/she used emotions differently? 
 
3.  What may motivate your leader to use his/her emotions in his/her interactions with 
you or other people at work? 
3.1. Do you think that the way your leader uses his/her emotional skills with you and 
others at work is working effectively? Why or why not? 
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3.2. Can you think of a time when your leader used his/her emotional skills and when 
you noticed that the way he/she did this was beneficial or disadvantageous for 
him/her?  
3.3. Why do you think that he/she used his/her emotional skills in that situation?  
3.4. Was there anything in particular at stake that may have motivated him/her to do so?  
3.5. If so, what was at stake? What was the scenario?  
3.6. Are there times when you notice that your leader disguises his/her emotions at work?  
3.7. Why do you think he/she does this? What outcomes is he/she looking for? 
3.8. What are the principal reasons that are likely to make your leader use his/her 
emotional skills in his/her interactions with you or others at work? 
3.9. Can you think of a time when you leader used his/her emotional skills to achieve a 
personal goal?  
3.10. If so, what was this goal? How important do you think that this goal was to your 
leader and why? 
3.11. How often does your leader use his/her emotional skills to achieve personal goals?  
3.12. Do you think that it is normal that leaders use their emotional skills to achieve 
personal goals?  
3.13. Do you think that your leader wants to achieve personal goals that are typical goals 
for leaders? If so what are they? 
 
 
 
 
 
  168 
Appendix C. Primary coding of leader transcripts from thematic analysis in Study 1 
Note. Citation codes – C1, C2, C3, etc. – are not fixed here and serve to distinguish the text units.  
 
Table 1. Perception of emotions 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations 
1.1 Perception 
neutral 
The leader: 
 Gives a neutral definition of 
emotions (e.g., “response to 
stimuli”) or describes emotions 
as neither positive/important nor 
negative/unimportant (e.g., as a 
“part of life”). 
 
C1: Now, emotion, what is emotion? I guess I would say emotion is 
people’s feelings and how they react to what they are doing, what 
they are asked to do, hmm the environment they are in. So I think the 
emotions and feelings in terms of how what they do is folding 
together hmm happiness, anger, frustration. I think emotion is a 
descriptive word for the feeling that the person is having. 
 
C2: I like to think of emotion as the sort of mythos side. If you think 
of the mythos and the logos, the logic is the sort of intellect and the 
emotion is more the subjective side, but it’s an intuitive natural 
response. 
 
1.2 Perception 
positive/ 
important 
 Uses positive words when 
describing emotions.  
 Feels comfortable in emotional 
situations. 
 Believes emotions are important 
for leadership effectiveness, 
negotiation, creativity, etc. 
C3: Integrity, trust, clarity of direction, the ability to be able to 
motivate teams, to keep people together, the ability to be able to get 
the best out of those people and to build confidence. So those sorts of 
things are very important. And a lot of that relates to persona and 
persona is often related to the emotion, the character of the 
individual. Where do emotions stop and where do they start? 
 
C4: I guess this is from my experience in (…) as well, that the 
leaders that I’ve seen be most successful, the pendulum has kind of 
swung I guess from focus on IQ dictating leadership success and it’s 
very much now you see the leaders that can better connect with their 
employees by sharing their emotions and recognising and managing 
other people’s emotions. 
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C5: It can also be a tool as a part of negotiation and persuading and 
managing situations. In some cases you can react very strongly to a 
situation or you can react very calmly or dispassionately and 
sometimes you can react in different ways to what people might 
expect you to react and control situations in that way. 
 
1.3 Perception 
negative/ 
interfering 
 Uses negative words when 
describing emotions. 
 Feels uncomfortable in 
emotional situations. 
 Believes emotions interfere with 
effectiveness at work. 
C6: Often people bring emotions to meetings that have nothing to do 
with their workplace. They’re often the most difficult because their 
emotions, because of something in their life or their (…) died or their 
(…) left them, and they come into a meeting, and the thing that you 
appear to be talking about seems to be driving the emotion but you 
realise actually it’s got nothing to do with the work situation but 
nevertheless, people bring those emotions in. So, part of being a 
leader, I think, is being able to try and understand where it’s coming 
from, if it is the work issue or if it is an external issue and then being 
able to say to that person “We need to try and separate those two 
things, so I can talk to you about work things and maybe someone 
can help you about the external things.” 
 
C7: (…) it rarely enters into it except perhaps in a negative way 
when someone has some problem in their personal life and it bubbles 
over into their professional life. So, I guess, in summing up (…) it’s 
hard to see where emotion plays a role, it does play a role but usually 
negatively in fact. (…) Keeping emotion out of it is the number one 
emotional skill I think.  
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Table 2. Attention given to emotions 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations  
2.1 Attention  
self-focused 
 Demonstrates an effort or ability 
to perceive and understand own 
emotions at work (e.g., feeling 
happy or proud from completing 
a goal, feeling angry because of 
an unfair situation). 
C1: If I’m getting angry I can feel myself getting angry. It’s not 
always quick enough to stop myself from saying something perhaps 
in a way which is perceived by others as a bit angry or a bit agro but 
yes, I’m aware of that. 
 
C2: When I measure myself against others, I think I’m much more 
willing to put my emotions on the table. I’m much more willing to 
say “I like this, I don’t like this, I don’t think we should do this, why 
are we doing.” I’m much more willing to question and show my sort 
of passion and inquisitiveness about a particular situation and I’m 
absolutely not afraid to be told no (…). So I’m very persistent and I 
suspect that’s not a common trait necessarily. I don’t know. But I 
know that when I set my mind to something I’m very determined and 
I think in order to be any kind of leader, you’ve got to have that sort 
of single-mindedness.  
 
2.2 Attention 
others-focused  
 Demonstrates an effort or ability 
to perceive and understand 
others’ emotions at work (e.g., 
through body language, facial 
cues, intonations/words used, 
other observations). 
C3: I take notes, but only single words and things like that. It’s more 
listening (…) I don’t talk in my head when you’re talking. When 
you’re finished talking, I do a really quick rewind of what you said. 
Consciously. I pick out – I will have picked out the words, whether 
they’re visual words, feeling words, how you move your hands, if 
you get red on your neck, your pupils dilate, which way your eyes 
move and all those things, and then I come back to you with the 
proper tone. 
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Table 3. Management of emotions 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations  
3.1 Managing in 
self 
 Describes self-regulation 
techniques to maintain an 
adaptive control over own 
emotions (e.g., taking a deep 
breath, reframing, seeking 
support from others, delegating 
tasks, suppressing negative 
emotions). 
C1: You might have your initial reaction is to get angry and to fly 
off the handle and if you go walk around the bottom of the building 
for 5 minutes and take a few minutes to think about it and come back 
in a way that’s probably more measured. So sometimes I do. I 
would, as I say, I would take the heat out of the moment by going for 
the 5 minute walk, getting some fresh air, thinking about I’ve got to 
go back and this is what I need to say to that person. So it would 
come out, I would hope, the message would still come out quite 
strongly and quite clear, but perhaps without the degree of anger that 
would have come out 10 minutes ago. 
 
C2: Thinking through, yes I’m feeling stressed for something or 
unprepared for something or I’ve got to read something or I’ve got to 
do that. So then rather than getting frustrated at other people, or 
expressing sort of negative emotions, thinking well if I don’t do X or 
I shift Y or I make a change to something, that’s a way of dealing 
with it. Or I get some help, you know, give it to somebody else. So I 
think, yeah, that’s what you can do. Because there’s only so much 
you can do. I mean it is better to go to the source of the problem 
rather than just trying to control emotion because after some point 
you won’t, it won’t work. You know, you did all, you’ll get too 
frustrated or too stressed or whatever it is, that’s the emotion, you 
can control it to some extent but the other way is to reduce it, reduce 
what’s causing it. 
 
C3: I guess if I’m dealing with like a feedback session perhaps, and 
the person is expressing to me that they are feeling disappointed in 
something within the organisation or disappointed about something, 
in those cases where I can’t control that thing that disappoints them, 
then I detach from that. If I can’t control it then I can’t help them 
beyond reassurance.   
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3.2 Managing in 
others 
 Describes techniques to manage 
emotions in others (e.g., 
listening with empathy, using 
humour). 
 Manipulates/disguises emotion 
to avoid contagion. 
 Attempts to motivate others 
with encouragement and 
positive feedback. 
C4: Typically I think it’s when staff have an issue in their life that’s 
affecting their work. I have to talk to them because it’s affecting the 
work and saying, “you know, I can understand you’ve broken up 
with (…), this is going to be a very difficult time and I suggest that 
you could get this help, or this help, or this help or some other help,” 
acknowledging that that’s the emotional state the person is in. 
 
C5: (…) was getting near the limit of (…) they are allowed to 
accumulate (…) I get asked why people are going over. Rather than  
(…) that says “you’re over, take some time” (…) it was a humorous 
(…) in the sense that you know “I am becoming concerned about 
your welfare, you haven’t taken (...). And there is a financial impulse 
in (…), blablabla.” Put the stuff in it but in a comical sense. 
 
C6: If I go into the team and say “Oh everything’s too difficult” then 
they’re going to pick that emotion up themselves and it becomes a 
self-fulfilled prophecy. Whereas if I go in and say, “Look, this is the 
reality, but we’ve done it before, we can do it again” and try and be 
more positive in both the emotion and the messaging, then I know 
that that will affect their state of mind as well. 
 
C7: (…) discussions with people about their underperformance (…) 
If instead you do it in a moderate way and say “these are the good 
things you’re doing well, these are the things you’re not doing well, 
what are we going to do about the things that you’re not doing well, 
how can you improve, how can we help you to improve, how do we 
have clear communication about what it is you need to do?,” 
generally people will actually respond quite well.  
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Table 4. Level of processing 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations  
4.1 Automatic 
expression 
 Shows emotions that are felt in 
the moment with everyone 
(irrespective of who they are 
and/or where they stand in the 
hierarchy of the organisation). 
 Acts reactively and doesn't 
intentionally or proactively 
calculate the way emotions are 
expressed.  
C1: I think it’s a generalisation but I think sometimes your emotions 
can be ahead of your brain, if you know what I mean. So it’s often a 
retrospective acknowledgement rather than a prospective. I mean, 
you don’t go into a meeting thinking “gee, I’m going to really 
behave like this or behave like that.” The situation creates an instant 
emotion and a response. So that’s why I say it’s often a retrospective 
analysis and you think “Gee, that made me angry or that made me 
this or that made me that.” I think it’s quite difficult, maybe some 
people can do it, to manufacture the emotions, because it’s just an 
intrinsic response. 
 
C2: I’ve been working as a manager, leader for (…). You know I’ve 
got a repertoire of how you respond to all of those various situations 
and I suppose that, so people that (…) and I admire this in them, they 
actually practice the speech before they have it with people. And I 
don’t do that (…); as I said I don’t do this very well. I am not that, I 
know how things are going to end. You know so we just need to start 
at the beginning and we just work through and that’s how it’s gonna 
end. You know, whereas the people (…) they would have a practice 
conversation to think through all of those possible situations while I 
“fly by the seat of my pants.” 
 
C3: So if I have two meetings in a day (…) I don’t think “Oh, okay, 
this person’s a little bit tricky, I need to be like this or that 
person’s…” because that would just add another layer of complexity 
to an already complex job. So, it’s not a premeditated sort of 
emotional sound check before everyone comes in. You just have to 
deal with it and respond and hopefully the response is always 
measured and consistent and they feel comfortable that you won’t go 
off the handle or be ridiculous or start crying. So it just creates a 
comforting communication.  
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C4: There are instances where you need to argue a certain case for 
something, maybe something that’s happened and you need to argue 
to say “Well, this is why I did it like this” and you explain the 
circumstances and some of them might have been anything like, you 
might have talked about the sort of emotional context of something, 
but that’s more about influencing people around rather than a 
personal goal. I mean, again, some of the questions pre-suppose a 
conscious plan around manipulating emotions. I think maybe people 
do that intuitively but do I think, “Okay, today I’m going to work it 
like this so I can get a promotion?” No, I don’t think so. 
 
C5: I think part of being a leader is that you have some consistent 
behaviour and that includes how you react emotionally. So if I’m 
talking to someone I supervise or I’m talking to a (…), the 
interaction is the same. I don’t try and show less or more emotion 
because then people regard you as fairly stable. I like staff that I 
work with to think that they can have a sort of consistent approach to 
the way we communicate. So I’m not up one day and down the next 
or you know, they don’t know how – “what is [he/she] going to be 
like today? Is [he/she] going to be cross or is [he/she] going to be 
this?” You know, you want to have a stable work environment where 
people feel they can approach you on any day about any matter and 
that they will have a reasonable response.  
  
4.2 Deliberate 
expression 
 Demonstrates an awareness of 
the way emotions are expressed. 
 Consciously expresses emotions 
and alters the emotions 
expressed according to 
circumstances and/or the 
category of people with whom 
there is an interaction. 
C6: You learn a lot of skills and so part of that is the more you learn 
about (…) emotions, and listening to people and using the language 
that they use back to them, the greater impact I have. And I have 
never used it inappropriately (…) in that example I just gave you, 
I’m conscious of what I need to do with emotion (…) I was 
conscious that that’s what I had to do (…) what I had to do to build 
them up and how, I built them up in steps. And I was conscious of 
how I needed to make people feel and what I expected and I was 
conscious while I watched them, what impact I was having. So I use 
it very much and in that situation. 
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C7: I don’t think you ever quite go into a conversation without 
putting some thoughts into how we are going to approach this. In 
fact I probably prefer to make a call than to receive one because 
when you receive the call you don’t have you know those few 
moments of thought about “how am I going to approach this.” So 
often when you receive a call, the first interaction is about getting a 
bit of time to think about this person, this is some of the issues 
facing, what are they going to ask me about, and what sort of the 
response. 
 
C8: Your peers you would, you know, you would be more open in 
your expression of emotion. You’d be less controlled, you’d be, you 
know, sort of, yeah, you’d just be less controlled. When you’re 
feeling frustrated you would probably express it with your peers, or 
people that you’re working closely with; whereas you wouldn’t let 
that show when you’re dealing with the part of the institution that 
you’re feeling frustrated with.  
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Table 5. Type of motivation 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations  
5.1 Motivation  
self-focused 
 Regulates his/her own emotions 
in order to protect his/her 
reputation and to display 
emotional strength. 
 Enjoys specific elements of the 
job such as financial gain, 
status, respect or admiration 
from others, feeling powerful. 
 Places importance on feeling 
respected by others and/or being 
recognised as successful. 
 Uses emotions to make his/her 
work life easier (e.g., achieving 
diminished or more manageable 
workload). 
 Views emotions as a tool for 
personal gain. 
C1: Well, it comes back to be seen as competently doing my job and 
doing my job well. So, to have a reputation for doing things, to 
getting the job done. That’s all. That’s all I want, because I’ve been 
given a job and I want to be able to do it.  
 
C2: I think that’s all that we’ve been talking about, is I go to work 
for a reason. I go to work to be successful, to have fun, to make 
money and enjoy myself mostly by and large, and meet a lot of 
people. So, it’s just a tool for everybody, every day. 
 
C3: Because, hmm, the money indeed. You know I look at the award 
and who get paid the most that would be the director of …, that’s 
what I wanna be (…) I notice that when I moved in the last (…) I 
took many jobs where I didn’t have many responsibility and I notice 
that my behaviour (…) is different when I don’t have it because I like 
being in charge. I like actually have a bit of a plan about how the 
world is gonna go and watching that unfold so I like it and yeah so 
hmm so that’s why. Is it a power thing? Yeah probably it is a power 
thing. 
 
C4: Well, by them performing well, indirectly does impact me. And 
if they perform badly it ultimately impacts me because ultimately I 
am responsible for the whole project. So yes, I mean, there is an 
indirect benefit in making sure that (…) at the very minimum have 
what it takes for them to perform well, and if it keeps going, if it just 
doesn’t happen then it’s time to replace them.  
 
C5: (…) instead of just not bothering, maybe they say “Oh, I’ll finish 
that tomorrow,” then they’ll stay an extra 10 minutes and finish it 
today, and their outputs are reliable and complaints are less. It makes 
my life as a manager much easier. (…) It removes some of the 
direction that I have to give because if I have established (…) who 
want to (…) independently and do it well and they’re committed to 
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it, that simplifies my role; whereas if they were ineffective and their 
inputs (…) were smaller, then I would have to do more supervision, 
more direction, more control. 
 
C6: To get people to help me and to build the kinds of relationships I 
need to in my (…) role, at least for a start. Then I think that (…) I 
will need to be back on my game and confident and know my stuff, 
but in (…) I know I’m going to need to rely on other people.  
 
5.2 Motivation 
others-focused 
The motive for valuing emotions is: 
 Working towards a common 
goal. 
 Building positive relationships. 
 Fulfilling others’ expectations 
of what the leadership role 
entails. 
 Achieving organisational goals. 
 Developing others. 
C7: Well, I think I definitely use that when achieving a collective 
goal. If (…) then I’ll do everything I can to make sure that they are 
motivated, understand why we have to do it, understand the risks of 
not doing it, understand the rewards for all of the team by achieving 
it. So certainly when it comes to collective goals, yep, then you use 
whatever skills you have, be it trying to engage people’s emotional 
drivers for the work.   
 
C8: Well, because I think that people expect leaders to be in control. 
Can you imagine if someone’s going into battle somewhere – and 
I’m not saying this is – don’t get me wrong with what I’m saying – 
but imagine if you’re actually going to be heading into a warfare 
situation and the General’s running around in circles not knowing 
what he’s going to do; losing his head and screaming and carrying on 
or crying or whatever in the corner, or giving the impression that he 
doesn’t know what is going on, everyone else crumbles underneath. 
The same sort of thing happens in any position of leadership; 
whether it’s a corporate position, whether it’s a mother trying to get 
all the children together to make sure they’re doing the right thing, or 
whether it’s a Principal in a school, because people look up to them 
to do that. 
 
C9: As I said, I want this place to be better than when I left. 
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C10: My (...) was doing this (…) that I’d encouraged [him/her] to 
do, and [he/she] was – I could tell, [he/she]’s not somebody who 
deals well with emotion, but I could tell that [he/she] was anxious 
about that, and I needed to be confident and focused on [him/her] for 
[him/her] to feel good about [his/her] (…). And if I had have gone 
out and been distracted or emotional or – it just wouldn’t have 
allowed [him/her] to do the best job that [he/she] could. And for 
[him/her] briefing our (…) has a really big impact so [he/she] needs 
to be really positive and upbeat and on message because that 
experience then has an effect on (…) people. I needed to kind of go, 
“say this, do this,” really get [him/her] in the right headspace. And I 
knew that if my emotions were interfering with that, I wouldn’t have 
been able to help [him/her] in the way I needed to. 
 
5.3 Motivation 
of other leaders 
 
1x1= positive 
perception of 
other leaders’ 
motives 
 
1x0 = negative 
perception of 
other leaders’ 
motives 
 
 
0x0 = mixed 
perception of 
other leaders’ 
motives 
 
The leader: 
 Critiques (positively and/or 
negatively) the leadership style 
of other leaders. 
 
 Compares his/her motives with 
the motives of other leaders who 
are part of the same field or part 
of other fields. 
C11: Perhaps sometimes they’re risk takers. They certainly are good 
listeners. I think they have a capacity to read people and understand 
people. I think they have empathy. (1x1). 
 
C12: I don’t think people are very self-aware. They get very annoyed 
when they don’t get what they want and become quite emotional. It 
doesn’t sort of get them anywhere but they make a lot of noise and 
sometimes they get what they want because they make a lot of noise 
and I’ve seen that quite a lot (…) there are people I’ve worked with 
before who (indistinct) will walk on broken glass to get what they 
want. And if that includes manipulating other people, then that’s 
what they’ll do and that could be to the point of ingratiating 
themselves, being the best of friends with someone until they get 
what they want and you don’t hear from them again. And I’ve 
certainly been around people like that, male and female. (1x0). 
 
C13: Frankly, I think the majority of people (…) are there because 
they really are, that’s what they want to do, they’re committed to it, 
they believe in (…), but there’s a small number of people that just 
actually want to be able to be called (…), whatever the case may be 
and say “I’m really important because I am (…), you’ve got to 
acknowledge me first.” I couldn’t care less. I couldn’t care less if I 
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went to a meeting and people say “Would you like to speak?” I say 
“No, not necessarily.” Some people get really offended. “I’m (…) I 
should be able to speak.” They get upset if they don’t get 
acknowledged. I don’t. It doesn’t bother me. It doesn’t really bother 
me. It doesn’t really. If it does, you really are there for the wrong 
reason but there are some people like that. I mean, there are some 
megalomaniacs in life. Some people are just like that. (0x0). 
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Table 6. Satisfaction with leadership style 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations  
6. Satisfaction 
with own 
leadership style 
 
1x0 = negative 
self-perception 
 
1x1 = positive 
self-perception 
 
 
 
 
The leader: 
 Expresses remorse about a past 
situation that he/she judges was 
not effectively handled. 
 Identifies areas for improvement 
with regard to his/her own 
leadership skills. 
 Discusses his/her current 
leadership style in a positive 
way. 
 
 
C1: In retrospect, I shouldn’t have made the remark I did (…) I 
should have (…) we would just chat about it. And here is the way I 
said “I am the manager and (….) and this is what I want to happen 
and it’s not optional (…).” (1x0). 
 
C2: I think in terms of reading people’s emotions, I am quite ok at 
that. In terms of regulating my own emotions, I think I am getting 
better at that. And I think it’s one of those things that as we journey 
through life, we get better. For me, I’ve picked up some, you know 
the triggers that I feel get me worked up or that I recognise a sign of 
when I am doing that. I am thinking about disengaging from content 
and thinking about process, so that’s you know ongoing learning 
experience. You know I don’t think anyone is ever perfect at it 
because we have so many different types of personalities and people 
in the world just when you think you’ve got it all sorted out there can 
be some cultural aspect coming (…) I think I am more aware of that 
now (…) So, in terms of the staff that I manage, I think I am 
reasonable at detecting; in terms of regulating that in the people I 
supervise, I never for a moment suggest that I am into controlling 
people. Working with their emotional state more than happy to do 
that but I don’t want to control. (1x1). 
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Table 7. Personal goal 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations  
7.1 Current  
personal goal 
 
 Moving up the hierarchy. 
 Achieving organisational goals. 
 Maintaining positive alignment. 
 
C1: It’s very clear within the company as to what is required to get 
to the next level. It’s laid out, but the question is do I want to stay on 
within the company or do I move? That’s something I’m still 
working on right now, in my head, but I definitely do want to move 
up career-wise, be promoted, be the head of a big business unit or a 
corporation. 
 
C2: It’s very simple. The objective is (…) and everything has to be 
tested against what will be the most productive thing to do for (…). 
And then it’s always pretty clear what has to be done. I just keep 
focused on the prime objective, which is to get (…) done and not on 
my personal likes or dislikes or whether I’m cheesed off or not.  
 
C3: To have a sense of fullness and wholeness, and that sort of a 
vaguish answer to a sort of vaguish question. Get promoted or get 
more money, no I don’t. I do care about those things but I don’t lie 
awake at night thinking about how can I get promoted. I don’t 
believe in doing those career maps that people have talked about. 
You know “in 2 years I’ll be here, and in 3 years I’ll be there and I 
am going to be this.” I have always in my working life, I will always 
derive joy from what I do and enjoy what I do. If I am not enjoying 
what I do I will do something else. 
 
7.2 Personal 
goal evolution 
 When past goals and current 
goals differ due to an evolution 
in their focus (e.g., past goal: 
building own reputation; current 
goal: developing others). 
C4: I have forgotten the academic who wrote this, different phases 
of your career where you know…at school, you may be studying, 
and the middle part of your career where you tend to be much more 
competitive. And then you are going to the third part or to the fourth 
part of your career where you are transitional; you tend to be 
promoted when you are doing well. And then you move to the part 
of your career, which I am in now, where the personal gain is not 
important. It’s more important that other people get credit for things 
than me; I’ve had enough. I know I can do the job well. I don’t need 
people to be patting me on the back or giving me awards. It’s more 
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important to me to help other people in the middle parts of their 
career to get on. So, that’s a driver for me. 
 
C5: I’ve kind of achieved most of the things I wanted. To get to a 
higher level was one, to get national recognition for what I was 
doing, to get international recognition, so I’ve done some (…) work, 
and that’s all good. They were sort of the big goals I had and I’ve 
ticked those off, so I’m kind of going more back now and trying to 
develop people. That’s more satisfying now. 
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Appendix D. Secondary coding of leader transcripts (subcategories of motives) in Study 1 
Note. Citation codes – C1, C2, C3, etc. – are not fixed here and serve to distinguish the text units.  
 
Table 1. Self-focused motivations 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations 
Status-related 
benefits 
 Interest in promotion, in power 
(e.g., opportunities to impact 
and influence), in income. 
C1: The last promotion that I got was in (…). Not even (…). So I’ve 
just swapped job to get a better one now, that’s what I do. Hmm 
yeah money primarily. I mean you know as I say, it’s all the same, 
you know whether it’s (…) or whether it’s (…) or whether it’s (…). 
I’ve done all of them and it’s all the same. 
 
C2: In terms of power or hierarchy, that doesn’t bother me except 
your ability to influence. So, the position I hold now allows me to 
have it – the factor I mentioned about having impact and having 
meaning in my work. If I sat somewhere lower down in the 
organisational structure, my ability to influence and impact as I do 
today would be diminished. 
 
C3: If there were no opportunity to be promoted then I wouldn’t be 
in the role. I wouldn’t be happy about it. Because there is no way up. 
There is no next step. You stagnate at a point where you are good at 
what you do, hopefully you’re good at what you do, but what that 
means is probably incremental salary, but there is no recognition by 
the next step, by giving you a promotion. 
 
External 
approval 
 Concerns about one's 
image/reputation. Desire to be 
perceived as being professional. 
C4: I guess if I’m covering up anger, it’s generally to make sure that 
I don’t damage my personal image, I suppose, or maybe damage a 
relationship that might be important within the organisation. Do you 
know what I mean? 
 
C5: Well it comes back to be seen as competently doing my job and 
doing my job well. So, to have a reputation for doing things, getting 
the job done. That’s all. That’s all I want, because I’ve been given a 
job and I want to be able to do it. That’s my only personal goal.   
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Self-
actualisation 
 Achieving personal goals, 
concretising one's vision and 
ideas (including extracting 
information from others to 
achieve the vision). 
C6: What do I like most about being a leader? I like being able to 
see my vision come to life, in a way that I see it. Obviously that 
challenges at all points. You’ve got (…) who challenge you rightly 
on how you achieve the vision, which is fair enough. They are valid 
points, but I think that’s probably the biggest thing, where as a leader 
you have a vision of how it is to be shaped, and you have the ability 
to shape it and be able to influence other people in your team to 
work towards that common objective.   
 
C7: To get people to help me and to build the kinds of relationships I 
need to in my (…) role, at least for a start, then I think that (…) I will 
need to be back on my game and confident and know my stuff, but in 
(…) I know I’m going to need to rely on other people. 
 
C8: So I can see that the thoughts I have, the advice I give, the 
strategies I come up with, I see them flowing through the business 
and I like to see that impact, that it’s applicable, that it has results. 
And I like the intellectual challenge of working with a business of 
such (…) scale, with a (…) team and getting results. So you have to 
think about what do we do, how do we do it, so there’s a good kind 
of problem solving element to my role that I enjoy, getting things 
done under difficult circumstances, I guess. 
 
Self-satisfaction  Pride, sense of achievement, 
feeling successful, having fun. 
C9: Well that probably makes me think I am doing a good job. So 
there’s probably an element of selfishness in that. 
 
C10: I think that’s all that we’ve been talking about, is I go to work 
for a reason. I go to work to be successful, to have fun, [“to make 
money” but was coded as “status-related benefits”], and enjoy 
myself mostly by and large, and meet a lot of people. So, it’s just a 
tool for everybody, every day. 
 
Meaning  Alignment with own 
personality, fulfilment of 
spiritual needs, authentic 
interest in the characteristics of 
C11: So that’s a given. If you’re not enjoying – I mean, no one gets 
into (…) for the money, that’s for sure. You really have to want it. 
You really have to need to do it. It’s not enough to want to do it. You 
have to really – it has to be something that you need to do to, I don’t 
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the job. know, to just to be true to yourself and have some self-respect. So 
that’s emotion. 
 
C12: I think that power and control and hierarchy only matter to me 
in the sense that they can achieve this level of impact and meaning 
that I can see in my work.  
 
Self-
preservation 
 Protecting one’s current position 
and/or health. Easing one’s life 
(e.g., avoiding conflict), 
maintaining one’s lifestyle. 
Having a sense of duty to care 
for oneself; importance given to 
self-esteem and self-respect. 
C13: (…) there’s probably a few but one that comes to mind is (…) 
my feelings were fairly strong, but I knew that that person would 
hold my career in their hands and provide any opportunities that I 
might need if [he/she] made this decision and that decision was out 
of my hands, so rather than destroy that relationship and have 
[him/her] not care about me at all, it was better to refrain and hold 
back the anger. I just held it within and just tried to, without joining 
[his/her] side, just take a negative approach – not a negative 
approach – a neutral approach. 
 
C14: It removes some of the direction that I have to give because if I 
have established (…) who want to (…) independently and do it well 
and they’re committed to it, that simplifies my role, whereas if they 
were ineffective and their inputs (…) were smaller, then I would 
have to do more supervision, more direction, more control. 
 
C15: Well by them performing well, indirectly does impact me, and 
if they perform badly it ultimately impacts me because ultimately I 
am responsible for the whole project. So yes, I mean, there is an 
indirect benefit in making sure that (…) at the very minimum, have 
what it takes for them to perform well, and if it keeps going – if it 
just doesn’t happen then it’s time to replace them. 
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Table 2. Others-focused motivations 
Codes Guiding definitions Representative citations  
Meeting 
leadership 
expectations 
 Meeting others' expectations of 
what the leader's role entails. 
Having a sense of duty with 
regard to meeting these 
expectations (e.g., to inspire, to 
be emotionally regulated). 
C1: Well because they see you as the leader. They follow you for a 
reason and they want to see confidence, they want to see optimism, 
they want to see a vision, a strategy, a place to go. But they by and 
large don’t want to see – think of a leader of the country that is a 
nervous anxious mess, well they won’t be a leader of the country for 
long. 
 
C2: I think another way that you control emotions in the workplace 
is that, you know, there’s a responsibility for you to always be, if 
you’re in a leadership position, to be, you know, in a positive frame 
of mind, and welcoming, and, you know, to give people the attention 
that they’re looking for. You know, even if it’s the, I’ve got a long 
day, the 6th event you’ve been to in a day, it’s important not to let 
that show. So you know, tiredness or um, you know concern over a 
particular issue or a sense of being rushed and worrying about what 
you’ve got to do next or what you need to do for the next day, you 
know, you do need to control those emotions as well. 
 
C3: I think it’s just, as I say, that resilience thing is just something 
that you need as an individual in all aspects of your life. You 
particularly need it in a competitive area of (…) because like (…) 
most business is competitive. You win some, you lose some, and on 
the occasions when you sort of lose, I think it’s important that you 
sort of show them behaviours that are consistent with that, with 
resilience and I guess you show them behaviours that you hope 
might be good influences rather than bad influences. 
 
Preserving/ 
fostering others’ 
wellbeing 
 Caring about others' overall 
wellbeing and happiness. 
Valuing others’ work-life 
balance. Attempting to prevent 
the experience of negative 
feelings in others. 
C4: I think if I’d gone in as a pure authoritarian, I could have told 
[him/her] what I wanted and walked out. But I could see [he/she] 
was upset so I told [him/her] what I wanted, but then discussed it 
with [him/her] and talked about how [he/she] felt and told [him/her] 
that I respected everything else that [he/she] does, and made sure 
[he/she] was okay by the end of it. So I didn’t just leave [him/her] 
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feeling bad about [himself/herself] and that [he/she]’d broken a rule. 
I made sure I patched up our relationship first, if that makes sense. 
 
C5: Managing the emotion helps address specific issues, but at the 
same time, I’d be very careful to some sense, from my personal 
opinion, that I want to make sure I understand how people feel and 
that they are comfortable being emotional. Because I guess the 
biggest thing around the places I work is the fact that I truly do focus 
on the work-life balance and if people are stressed and don’t like 
coming to work, go home with a sense of not having accomplished 
anything, they’re frustrated, well, that carries on in the trip home, the 
family situation; and then in the family situation the family might 
say, “Well, what are you there for?” And that’s a big question 
because why would you work somewhere if you don’t enjoy it or 
you’re not making a contribution or you don’t feel good about it. So 
I want to make sure in that sense that I manage the emotions to the 
extent that it has a positive impact on people’s work-life balance and 
their role at work. 
 
Developing 
others 
 Creating opportunities for others 
to develop their own 
competencies and/or to evolve 
in the organisational hierarchy 
(or elsewhere). Providing 
support to others (e.g., 
resources, time, guidance, 
direction, inspiration) to help 
them accomplish their assigned 
tasks. 
C6: The biggest one is giving away my knowledge. I think that’s the 
reason – I like to think that’s the reason that leaders – that’s what 
they aspire to, why they rise, because people recognise that they 
have something that they can offer that others can’t. That there’s 
something that people see in that leader that they might not see in 
other people. And I mean, since we’re talking about emotions, it’s 
also I believe how the leader makes the organisation come together 
and how everybody feels about being there. And as corny as it might 
sound, I would love to know that people wake up in the morning and 
go “I get to go back and work at (…) today and I can’t wait to get on 
that bus and get there.” You know? So I’m sure there aren’t many 
people that do that every day but I know there’s some that do it some 
days and that’s the starting point. I think it’s about me developing 
more leaders, better leaders, people that can take words and wisdom 
from me and understand the skills I’ve used and hopefully acquire 
some of those so that they become better at what they do.  
 
  188 
C7: If I don’t necessarily respect that person professionally, it comes 
back to making sure that they’re alright so that they can do what’s 
required for them to achieve their objectives.  
 
Advancing 
organisational 
goals 
 Concerns about business 
prosperity. Desire to increase 
organisational performance. 
Focus on team effectiveness, 
productivity. 
C8: They’re more likely to be committed to the organisation and 
effective in their work if they have a sense that people in leadership 
positions are, you know, communicating to them in a way that 
inspires their confidence in the institution. 
 
C9: I think if you can recognise that something is emotionally either 
difficult for a person or how they’re made up in terms of how 
emotions play a part in their character, it’s much more easy to read 
them, to know where they’ll do well, to know where they’ll struggle, 
and to, I suppose, to help – I find it helps me as a leader and a 
manager of people if I can actually understand emotionally where 
they’re at and what buttons I can press or not press too, to get the 
best out of them. 
 
Social 
connectedness 
 Connecting/socialising with 
others. Valorising 
communication, groups, and the 
social culture. 
C10: There’s a connection about it, probably not necessarily direct, 
like I interact with my staff in a way that maintains a good 
relationship and a good rapport but that’s about the ongoing 
relationship because we’ll probably all be working together for 5 
years, 10 years, for an extended period. It’s not about “Oh I’ll work 
well with them so my reputation is good.” That’s not what it’s about.  
 
C11: There is a strong collegial spirit within the group and I think 
(…) it is something that we discuss about continuing the fostering of 
the collegial spirit so that people feel part of a team, part of a 
discipline group as (…) managers, have an identity and regarded as 
you know doing a good job and we’ve developed you know a 
philosophy of having you know clear, open, honest discussions with 
people, clear, open, honest discussions on pricing of the services we 
provide so we’ve got nothing to hide (…) that’s what we do with our 
staff as well so it becomes a mantra, a philosophy that runs through 
the group. 
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C12: As part of your everyday work you’ve got to control emotion 
and you also then use it to build bonds with people, to bring people 
on so they’re part of the same team, and we’re all working together 
to achieve a goal, you know, that’s all about using emotion. It’s 
about eliciting, or triggering or generating shared emotion, you 
know, it’s a sense of empathy that builds up in groups. 
 
Altruistic 
values/ 
aspirations 
 Concerns about society, the 
future of human kind. Having a 
strong sense of justice. 
C13: I know this sounds very, very cliché and very, very predictable 
but I wanted to make a difference, and I know people will go “Er, 
that’s another (…).” That’s what it was. I mean (…) I’m not going to 
construct something for the sake of it. I wanted to make a difference 
because I believed in it.   
 
C14: I wanted (…) to have a first world-class capability in this new 
field. And we got that, double.  
 
C15: It’s not so much what’s at stake. I think it’s more when I feel 
people are being just unreasonable. So, if I feel, and you know this 
happens I suppose reasonably regularly in a negotiation. You’ve put 
a considered position, what you’re asking for is in your view not 
unreasonable and then you get this response from the other side 
usually which is just a brush off, or we can’t do it or whatever. And 
it’s then when you feel that the arguments and the logic are all just 
being ignored and you’re just getting no – it’s not a two-way street. 
It’s just a sort of dictated thing, which – and when you say is it 
something that’s at stake? It’s probably more something that’s at 
stake for my clients than for me. So where I feel that my client might 
be being taken advantage of, that’s when I can feel my blood 
pressure sort of going – only because I think that the other side are 
being unreasonable in their approach. So I guess it’s, as I say, it’s 
more what’s at stake for my client than for me that usually affects 
my emotions. 
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Appendix E. Organisation chart used in Study 2’s in-basket experiment 
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Appendix F. Emails used in Study 2’s in-basket experiment (Conditions 1-4) 
Note. Underlined text = manipulation of personal goal pursuit (desirable vs. undesirable job offer) 
          Text in italics = manipulation of the presence of competitiveness (high vs. low) 
 
Condition 1 – C1= Personal Goal Pursuit (PGP) AND High Competitiveness 
 
EMAIL 3 
  
To:        National sales managers 
CC:       mary.hern@micro.com 
From:    HR@micro.com 
Date:     October 11, 2015 at 9:06AM 
 
Subject: Director Of Marketing Sales Position (Vacant next March)  
  
Dear all, 
  
         As you have been informed recently Howard Humphries is retiring next March. As a result, we 
are now recruiting for the position of Director of Marketing Sales and will start conducting interviews 
in December.  
 
Despite current budget issues, Howard is leaving a rich portfolio. Because of this, opportunities for 
development as well as international travels have been significantly augmented for the selected 
candidate. Income range for the position has also been augmented to 150-200K depending on bonuses 
gained, which represents a 40% increase of the current income you receive as National Sales Managers. 
 
The competition is open to all National Sales Managers. 
 
Note that the position will also be advertised to external candidates. As you know, is it a tradition at 
Micrometre Electronics to maximise our policy of openness to external applications in order to attract 
the best candidates. 
 
Please liaise with Mary Hern (cc-ed) for any questions. Mary is the main point of contact for any 
administrative details. She will forward further information shortly. 
  
Best of luck to all who decide to compete.  
  
Kind regards, 
  
Micheline Smith 
HR Officer 
Micrometre Electronics 
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Condition 2 – C2= PGP AND Low Competitiveness 
 
EMAIL 3 
 
To:      [First Name].[Last Name]@micro.com 
CC:     mary.hern@micro.com 
From:  HR@micro.com 
Date:   October 11, 2015 at 9:06AM 
 
Subject: Director Of Marketing Sales Position (Vacant next March) 
 
Dear [First Name of Participant],  
  
As you have been informed recently Howard Humphries is retiring next March. As a result, we are now 
recruiting for the position of Director of Marketing Sales and will start conducting interviews in 
December.  
  
Despite current budget issues, Howard is leaving a rich portfolio. Because of this, opportunities for 
development as well as international travels have been significantly augmented for the selected 
candidate. Income range for the position has also been augmented to 150-200K depending on bonuses 
gained, which represents a 40% increase of the current income you receive as National Sales Manager.  
  
If you are interested you are welcome to interview.  
  
Note that the position will not be advertised to external candidates for a while. As you know, our 
tradition at Micrometre Electronics is to value candidatures from our employees first and foremost and 
to limit external applicants. 
  
Please liaise with Mary Hern (cc-ed) for any questions. Mary is the main point of contact for any 
administrative details. She will forward further information shortly. 
 
Best of luck if you would like to interview. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Micheline Smith, 
HR Senior Officer 
Micrometre Electronics 
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Condition 3 – C3= No PGP AND High Competitiveness 
 
EMAIL 3 
  
To:        National sales managers 
CC:       mary.hern@micro.com 
From:    HR@micro.com 
Date:     October 11, 2015 at 9:06AM 
  
Subject: State Plant Controller Position (Vacant next March)  
  
Dear all, 
  
  
         As you have been informed recently Patrick Locke is retiring next March. As a result, we are now 
recruiting for the position of State Plant Controller and will start conducting interviews in December.  
  
Current budget issues have left Patrick with a small portfolio. Because of this, opportunities for 
development as well as international travels have been significantly reduced for the selected candidate. 
Unfortunately, income range has also been reduced to 70-90K depending on bonuses gained, which 
represents a 15% decrease of the current income you receive as National Sales Managers. 
  
The competition is open to all National Sales Managers. 
  
Note that the position will also be advertised to external candidates. As you know, is it a tradition at 
Micrometre Electronics to maximise our policy of openness to external applications in order to attract 
the best candidates. 
  
Please liaise with Mary Hern (cc-ed) for any questions. Mary is the main point of contact for any 
administrative details. She will forward further information shortly.  
  
Best of luck to all who decide to compete. 
   
Kind regards, 
  
Micheline Smith, 
HR Senior Officer 
Micrometre Electronics 
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Condition 4 (control) – C4= No PGP AND Low Competitiveness 
 
EMAIL 3 
 
To:        [First Name].[Last Name]@micro.com 
CC:       mary.hern@micro.com 
From:    HR@micro.com 
Date:     October 11, 2015 at 9:06AM 
  
Subject: State Plant Controller Position (Vacant next March)  
  
Dear [First Name of Participant], 
  
  
         As you have been informed recently Patrick Locke is retiring next March. As a result, we are now 
recruiting for the position of State Plant Controller and will start conducting interviews in December.  
  
Current budget issues have left Patrick with a small portfolio. Because of this, opportunities for 
development as well as international travels have been significantly reduced for the selected candidate. 
Unfortunately, income range has also been reduced to 70-90K depending on bonuses gained, which 
represents a 15% decrease of the current income you receive as National Sales Managers. 
  
If you are interested you are welcome to interview. 
  
Note that the position will not be advertised to external candidates for a while. As you know, our 
tradition at Micrometre Electronics is to value candidatures from our employees first and foremost and 
to limit external applicants. 
  
Please liaise with Mary Hern (cc-ed) for any questions. Mary is the main point of contact for any 
administrative details. She will forward further information shortly. 
  
  
Best of luck if you would like to interview.  
 
 
Kind regards, 
  
Micheline Smith, 
HR Senior Officer 
Micrometre Electronics 
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Appendix G. Measures administered in Study 2 
Emotional intelligence measure: Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002a)  
 
Four example items (one per branch) adapted from items available at www.eiskillsgroup.com 
 
 
                      Note. Photo substituted for reasons of copyright.
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Machiavellianism measure: Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS; Dahling et al., 2009) 
 
 
Amorality subscale 
3. I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others. 
8. The only good reason to talk to others is to get information that I can use to my benefit. 
9. I am willing to be unethical if I believe it will help me succeed. 
10. I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they threaten my own goals. 
11. I would cheat if there was a low chance of getting caught. 
 
Desire for Control subscale 
2. I like to give the orders in interpersonal situations. 
4. I enjoy having control over other people. 
10. I enjoy being able to control the situation. 
 
Desire for Status subscale 
1. Status is a good sign of success in life. 
2. Accumulating wealth is an important goal for me. 
8. I want to be rich and powerful someday. 
 
Distrust of Others subscale 
4. People are only motivated by personal gain. 
8. I dislike committing to groups because I don’t trust others. 
9. Team members backstab each other all the time to get ahead. 
10. If I show any weakness at work, other people will take advantage of it. 
11. Other people are always planning ways to take advantage of the situation at my expense. 
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Personality measure: Big Five Inventory-44 (BFI-44; John et al., 2008) 
Measure obtained from the Berkeley Personality Lab (www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~johnlab/bfi.htm) 
 
 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree that 
you are someone who likes to spend time with others?  Please indicate for each statement the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
 
 1 
Disagree strongly 
 2 
Disagree a little 
3 
Neither agree nor disagree 
4 
Agree a little 
5 
Agree strongly 
 
I am someone who… 
 
1. Is talkative 
2. Tends to find fault with others 
3. Does a thorough job 
4. Is depressed, blue 
5. Is original, comes up with new ideas 
6. Is reserved 
7. Is helpful and unselfish with others 
8. Can be somewhat careless 
9. Is relaxed, handles stress well. 
10. Is curious about many different things 
11. Is full of energy 
12. Starts quarrels with others 
13. Is a reliable worker 
14. Can be tense 
15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker 
16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm 
17. Has a forgiving nature 
18. Tends to be disorganized 
19. Worries a lot 
20. Has an active imagination 
21. Tends to be quiet 
22. Is generally trusting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Tends to be lazy 
24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
25. Is inventive 
26. Has an assertive personality 
27. Can be cold and aloof 
28. Perseveres until the task is finished 
29. Can be moody 
30. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
32. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
33. Does things efficiently 
34. Remains calm in tense situations 
35. Prefers work that is routine 
36. Is outgoing, sociable 
37. Is sometimes rude to others 
38. Makes plans and follows through with them 
39. Gets nervous easily 
40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
41. Has few artistic interests 
42. Likes to cooperate with others 
43. Is easily distracted 
44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature 
  198 
Cognitive ability measure: Wonderlic Personnel Test– Quicktest (WPT-Q; Wonderlic Inc., 2004) 
Sample questions (from the WPT but similar to the WPT-Q –  differences are: timing and number of questions) 
Retrieved from www.wonderlic.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/WPT-REnglishSampleQuestions.pdf 
 
 
1. Which of the following is the earliest date?  
A) Jan. 16, 1898     B) Feb. 21, 1889     C) Feb. 2, 1898     D) Jan. 7, 189     E) Jan. 30, 1889 
 
 
2. LOW is to HIGH as EASY is to  ? . 
J) SUCCESSFUL      K) PURE       L) TALL      M) INTERESTING      N) DIFFICULT 
 
 
3. A featured product from an Internet retailer generated 27, 99, 80, 115 and 213 orders over a 5-hour 
period. Which graph below best represents this trend? 
 
 
 
4. What is the next number in the series?   29    41    53    65    77    ?  .   
J) 75       K) 88  L) 89       M) 98  N) 99 
 
 
5. One word below appears in color. What is the OPPOSITE of that word?  
She gave a complex answer to the question and we all agreed with her. 
A) long  B) better  C) simple  D) wrong  E) kind 
 
 
6. Jose’s monthly parking fee for April was $150; for May it was $10 more than April; and for June 
$40 more than May. His average monthly parking fee was ? for these 3 months. 
J) $66   K) $160  L) $166  M) $170  N) $200 
 
Correct answers: 1. E, 2. N, 3. D, 4. L, 5. C, 6. M 
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Appendix H. Results of exploratory factor analysis of strategic behaviours items in Study 2  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and factor loadings for principal component analysis of the strategic behaviours 
with varimax rotation (N = 152) 
                     Factor Loadings  
               and Communalities 
  Mean       SD        SEB         SIB           h2 
Impression1    2.72 1.20 .83       .06                          -.68 
Impression2 2.90 1.24 .87         .10                        .76 
Impression3 2.64 1.22     .73       .07                        .53 
Deliberation1 4.24 1.02   -.06       .84 B                  .70 
Deliberation2 4.21 1.03     .21       .79                        .68 
Discretion    3.32   1.39  -.05            -.45          .21 
Note. Salient factor loadings (λ > .45) are shown in bold text. 
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Appendix I. Paired-samples t-tests of strategic behaviours SEB and SIB in Study 2 
           
Table 1 
Paired Samples Statistics (N=13 expert raters) 
 Mean  N    SD Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 SEB_Impression 4.15 13 1.03       .29 
SIB_Impression 1.92 13   .86       .24 
Pair 2 SEB_Discretion 2.33 13   .51       .14 
SIB_Discretion 2.18 13   .68       .19 
Pair 3 SEB_Deliberation 2.00 13   .69       .19 
SIB_Deliberation 3.00 13   .65       .18 
Pair 4 SEB_Internal 2.51 13   .90       .25 
SIB_Internal 2.64 13   .83       .23 
Pair 5 SEB_External 3.41 13   .73       .20 
SIB_External 2.05 13   .94       .26 
   Note. SD= standard deviation. 
 
 
Table 2 
Paired Samples Correlations (N=13 expert raters) 
                                                       N N    Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 SEB_Impression & 
SIB_Impression 
13        .00 .99 
Pair 2 SEB_Discretion & 
SIB_Discretion 
13       -.16 .60 
Pair 3 SEB_Deliberation & 
SIB_Deliberation 
13        .61 .03 
Pair 4 SEB_Internal & 
SIB_Internal 
13        .19 .53 
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Table 3 
Paired Samples Test of Experts’ Ratings of Strategic Behaviours Items for SEB and SIB (N=13) 
 
Paired Differences 
t df    Sig. (2-tailed) Mean SD 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% CI 
Lower     Upper 
Pair 1 SEB_Impression - 
SIB_Impression 
2.23 1.34 .37 1.42  3.04 5.99 12      .00 
Pair 2 SEB_Discretion - 
SIB_Discretion 
.15 .91 .25 -.40  .70   .61 12       .55 
Pair 3 SEB_Deliberation - 
SIB_Deliberation 
-1.00 .59 .16   -1.36  -.64 -6.08 12      .00 
Pair 4 SEB_Internal - 
SIB_Internal 
-.13 1.10 .31     -.79  .54 -.42 12      .68 
Pair 5 SEB_External - 
SIB_External 
1.36 1.05 .29      .72  1.99 4.67 12       .00 
Note. SD = standard deviation; CI = confidence interval; SEB = strategic external behaviours; SIB = strategic internal behaviours. 
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Appendix J.  Calculating ethicality: A proposed model for future research on SEI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
          
             
 
                        
  
                    
Note. SF= strictly self; SO= strictly others; MS= mostly self; MO= mostly others; E= equal for self and others. Cost = may be any types of 
resources consumed (e.g., time, mental resilience, financial investment).  
Across Columns A-E: Highest possible total score = 5; Lowest possible total score = 0. 
Intentions score (Column A) is always 1 as no judgement is made at this point (all intentions are equally valued). Latent & vivid (Column B)= 
always .25 (and a reduction of .25 subsequently applies to all other scores in other columns) and 1, respectively. Column C= scores vary from 
-1 to 1 as a function of the normality of the identity of the target who endures the cost (if I pursue a goal strictly for myself it is expected, from 
a purist perspective, that I strictly endure the cost). Column D = scores vary from -1 to 1 as a function of the amortisation of the cost endured. 
Column E= scores vary from -1 to 1 as a function of the logic of correspondence between the identity of the ultimate beneficiary and the 
identity of the beneficiary as originally intended (Column A) - only when no unexpected cost is caused and the goal is fully achieved. Scores 
in Column E vary as a function of Columns A and D if no unexpected cost is caused but the goal is not fully achieved. If an unexpected cost 
is caused and the goal is fully achieved, scores in Column E vary as a function of Columns A and C. If an unexpected cost is caused and 
the goal is not fully achieved, scores in Column E vary as a function of Columns A, C and D. If scores in Columns C and D are both negative, 
scores in Column E must be positive (an unexpected cost is caused, the goal is not fully achieved, but some unexpected benefits are created 
and that compensates for the general losses, irrespective - in this specific case - of whether or not the identity of the ultimate beneficiary 
corresponds to the identity of the beneficiary as originally intended). This model is a first draft hoped to inspire future research on SEI. 
 
A B C D E 
Goal-related intentions 
(To serve….) 
 
Goal awareness Impact of actions 
undertaken to achieve the 
goal during its pursuit 
(cost caused) 
Goal achieved Proportion of ultimate 
benefits (i.e., long-term 
benefits: from when a new 
goal is being pursued) 
SF SO MS  MO E   Latent Vivid   SF   SO MS MO E Nil  Partial Full   SF  SO MS  MO E 
1          1  1       1 1     
1          1  1      .50  .75     
1          1  1      -1     .50     
1               1  1          1  -1    
1          1  1           1   .75   
1          1  1          1    .25  
1               1  1       1     .50 
1          1   -1       1 .75     
1          .25   -.75    -.75    .25    
